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Abstract
Following no strict legal or institutional definition, restructurings relate to renegotiations of 
within the firm - as a nexus of contracts - combined agreements. This cumulative dissertation 
focuses on renegotiations that are triggered by financial distress and that are conducted with 
current or potential debt- and shareholders. In form of a literature review, the first manuscript 
systematizes the bargaining dynamics between existing capital providers and their influence on 
the choice for in- or out-of-court firm reorganizations in Germany and the United States. How the 
renegotiations of existing payment obligations are reflected in financial instruments accounting 
according to the IFRS and the capital structure of the distressed firm is further elaborated in a 
case-based instructional resource. The second part of the dissertation discusses restructurings 
through the acquisition of the distressed target. Specifically, the phenomenon of negative good-
will is studied that arises in business combinations with acquisition costs that are lower than 
the fair value of the targets’ net assets. For the exemplary case of Germany, manuscripts three 
and four examine the frequency, materiality and reasons for the by the IASB as anomalous ac-
claimed phenomenon together with investors’ reactions to such transactions.
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1. Introduction 
During the past three years that the underlying dissertation was prepared, the corporate crises 
of German Pellets, KTG Agrar, MIFA, MS Deutschland, Steilmann, Strenesse or Wöhrl – to 
name only a few – covered the German newspapers and drew special attention to the topic of 
“restructuring” (Schier, 2017). While indicative of no highly distressed market, the number of 
German corporate insolvency cases has followed a downward trend and reached its lowest 
level since 2009 (Creditreform, 2016), the topic is in the current low yield environment of 
great interest particularly among the alternative investment community (BCG, 2016).  
Also in the medium- to long run, experts expect restructurings to remain in the headlines as 
over the next five years a total of approximately 9.6 trillion dollar in rated corporate debt is 
maturing globally, whose refinancing could cause difficulties with lowered corporate bank 
lending due to tightened regulation, an uncertain political environment and slowly rising in-
terest rates at least in the US. Thus, the currently on the oil and gas-, shipping-, retail- or fash-
ion industry focused restructuring activities might broaden in the near future (BCG, 2016; 
Schwarzberg and Parker Deo, 2016; PwC, 2017; S&P Global Ratings, 2017). 
As the higher frequency of restructurings and bankruptcies in the latter sectors highlights, 
corporate crises can be triggered by industry-specific or economy-wide downturns, but also 
by internal causes such as fraud, mismanagement of operations or finances leading up to (an 
imminent) payment default. With the firm representing a nexus of contractual relations be-
tween for example employees, suppliers or investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), various 
renegotiation scenarios exist as potential countermeasures. However, the underlying disserta-
tion will focus on renegotiations with existing or potential debt- and shareholders thus relating 
to a distressed firm’s capital structure. Furthermore, restructurings via mergers into other 
firms will be studied with a specific sample of underpaid for acquisitions. 
Countermeasures relating to the operations of the firm, e.g. with cost cutting initiatives or 
strategic realignments, will not form part of the discussion although poor performance might 
next to a firm’s liabilities explain its liquidity problems. However, as Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1991) bring forward “no financial maneuvering can save these economically distressed 
firms” (p.1190). Therefore, underlying the first part of this dissertation will be the assumption 
that there are no better alternative uses of a distressed firm’s assets supporting its efficiency 
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and continuance, but excessive levels of (current) debt obligations make a restructuring nec-
essary (Lemmon, Ma and Tashjian, 2009; White, 1994).  
However, to what extent debtholders are willing to restructure and make concessions or even 
provide new financing depends on a diverse set of factors such as their level of impairment, 
their proportion of ownership, their homogeneity, their information asymmetries on the state 
of the firm or their bargaining positions in alternative in-court proceedings making restructur-
ings a very complex undertaking. Next to the funding considerations by individual groups of 
capital providers as well as their interrelations within a firm’s capital structure, there are many 
adjacent topics relating for example to the design of loan contracts and the inclusion of cove-
nants. As agreed upon contractual supplements, covenants allow lenders to better monitor the 
state of the firm, to receive vast control rights in case of their breach and to thus also trigger 
restructurings without an actual payment default being present. 
In the second part, the paradox phenomenon of negative goodwill will be examined character-
izing acquisitions of businesses for purchasing prices below their net asset values. Measured 
at fair value this means that the assets are not sold according to their “highest and best use” 
(IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement) rather suggesting a piecemeal liquidation instead of con-
tinuance via the merger into another firm. The reasons why such – according to the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB) – anomalous transactions (IFRS 3.BC371, 2008) 
still quite frequently prevail, how they are accounted for as well as how the market reacts to 
them will be further analysed. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the overall structure of this cumulative dissertation with the four manu-
scripts being equally distributed between part one, covering restructurings through renegotia-
tions with capital providers, and part two, clustering restructurings through acquisitions. 
Manuscript A (chapter II) thereby systematizes, in the form of a literature review, the bargain-
ing dynamics particularly between bank lenders, bondholders and alternative investors in in- 
and out-of-court reorganization settings in the US and Germany. Manuscript B (chapter III) 
applies these considerations to a realistic case scenario and on one hand discusses how the 
monitoring device of financial covenants and the restructuring toolset of debt-for-equity 
swaps are reflected in financial instruments accounting. On the other hand, the teaching re-
source shows how the classification or measurement of financial instruments affects a firm’s 
capital structure and funding strategy. Consequently, the latter manuscript is placed at the 
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interface between corporate finance and financial reporting as is illustrated by figure 1.2. 
Manuscript C (chapter IV) examines, in a descriptive analysis, the frequency, materiality and 
reasons for the phenomenon of negative goodwill. Manuscript D (chapter V) presents initial 
evidence for Germany on how the market values such business combinations and allows for 
inferences on the accounting treatment of negative goodwill also placing the paper at the in-
terface to financial reporting. 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Figure 1.2: Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Reporting 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
“Restructuring Under Distress: Essays on Corporate Finance and 
Financial Reporting”
I.
Part 1 
Restructuring via
Renegotiations
Part 2 
Restructuring via 
M&A
Manuscript A
“Capital Structure and the Choice 
Between In- and Out-of-Court 
Reorganization: A Literature 
Review”
II.
Manuscript B
“The Hardest Cycle Climb at 
TCC: A Financial Instruments 
Case”
III.
IV.
Manuscript C
“Frequency of and Reasons for 
Bargain Purchases: Evidence 
From Germany”
Manuscript D
“Does Underpayment Pay the 
Acquirer? An Event Study on 
Bargain Purchases”
V.
Corporate Finance Financial Reporting
Part 1 
Restructuring via 
Renegotiations
Part 2
Restructuring via 
M&A
Manuscript A Manuscript B
Manuscript CManuscript D
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2. Overview and Findings 
2.1 Capital Structure and the Choice Between In- and Out-of-Court Reorganiza-
tion: A Literature Review 
How does a distressed firm’s capital structure affect its decision for in- or out-of-court reor-
ganizations? Following the latter research question, the literature review systematizes an es-
pecially since the financial crisis growing body of academic studies for the US and Germany. 
Thereby, particular focus is placed upon the restructuring negotiations with bank lenders, 
bondholders and the increasingly involved group of alternative investors. While the early re-
organization literature proposes that the level of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs
1
 drive 
the decision for or, according to Haugen and Senbet (1978, 1988) particularly, against formal 
proceedings, Gilson (1997) suggests that there are also considerable transaction- and oppor-
tunity costs
2
 attached to out-of-court reorganizations making the procedural choice a cost-
benefit trade-off.  
To this trade-off, a distressed firm’s capital structure and the within it combined capital pro-
viders critically contribute (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein, 1994; Ivashina, Iverson and 
Smith, 2016). The “easiness” of negotiations with involved creditors (Demiroglu and James, 
2015) and their willingness for delaying or stepping down from part of their claims ultimately 
influences the feasibility of out-of-court reorganizations. Different factors thereby drive the 
negotiations with existing lenders such as their share in the overall funding of the firm, their 
seniority or collateralization and the associated wealth transfer effects from concession grants, 
their level of impairment, potential bias to liquidate the firm or their benefits from holding out 
of informal restructurings. 
                                                 
1
  Direct bankruptcy costs cover fees paid to lawyers, accountants and advisors as well as other administrative 
charges related to filing. Indirect bankruptcy costs are associated with expenses resulting from the adverse 
perception of bankruptcy, e.g. affecting consumers’ purchasing decisions, relations with suppliers or the re-
tention of key employees.  
2
  Transaction- and opportunity costs can result from under formal proceedings facilitated creditor coordination 
mechanisms such as standardized agenda- or majority voting rules. The latter are particularly important for 
renegotiations with bondholders whose indentures are difficult to change in out-of-court reorganizations giv-
en the rulings of the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and the German Debenture Law of 1899 (Schul-
dverschreibungsgesetz, revised in 2009). Furthermore, beneficial taxation treatments or liquidity facilitations 
via super-ordinated loans or automatic stay provisions can add to the out-of-court opportunity costs.  
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Further investigating the bargaining dynamics,
 
51 academic studies covering a US or German 
in- or out-of-court setting were filtered out of the research databank, Business Source Com-
plete, systematized with help of a detailed table and rigorously analysed as part of the manu-
script’s discussion. Moreover, the main characteristics of the US bankruptcy code of 1978 and 
of the new German insolvency statue, becoming effective in 1999, are presented as theoretical 
fundamentals that in defining the alternative to out-of-court reorganizations influence the 
overall bargaining dynamics to financial restructurings (Brown, 1989). 
Even though a rather recent literature review exists by Ayotte, Hotchkiss and Thorburn 
(2013), the latter authors focus on the individual, isolated interests of the in a restructuring 
involved stakeholders instead of discussing the complex interrelations between different 
groups of capital providers. Therefore, the underlying review represents a substantial contri-
bution to the existing literature, as it not only includes a comparative analysis between the US 
and Germany, but also channels a comprehensive set of theoretical as well as empirical stud-
ies that cover a distressed firm’s creditors, their bargaining dynamics and the ultimate feasi-
bility of out-of-court reorganizations. 
Despite the great number of studies particularly for the US, the analysis uncovers seven spe-
cific areas for future research with three for each country setting and one cross-country impli-
cation. For the US, the still ambiguous impact of bank debt,
3
 the exact role of alternative in-
vestors and the sparse body of recent theoretical literature covering the, with diverse capital 
providers, greater creditor control rights and widely filed prepacked bankruptcy proceedings, 
evolving bargaining dynamics stand out.  
For Germany, academic literature is relatively scarce and the identified empirical studies are 
focused on sample periods spanning the years from 1991 to 2004. Therefore, a general update 
on the relation would be desirable especially in light of regulatory changes such as the revi-
sion of the German Debenture Law in 2009 or of recent evidence provided by practitioners on 
a lower prevalence of the for Germany typical bank pools (Blatz, Kraus and Haghani, 2006) 
and on a higher importance of public debt restructurings (Dr. Wieselhuber & Partner, 2015).  
                                                 
3
  While the theoretical literature points out the low costs to negotiations with bank lenders, their insider status 
and the alternatively difficult negotiations with public debtholders, empirical research remains divided upon 
bank debt’s positive impact on out-of-court reorganizations. 
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The cross-country inference is based upon observations by Blatz et al. (2006), Undritz (2010) 
or more recently Geiwitz (2014). All authors emphasize that various, with the new German 
insolvency statue first introduced provisions such as the filing condition of imminent insol-
vency (§18 InsO) or the according to the role model of Chapter 11 drafted debtor-in-
possession-managed procedure (§270-285 InsO) are largely unused instruments in formal 
reorganizations. In order to raise awareness for these options, more comparative studies to the 
US and exemplary case studies of German in- as well as out-of-court reorganizations should 
be implemented by academia. In particular, such research could diminish the still prevailing 
stigma of insolvency, educate about negotiation scenarios and common restructuring toolsets, 
which are important to have at hand under the time-critical circumstances of financial distress. 
The paper was fully developed by the author of the dissertation herself and was submitted for 
publication to the journal, Management Review Quarterly (ISSN 0344-9327) (VHB-Jourqual 
3: C), in March 2017. Furthermore, the manuscript was published online as HHL Working 
Paper No. 162. 
 
2.2 The Hardest Cycle Climb at TCC: A Financial Instruments Case 
Responding to the above identified research area, this manuscript represents a teaching case 
study that is embedded in a realistic out-of-court reorganization scenario in Germany. The 
fictitious bicycle producer, The Cycle Company AG (TCC), is one of Germany’s leading 
companies in the industry aiming for an ambitious expansion into the electric bike segment. 
However, the growth strategy requires tapping different funding channels including a loan 
from the business development bank of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania as well as a financ-
ing via the capital markets. 
Whether the latter financial instrument must be classified as debt or equity, how it is meas-
ured and how it consequently affects TCC’s capital structure are all questions students be-
come in the course of the case study faced with. For their assessment, an in-depth and inte-
grated understanding of the by the IASB and its predecessor, the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC), defined reporting standards IAS 32 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation, IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosure 
becomes necessary. 
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In particular, students are made familiar with a set of financial terms such as step up clauses 
or perpetual maturities, their attached contractual obligations, their consequent accounting 
treatment and their economic consequences for the firm. Moreover, financial covenants are 
introduced being defined as contractual supplements that via agreed upon financial ratios and 
respective target levels inform about the borrower’s level of indebtedness, liquidity or profit-
ability. Next to their monitoring function, they can also trigger financial restructurings as a 
covenant breach grants the lender the right to cancel the loan without an actual payment de-
fault being present (Moir and Sudarsanam, 2007).  
The importance of financial covenants in German corporate debt financing, the most com-
monly underlying financial ratios and their reporting frequency were in preparation to the case 
study thoroughly examined in a collaboratively conducted survey with Roland Berger Strate-
gy Consultants (2014). Financial covenants’ high prevalence in Germany also past the finan-
cial crisis and their attached control rights were further discussed in articles published with 
the German journal, Der Betrieb (ISSN 0005-9935) (VHB-Jourqual 3: D), and in a presenta-
tion at the Annual Meeting of the Mergers & Acquisitions Alumni e.V. in September 2015 
(Zülch, Holzamer, Böhm and Kretzmann, 2014; Zülch, Kretzmann, Böhm and Holzamer, 
2015).  
Next to financial covenants, the, for financial restructurings and the reshuffling of the capital 
structure, essential tool of financial instruments exchanges is covered via a debt-for-equity 
swap. Within the case setting, the exchange is used to resolve TCC’s crisis state that originat-
ed from a misclassification of the newly raised capital instrument as debt, a combined with an 
operational underperformance triggered imminent financial covenant breach and the conse-
quent threat of loan repayment. The debt-for-equity swap can remedy the covenant breach and 
from a pedagogical perspective faces students with a reclassification exercise that is meant to 
improve their understanding for the interrelations between financial reporting and a firm’s 
capital structure. Moreover, students are asked to explain the transaction’s accounting treat-
ment according to IFRIC 19 Extinguishing Financial Liabilities with Equity Instruments and 
to reflect in detail upon the disclosure requirements of the with the exchange remedied finan-
cial covenant breach according to IFRS 7. 
Overall, the case follows an integrative teaching approach in that it combines the presenta-
tion-, measurement- and disclosure requirements of the complex financial instruments ac-
 Restructuring Under Distress, Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Reporting: An Overview 
 
 
9 
 
counting. Furthermore, the economic consequences of accounting decisions are highlighted 
that can even contribute to a corporate crisis as in the present case setting.
4
 The teaching de-
sign responds to the by Barth (2008) as well as Bianco, Levy, Marcel, Nixon and Osterheld 
(2014) identified need for an integrative teaching approach to accounting. While there are 
cases covering the accounting treatment of single capital measures such as stock buybacks 
(Kimmel and Warfield, 2008; Mohrmann and Stuerke, 2014) or preferred stock issuances 
(Margheim, Hora and Kelley, 2008), all to the authors’ best knowledge existing pedagogical 
resources focus on isolated financial instruments and their treatment instead of taking a 
broader approach to a firm’s capital structure.  
Especially for business students, a sound knowledge of the accounting- as well as finance 
technicalities and an integrated understanding of their interrelations should be highly relevant 
as they are likely to be confronted with such complex corporate scenarios in their potential 
advisory careers in the banking- or consulting sector. Given this purpose, the case was im-
plemented twice in an advanced accounting class of the full-time Master of Sciences program 
at the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. Key results of the after the in-class dis-
cussion conducted survey are that firstly case-based teaching was appraised as a beneficial 
learning experience; secondly the level of difficulty was despite the complex restructuring 
setting considered appropriate; thirdly the understanding for financial instruments accounting 
was considerably improved with the practical application and fourthly the integration of cor-
porate finance was highly appreciated. 
The manuscript was submitted to the journal, Issues in Accounting Education (ISSN 0739-
3172) (VHB-Jourqual 3: C), in November 2015. Based on the constructive feedback, the 
teaching resource was revised and submitted to the annual American Accounting Association 
Conference on Teaching and Learning in Accounting, where it was accepted for presentation 
in August 2016. After further in-class implementations, the paper was submitted to the jour-
nal, Corporate Ownership and Control (ISSN 1727-9232) (VHB-Jourqual 3: C), in February 
2017. Furthermore, the teaching resource was published online as HHL Working Paper No. 
160. 
                                                 
4
  The misclassification of the newly raised capital instrument ultimately resulted from significant misunder-
standings between TCC’s accounting- and finance department highlighting the importance of an integrated 
understanding. 
 Restructuring Under Distress, Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Reporting: An Overview 
 
 
10 
 
The manuscript has been co-authored by Henning Zülch and Daniel Voll. The idea of inte-
grating financial reporting and corporate finance in a restructuring case setting was collabora-
tively developed and implemented together with Daniel Voll through the preparation of the 
case manuscript, the teaching guidance, the recommended solutions as well as the in-class 
effectiveness tests. Henning Zülch provided supervision as well as mentoring throughout the 
complete process. 
 
2.3 Frequency of and Reasons for Bargain Purchases: Evidence From Germany 
In this manuscript, we examine the, by the IASB officially addressed to phenomenon of “bar-
gain purchases” also referred to as lucky buys or with regards to the value difference as nega-
tive goodwill or badwill. As the latter designations propose, the opposite logic to the widely 
known concept of “goodwill” applies, i.e. according to IFRS 3 Business Combinations when 
the under the acquisition method accounted for net asset value exceeds the acquisition costs in 
a business combination. While the IASB believes such transactions to be rare and anomalous, 
because “business entities and their owners generally do not knowingly and willingly sell as-
sets or businesses at prices below fair values” (IFRS 3.BC371, 2008), studies such as by the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2014) provide initial evidence that the 
phenomenon is especially for the IFRS reporting regime more common than logic would at 
first suggest. 
Despite its by the IASB acclaimed anomalous nature, great attention is placed upon the treat-
ment of negative goodwill becoming substantially changed with each revision of the respec-
tive accounting standards for business combinations. To provide the reader with the concep-
tual background on the controversy of the under IFRS 3, for all business combinations occur-
ring on or after March 31, 2004, introduced current treatment of negative goodwill as a day-
one profit, the manuscript starts off with an overview on the preceding standard and its vari-
ous revisions, i.e. IAS 22 (1983 / 1993 / 1998).
5
 
                                                 
5
 Broadly speaking, all treatments preceding IFRS 3 allocated negative goodwill over time instead of recogniz-
ing it as a day-one profit. Negative goodwill was accounted for either (1) by reducing the value of the ac-
quired nonmonetary assets with the rationale of realizing the gain upon their usage or sale, (2) by allocating 
income over a specified period of time or to a specific point in time when future losses and expenses were 
expected from the target, or through a combination of (1) and (2). For a more detailed discussion please refer 
directly to the manuscript.  
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Also the by the IASB from 2013 to 2015 conducted Post-implementation Review (PIR) on 
IFRS 3 (2008), included the accounting for negative goodwill as a main review area. Notwith-
standing several comment letters by international accounting standards boards and multina-
tional companies requesting a return to previous treatments (IASB, 2014), the IASB decided 
to maintain the current guidance. Next to the regular debate on the accounting for negative 
goodwill, its enforcement is of central interest with bargain purchases representing an explicit 
main focus area in the years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016 as defined by the German Financial 
Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP, 2016) also suggesting a higher than by the IASB ac-
credited relevance of the phenomenon. 
Given the great focus but inconclusive evidence on the phenomenon, the manuscript studies 
the relevance of negative goodwill transactions by examining their frequency, materiality and 
disclosed reasons. Our sample of potential negative goodwill acquirers is based upon the an-
nual composition of the main indices of the German stock exchange, namely the DAX30, 
MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX, in the years 2005 to 2013. Among the resulting 1,440 firm-year 
observations, 61 firm-years reveal 96 individual badwill transactions. Based on the outlined 
sample, the frequency analysis reveals that 4% of the yearly 160 largest listed firms in Ger-
many were confronted with the phenomenon of negative goodwill during the period of analy-
sis.  
One company particularly standing out is Arques Industries AG that before changing its strat-
egy under the name of Gigaset AG in 2010 focused on the acquisition of non-core businesses 
and restructuring targets. Furthermore, our observations suggest that negative goodwill trans-
actions are not only occurring more frequently than expected, but are also of high materiality 
amounting for our sample to an average negative goodwill of 20.9 million euro per transac-
tion and when compared to the acquirer’s operating income during the respective reporting 
period to an average ratio of 16%. 
With the substantial relevance of negative goodwill observed for our sample, the question of 
why such transactions arise comes up. For our analysis, we reviewed the comment letters 
submitted as part of the PIR (IASB, 2014) and developed a classification scheme based on by 
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the IASB (1) explicitly accepted reasons, i.e. bargain purchases,
6
 errors- or exceptions in 
recognition and measurement; (2) explicitly not accepted reasons, i.e. expectations of future 
losses and (restructuring) expenses;
7
 and (3) not mentioned reasons such as market condi-
tions.  
Based on the anecdotal evidence provided by the comment letters, we associate case scenarios 
to each of the outlined main categories that apart from specific accounting exceptions or dif-
ferent views on valuation often relate to some kind of restructuring setting, e.g. with a dis-
tressed company selling under time pressure in order to avoid insolvency, future expected 
restructuring expenses or extreme stock price downturns suggesting market participants’ ad-
verse outlook on the target. Also the 25% sample contribution by Arques Industries AG sup-
ports the relation between bargain purchases and the distressed nature of the acquiree. 
In a next step, we oppose the in the negative goodwill acquirers’ annual reports disclosed rea-
sons (according to IFRS 3.B64(n)(ii), 2008) and nature of the gain (according to 
IFRS 3.67(h), 2004) to our developed scheme. Unfortunately, only 26% of our sample pro-
vides meaningful disclosures uncovering significant non-compliance in the IFRS financial 
statements. However, for the transactions with explicit indications, we find an equal distribu-
tion between the number of disclosed reasons accepted by the IASB, notably all relating to 
bargain purchases, and unaccepted or not mentioned reasons. These results question the cur-
rent treatment of negative goodwill as a day-one profit as this approach is fully aligned to the 
reasoning of lucky buys (IFRS 3.BC150-156, 2004). 
The paper was first presented at the international conference Corporate Governance, Account-
ing and Audit: Crisis Challenges co-organized by Leuphana University and the publishing 
house Virtus InterPress in November 2015. During the conference, the paper was selected for 
publication in the journal, Corporate Ownership and Control (ISSN 1727-9232) (VHB-
Jourqual 3: C), in January 2016. 
                                                 
6
  The IASB further clarifies bargain purchases with instances “when the seller of a business wishes to exist 
from that business for other than economic reasons and is prepared to accept less than its fair value as con-
sideration” (IFRS 3.BC148(c), 2004).  
7
  Restructuring costs are according to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets often 
not recognizable, because the standard requires the acquiree to have a present, legally or factually binding ob-
ligation as a result of a past event that is more likely than not and can be reliably estimated. As there is usual-
ly no past event, which would mark a future restructuring, such provisions are not recognizable, but are con-
sidered in the purchasing price negotiations. 
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The manuscript has been co-authored by Henning Zülch and Torben Teuteberg. The research 
question and the definition of the corresponding data items were collaboratively developed by 
Torben Teuteberg and Josefine Boehm. The author of this dissertation was also responsible 
for the data collection being based on a thorough review of 74 annual reports and on comple-
mentary information from the databanks, S&P Capital IQ as well as Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Furthermore, the data analysis was conducted and the section “Empirical Evi-
dence” of the paper was written. Torben Teuteberg provided a second opinion on complex 
negative goodwill transactions during the data collection process and prepared the sections 
“Introduction”, “Conceptual Background” as well as “Conclusion and Avenues for Future 
Research” of the manuscript. Henning Zülch mentored and supervised the complete develop-
ment of the manuscript.  
 
2.4 Does Underpayment Pay the Acquirer? An Event Study on Bargain Purchases 
In the previous manuscript, we presented empirical evidence that negative goodwill is of a 
higher, than by the IASB suggested relevance. Furthermore, we highlighted the controversy 
on the nature of negative goodwill and its accounting treatment that was only recently docu-
mented again in the under the Post-implementation Review on IFRS 3 (2008) submitted 
comment letters (IASB, 2014). With the aim of providing a new perspective on the discus-
sion, whether negative goodwill represents a mere accounting phenomenon, this manuscript 
examines how investors of the acquiring firm perceive such transactions. 
In case investors appraise negative goodwill transactions as lucky buys and thus as actual un-
derpayments, more positive returns should be observable upon acquisition announcement. 
The relation between acquisition costs and acquirers’ announcement returns would be in line 
with Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), who for the contrary scenario suggest that buy-
ing firms usually overpay for the target and consequently realize low or even negative an-
nouncement returns. Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar and Travlos (2013) as well as Ang and 
Mauck (2011) support the latter authors’ proposal finding significantly negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for their samples of US listed acquirers in the years from 1990 to 2007 and 
1977 to 2008, respectively. 
Nevertheless, Comiskey, Clarke and Mulford (2010) studying a sample of 43 negative good-
will acquisitions by US listed firms between 2000 and 2007 do not find compelling evidence 
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for such a positive differential reaction. The authors call for further research under the State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 142 (Revised) introducing the recogni-
tion of negative goodwill as a day-one profit and the disclosure requirement for the reasons of 
the gain.
8
 Dunn, Kohlbeck and Smith (2016) follow this quest and study a sample of 182 US 
forced bank sales in the years 2009 and 2010. For a subsample of 52 acquisition announce-
ments by public acquirers, the authors find significantly positive announcement returns for the 
33 negative goodwill transactions and insignificant returns close to zero for the rest of the 
subsample.  
Despite the presented evidence on an apparent difference in investor reactions, Dunn et al. 
(2016) focus on a sample of forced sales that following the classification scheme developed 
by Boehm, Teuteberg and Zülch (2016) can be associated to bargain purchases. Given their 
sampling approach, it is therefore difficult to conclude that on average investors relate the 
occurrence of negative goodwill to lucky buys thus providing support for its treatment as a 
day-one profit. Consequently, we see the need for further empirical evidence and conduct an 
event study on a sample of 58 negative goodwill acquisitions by Germany’s yearly 160 largest 
listed firms in the years between 2005 and 2014.  
To test whether investors react on average more positively to the announcement of negative 
goodwill transactions than to a set of comparable transactions without badwill, we identify 
similar transactions with the matching criteria of acquirer size, -sector, relative transaction 
size and announcement year closely following Comiskey et al. (2010). In contrast to the latter 
authors, we indeed find evidence for a positive differential reaction between our two subsam-
ples. The difference in investor reactions particularly holds, when we exclude the negative 
                                                 
8
  SFAS No. 142(R) was developed in a joint-project with the IASB and introduced for all fiscal years starting 
on or after December 15, 2008. During the sample period examined by Comiskey et al. (2010), the Account-
ing Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 16 and later SFAS No. 141 had to be applied with both provisions 
accounting for negative goodwill by reducing the fair values of a set of qualifying assets. Any excess was ei-
ther amortized to income under APB Opinion No. 16 or treated as a day-one extraordinary gain under SFAS 
No. 141. 
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goodwill transactions together with their matched pairs that are according to the respective 
acquirers’ disclosures caused by adverse market conditions.9  
The observed effect for to market conditions related negative goodwill transactions is espe-
cially noteworthy as the IASB does not even mention such origins for the phenomenon. These 
transactions, however, are amongst the ones with the highest gains from negative goodwill 
and with the most negative investor reactions in our studied sample. For the rest of our obser-
vations, the on average significantly positive difference between the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns of the two subsamples indicates that investors indeed might perceive acqui-
sitions with badwills as more value creating. The presented evidence therefore suggests a rela-
tion between the occurrence of negative goodwill and actual bargain purchases. 
With our approach, we are, however, not able to draw any inferences on the total amount of 
negative goodwill ultimately being booked as a day-one profit in the acquirer’s income state-
ment. Moreover, we urge to undertake further research presenting larger sample evidence on 
market participants’ valuation of negative goodwill. The paper is currently in a working paper 
status and was published online as HHL Working Paper No. 163. It is the intention of the 
submitting candidate to further develop the manuscript together with members from the Chair 
of Accounting and Auditing at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management.  
The manuscript has been co-authored by Henning Zülch. The author of this dissertation for-
mulated the research question; hand-collected the negative goodwill transactions data for 
2014 in addition to manuscript 3; compiled the matching transactions and stock returns data 
with help of the databanks, LexisNexis, S&P Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters Datastream; 
prepared the analyses and wrote the paper. Henning Zülch provided valuable mentorship and 
supervision throughout the complete process. 
 
                                                 
9
  Adverse market conditions can lead to a negative goodwill, if during extreme market downturns the com-
bined value of the target’s shares lies below the fair value of its net assets. Furthermore, a negative goodwill 
can occur if the consideration transferred takes the form of a fixed amount of acquirer’s shares, whose value 
falls between the agreement- and closure date. With regards to the latter cause, the badwill is unlikely to be 
known in the announcement date and with regards to the former origin market participants have an adverse 
outlook on the target questioning a real bargain purchase.  
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1. Introduction 
With the firm representing a nexus of contractual relations between for example employees, 
suppliers, lenders or shareholders, renegotiations are part of the firm’s daily business opera-
tions, but become of acute importance during periods of corporate crisis (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976). Financial distress is thereby present when the firm’s liquid assets are (expected to 
be) insufficient to cover its current payment obligations on hard contracts
11
 such as bank loans 
or public bonds (Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian and Thorburn, 2008).
12
 To solve the liquidity 
problem, cash can either be generated through asset sales or through reductions or deferral of 
liabilities focusing the restructuring efforts on the firm’s capital structure (John, 1993). 
This paper will concentrate on the latter way of resolving financial distress. Restructuring the 
firm’s operations, e.g. via strategic realignments or cost cutting initiatives, will not form part 
of the discussion although poor performance might next to excessive debt obligations explain 
part of the firm’s liquidity problems. However, as Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) put it “no 
financial maneuvering can save these economically distressed firms” (p.1190). Therefore, 
underlying the discussion of this paper will be the assumption that there are no better alterna-
tive uses of a distressed firm’s assets supporting its efficiency and continuance, but with its 
high fixed financing costs debt renegotiations or a refinancing become necessary (Lemmon, 
Ma and Tashjian, 2009; White, 1994). 
With regards to the choice between in- and out-of-court reorganizations of the distressed firm, 
the early restructuring literature highlights the direct- as well as indirect costs to bankruptcy 
(e.g. Altman, 1984; Warner, 1977; Weiss, 1990).
13
 Given these additional costs, Haugen and 
Senbet (1978) point out that in-court reorganizations are not optimal and therefore should 
                                                 
11
  To the contrary, soft contracts contain no contractually binding payment obligations and cover financial in-
struments such as common or preferred stock. 
12
  Next to the presented flow-based definition of financial distress, the stock-based criterion of over-
indebtedness exists. However, as no payment default is present and also issues of measurement may prevail, 
no immediate restructuring may be triggered for US companies. Also for Germany, there are measurement 
uncertainties on over-indebtedness, which nevertheless classifies next to illiquidity as a insolvency filing re-
quirement. 
13
  Direct bankruptcy costs cover advisory fees paid to lawyers, accountants, investment bankers or trustees as 
well as other legal and administrative charges related to bankruptcy filing. Indirect bankruptcy costs are asso-
ciated with (1) decreases in sales and inventory values
 
due to adverse consumer perceptions or higher ex-
pected maintenance costs (Titman, 1984), (2) increases in operating costs due to employee retention pro-
grams or cancelled supplier contracts and (3) gradual declines in a firm’s competitiveness with managers’ 
time and attention being devoted to the bankruptcy proceedings (Weiss, 1990). 
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never be chosen. However, Gilson (1997) brings forward that there are also considerable 
transaction costs attached to out-of-court restructurings introducing a cost-benefit trade-off 
between the proceedings. These transaction costs may be related to institutional biases hinder-
ing public debt renegotiations out-of-court and introducing opportunity costs given in-court 
benefits such as simplified creditor coordination via majority voting rules, beneficial taxation 
treatments or liquidity facilitations via super-ordinated loans or automatic stay provisions.
14
 
Furthermore, the procedural cost-benefit trade-off seems to critically depend on a firm’s capi-
tal structure (e.g. refer to Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein, 1994; Ivashina, Iverson and 
Smith, 2016) and on the “easiness” of renegotiating with involved lenders (Demiroglu and 
James, 2015). A variety of factors appear to determine the negotiation costs as well as lend-
ers’ willingness for concessions including capital providers’ funding share, their level of col-
lateralization, their insider status or the complexity of the firm’s liability structure overall. Via 
a comprehensive literature review on the US as well as Germany the underlying paper will 
therefore examine what pre-restructuring capital structure characteristics determine the proce-
dural choice of reorganizations. 
Of special interest will thereby be the impact of bank lenders, who despite a large body of 
theoretical as well as empirical literature are still attested an ambiguous role (e.g. Bedendo, 
Cathcart and El-Jahel, 2016; Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez, 1996; Lim, 2015). Further-
more, alternative restructuring solutions brought about via contractual design, activist inves-
tors and legal procedures will be studied for their consequences on the reorganization choice 
thus targeting recent developments in literature. The paper contributes to academia in that it 
collects, systemizes and critically discusses a large body of related US
15
 as well as German 
literature highlighting areas for future research and drawing inferences between the two coun-
tries. 
Also for practitioners, the review can be of relevance as the bargaining dynamics and ration-
ales of various capital providers are discussed together with their options in in- and out-of-
court settings. Although we are currently not facing an ample restructuring market, case by 
                                                 
14
  Taxation, e.g. on net operating losses (NOL) or cancellation of debt (COD) income, as well as operating 
leases’ and pension liabilities’ in-court treatment will not be discussed by this paper. Nevertheless, table 
2.A.1 includes their by the academic literature identified influence on the procedural reorganization choice.  
15
  In contrast to a recent literature review by Ayotte, Hotchkiss and Thorburn (2013) that highlights the individ-
ual interests of different stakeholders in a distressed firm, the discussion of this paper focuses on capital pro-
viders’ concerted actions as part of the firm’s liability structure and their impact on the reorganization choice. 
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case restructurings, which are at the moment especially ample in the oil and gas-, mines and 
metals-, shipping-, fashion- or retail sectors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017; Schier, 2017), 
are common and in an environment of low yields closely watched by alternative investors. 
The paper will proceed with an overview on distressed firms’ reorganization choices in the 
US and Germany in section 2 and outline the applied methodology for filtering relevant aca-
demic literature in section 3. In section 4, the identified theoretical as well as empirical litera-
ture will be critically reflected upon for the US as well as Germany and areas for future re-
search will be summarized again in section 5 before concluding in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Background on Reorganization Choices 
In difference to the US bankruptcy regime, the German insolvency code defines specific con-
ditions for bankruptcy filing, i.e. in cases of (1) insolvency (§17 InsO), (2) over-indebtedness 
(§19 InsO), or (3) imminent insolvency (§18 InsO). The latter state, however, does not repre-
sent a mandatory filing requirement and was introduced only with the insolvency statue (In-
solvenzordnung, InsO) becoming effective in 1999 replacing the previous norms of the 
Forced Settlement Act of 1935 (Vergleichsordnung) and the Bankruptcy Act of 1877 
(Konkursordnung) (Jostarndt, 2007). The option of filing for insolvency based on expecta-
tions of future payment defaults (on existing obligations) enables early filing and a real choice 
between in- and out-of-court reorganizations making the period starting from 1999 particular-
ly relevant for the underlying discussion on Germany. 
Chapter 11 as the in-court reorganization procedure for businesses in the US became intro-
duced as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and does not contain a specific liquidity 
requirement for filing thus leaving much leeway to a firm’s reorganization choice. Further-
more, it is a by design debtor-friendly procedure allowing the borrower to keep control and 
possession over its assets and the management to suggest a reorganization plan within an ex-
tendible exclusivity period of 120 days starting from voluntary or involuntary (, i.e. by credi-
tors enacted) filing. The plan must specify the classes of claims as well as their treatment and 
is decided upon by the (impaired) claimholder classes by vote with a two thirds majority by 
value and a simple majority by number of class claimants (11 US Code §1126). After the ex-
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clusivity period, alternative plans can be suggested by creditors or creditor committees
16
 and 
voted upon until acceptance or court intervention. 
On the contrary, the German insolvency statue is classified as a creditor-friendly procedure 
that upon its opening hands over the firm with all its assets and liabilities to the insolvency 
administrator with the overarching aim of a collective satisfaction of the debtor’s creditors (§1 
InsO). In a report meeting (Berichtstermin), the insolvency administrator presents the eco-
nomic state of the firm and makes suggestions upon the value-maximizing resolution through 
liquidation into pieces, a merger into another firm (Übertragende Sanierung) or since 1999 an 
insolvency plan and thus an independent reorganization. The creditor assembly (Gläubig-
erversammlung) votes upon the presented options and decides by simple majority based on 
the value of their claims.  
The insolvency plan is thereby one of the main changes of the German insolvency statue 
(Schulze, Bert and Lessing, 2012) that was introduced according to the role model of Chapter 
11 and can similarly to the US regime be also submitted by the debtor simultaneously with 
filing in the form of a “prepackaged” insolvency plan. The insolvency plan suggested by the 
insolvency administrator or the debtor is voted upon by within the plan defined claimholder 
classes whose acceptance is secured via a simple majority by amount and number of claim-
holders. Moreover, also a debtor-in-possession managed procedure (Eigenverwaltung)
17
 is 
feasible under the insolvency statue that was further strengthened with the German Insolvency 
Law Reform (Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen) becoming 
effective in 2012. Consequently, a trend of convergence towards the US in-court reorganiza-
tion procedure is clearly observable that is driven by several legal revisions not only to the 
standard insolvency procedure (Planverfahren) outlined in the previous paragraph, but also 
through the provision of several procedural options. Despite the growing similarities, Schulze, 
Bert and Lessing (2012), however, point out that also with embedding more and more Ameri-
                                                 
16
  A creditor committee, consisting of the seven largest parties of unsecured claims willing to serve or of a 
representative group formed pre-filing, is appointed by the trustee (11 US Code §1102). Alternative creditor 
committees might be installed as well. The committees play a central role in consulting the trustee or debtor-
in-possession, in investigating the acts of the debtor and in participating in a plan formulation (11 US Code 
§1103). 
17
  Prerequisites for debtor-in-possession management are a request by the debtor and no identifiable disad-
vantages for any involved creditors. Instead of being managed by the insolvency administrator, the debtor 
will lead the procedure and be assisted by an insolvency monitor (§270 InsO).  
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can procedural elements creditors’ interests still remain core to the German insolvency regime 
thus limiting a full harmonization. 
Common to both regimes is, however, that while in-court reorganizations include all investors 
within the renegotiations, out-of-court restructurings can be focused on individual investor 
groups. Figure 2.1 provides an overview on the procedural choice in general and the most 
often named financial restructuring possibilities in out-of-court reorganizations. These might 
most certainly also be applied – individually or as a mix – during in-court procedures via the 
reorganization plan, which then has to be voted upon by all claimholder classes of the firm. 
While this acceptance procedure increases the number of involved parties, the complexity and 
renegotiation time in addition to the direct and indirect bankruptcy costs, the following sec-
tions will discuss institutional biases, lender characteristics and -interdependencies that still 
might lead to a preference for in-court reorganizations.  
Figure 2.1: Overview on the In- and Out-of-Court Reorganization Choice 
 
Source: Own creation based on Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2004). 
Notes: The figure above provides a simplified overview on the reorganization choice of a financially distressed 
but economically viable firm. Given the latter assumption and this paper’s focus on independent (financial) re-
structurings, liquidations and mergers into other firms are not included in the above overview. 
 
3. Methodology 
To identify a comprehensive set of academic studies discussing the state of financially dis-
tressed or already bankrupt companies in Germany and the US, the research databank Busi-
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ness Source Complete was filtered for the search terms “financial distress”, “bankruptcy” or 
“insolvency”, as well as for the US legal proceedings “Chapter 11” and “prepack”.18 Cases of 
personal- instead of corporate bankruptcy were excluded also via search term definition. With 
regards to the allowed mediums, the search was limited to peer-reviewed academic journals 
published in English and excluded pure ethics as well as law journals. The latter filtering cri-
teria might possibly eliminate relevant studies, but were assessed as necessary to decrease the 
initial filtering results to a manageable size of 790 studies as of 01/11/2016 to be reviewed 
individually for their topical relevance.
19
 
In the screening process, studies spanning reorganizations of the financial sector, i.e. banks, 
insurances and real estate companies, became excluded due to their differing capital structures 
and bankruptcy provisions. Furthermore, studies on the optimal capital structure of a firm and 
prediction models of distress are not considered.
20
 All as relevant to the discussion identified 
literature was checked for cross-references and for forward-citation with help of Google 
Scholar (https://scholar.google.de/) thus allowing for a targeted set of relevant studies that 
might not meet the strict filtering criteria of the publication mediums defined above. 
All with the discussed methodology identified academic literature on the relation between a 
firm’s pre-restructuring capital structure and its reorganization choice is categorized and 
summarized in table 2.A.1. The overview is included so as to give the reader a detailed, 
chronological overview on relevant publications, studied samples, the in- / out-of-court reor-
ganization context and a brief summary on key findings that can be referred to separately and 
as a supplement to the lecture of this paper.  
Due to the very limited academic evidence on Germany, recent studies by practitioners as 
well as anecdotal evidence will be further discussed in the text in order to uncover current 
trends, gaps in understanding and consequent academic research potential. 
                                                 
18
 These search terms were selected based on a set of highly relevant, previously identified academic papers 
covering financial restructuring and were subsequently tested for their individual search relevance. Further-
more, the search terms do not include a filter for capital structure to not excessively restrict the pool of results 
and allow for a wide array of papers touching upon the relation between capital structure and the choice of 
reorganization.  
19
  Due to the very limited amount of German studies, a consecutive search was undertaken allowing also for 
publications in German with no other as relevant identified studies.  
20
  The underlying paper assumes a state of distress and analyses the consequences of a given capital structure 
on the procedural reorganization choice. Therefore, neither optimal capital structure theories nor more gen-
eral distress prediction models are considered as relevant for the discussion. 
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Theoretical Discussion 
4.1.1 The Decisive Role of Bank Debt 
The early theoretical literature on financial distress postulates that a firm’s reorganization 
choice is driven by its bank’s standing. Establishing a simplified model with three claimant 
classes, a large bank lender, a non-cohesive group of bondholders and equity holders, Bulow 
and Shoven (1978) are the first to illustrate the influence of bank lenders with help of numeri-
cal examples. Underlying the authors’ argumentation are the assumptions that it is very diffi-
cult to negotiate the existing terms with the diverse group of bondholders and also new fund-
ing is prohibitively costly to raise from external sources due to information costs in the midst 
of a firm’s financial crisis.21 Consequently, the bank – as a close monitor and insider – stands 
in the centre of renegotiations. Equity holders as the residual claimants, prone to avoid liqui-
dation,
22
 will aim to form a coalition with the bank and offer a portion of their share.  
However, if the value of the equity claim combined with the value of the bank’s debt under 
continuance does not exceed the private lender’s received value upon liquidation, the firm 
will be liquidated. Another necessary condition for continuance is that the value difference of 
bondholders’ claim under liquidation versus continuance does not exceed the costs of filing 
for liquidation consequently halting the restructuring. Given these two conditions and equal 
priority of the bank lender and bondholders, Bulow and Shoven (1978) show that if bond-
holders have a relatively small current claim (that must be paid to prevent default)
23
 the ex-
pected present value including the payoff of uncertain period two operations might be rela-
tively low compared to the continuation value of the firm. If the expected difference, which 
would be shared between the bank and equity holders, exceeds the bank’s received value up-
on immediate liquidation, the firm will be kept alive. Thereby, it is of no importance whether 
                                                 
21
  Bulow and Shoven (1978) define financial distress with a combination of a negative net worth of the firm, 
i.e. total obligations to the bank and bondholders exceed the liquidation- or continuation value of the firm’s 
assets (including cash), and an immediate liquidity crisis, i.e. the cash at hand is not sufficient to cover cur-
rent debt obligations.    
22
  Given the by Bulow and Shoven (1978) assumed negative net worth of the financially distressed firm, equity 
holders would receive nothing under liquidation.  
23
  And consequent liquidation given the assumption that no negotiation is possible with bondholders.  
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the total liquidation value of the firm exceeds its value under continuance, but only the bank’s 
standing matters for the restructuring decision. 
White (1980) continues the discussion and presents a formal model for the restructuring deci-
sion. The author generalizes that a firm is immediately liquidated if the liquidation value is 
negative after deducting the present value of all payments to long-term bondholders so that 
total pay-out to the latter group must be reduced.
 24
 If proportions of bank debt are of senior 
priority these payment reductions will benefit the bank and will lead to a greater propensity to 
liquidate the firm. With her theory, White (1980) introduces the effects of seniority that are 
further discussed by James (1995) who outlines a senior bank lender’s options considering the 
level of impairment. 
The author argues that when bank debt is secured and unimpaired, i.e. the face value of debt is 
lower than the liquidation value of the firm, there will be no bank concessions offered. These 
might only be reasonable if senior bank debt is impaired and the sum of renegotiated debt and 
new equity received exceeds the value upon liquidation. In James' (1995) simplified model, 
the equity value to the bank lender is determined as the difference between the firm’s future 
growth options and the proportion of public debt outstanding. Assuming good growth pro-
spects of an only financially distressed firm and focusing our analysis on the influence of the 
capital structure, great proportions of public debt, i.e. a debt overhang, would reduce equity 
value and lead to high wealth transfers from the senior bank lender to subordinated bondhold-
ers ultimately hindering concessions.  The apparent deadlock for restructuring can then only 
be resolved by also reducing the proportion of public debt. Consequently, James (1995) devi-
ates from the rigid assumption of non-negotiability with public debt holders. 
 
4.1.2 The Negotiability of Public Debt 
In their study, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) establish a model that allows for the renegotia-
tion of bank debt as well as of public debt, which poses a special challenge in the US not only 
because of the diverse nature of investors as suggested by Bulow and Shoven (1978) but also 
because of an institutional bias introduced by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. As Roe (1987) 
                                                 
24
  On the contrary, White (1980) argues that if the net liquidation value is positive, bondholders would need to 
be paid in full upon immediate liquidation so that the firm will continue with the prospect of potentially re-
ducing bondholder payments upon liquidation in future periods. 
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explains the act “prohibits a binding vote by bondholders to change any core term – principal 
amount, interest rate, or maturity date – of a bond issue” (p.232). Jostarndt (2007) points out 
that also the German Debenture Law (Schuldverschreibungsgesetz, SchVG) of 1899 highly 
limits modifications to bond indentures.   
Thus, direct renegotiation as in the case of bank debt is made difficult but can still be 
achieved by offering to exchange old public debt for packages of cash, new debt or equity 
thus avoiding the prohibition. However, each individual bondholder might be better off hold-
ing out of the exchange offer thus creating a prisoner dilemma and a potential failing of the 
out-of-court reorganization as the offer’s success usually depends on a predefined fraction of 
acceptance. However, Roe (1987) suggests workarounds to reduce the holdout problem that 
are formalized in a theoretical model by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991).
25
 The authors show 
that the holdout problem of long-term, highly scattered public debt can only be avoided by 
offering a more senior debt claim,
26
 cash or shorter maturity debt thus critically disadvantag-
ing old bondholders’ payments.  
In situations where there is a cash shortage so that current public debt obligations cannot be 
paid, the firm faces the choice of renegotiating with the bank or public debtholders. However, 
it is argued that the firm will always prefer public debt renegotiations, because as long as the 
expected payment of the new security exceeds payment to holdouts in the period of renegotia-
tion,
27
 bondholders are incentivized to participate in the exchange, i.e. a holdin situation is 
created,  allowing terms that the bank would never accept.
28
 Therefore, the feasibility of pub-
lic exchanges appears to drive the restructuring decision and bank debt seems to play only a 
minor role contrary to the argumentation in section 4.1.1.  
                                                 
25
  In addition to the ways described by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Roe (1987) suggests that the incentive 
to holdout is further reduced by the fact that successful exchanges usually maintain less than 20% of the old 
debt issue leaving behind a thinly traded market with no analyst coverage and high bid-ask spreads.  
26
  Even when the old public debt issue contains covenants prohibiting more senior debt claims, these can be 
stripped by majority voting rules as covenant transformation is not covered by the Trust Indenture Act.  
27
  While the holdouts become subordinated via the exchange transaction, they receive interest payments in the 
period of renegotiation that the tendering bondholders usually waive. Therefore, these current obligations are 
of higher priority and particular attention given the condition of cash shortage and financial distress (Roe, 
1983).   
28
  In situations where the cash shortage is so high that the repayment of the bank is also not feasible, the firm is 
either liquidated or the bank accepts payment equal to its claims’ liquidation value. If the reduced bank pay-
ment raises the expected payment of a new security issue above the payment to holdouts, an exchange offer 
is executed. 
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However, as Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) point out themselves exchange offers are not 
always senior so that holdouts are likely, because of individual bondholders wanting to max-
imize their returns, but also for reasons of different firm value estimates, (assumed) infor-
mation conflicts between management and creditors or varying preferences of exchanged for 
securities (Roe, 1983). The difficulty of reaching unanimous consent under the Trust Inden-
ture Act stands against the by bankruptcy law defined voting procedures of in-court restruc-
turings only requiring a two thirds majority by value and a simple majority by number of 
creditors of a predefined creditor class. Thus, under in-court proceedings direct changes to a 
complete public debt issue can be decided by majority with no potential for holdout thus eas-
ing creditor coordination problems occurring out-of-court.
29
 In this way transaction costs as-
sociated with out-of-court public debt restructurings appear to be reduced (Gilson, 1997), 
suggesting a higher likelihood for in-court reorganizations under the presence of public debt.  
In Germany, the holdout problem has been confronted in 2009 with a revision of the old 
German Debenture Law that now allows for wide-reaching, out-of-court modifications of 
bond indentures (spanning maturity, interest, principal, seniority or security exchanges) that 
have to be voted upon by a qualified majority of 75% by value (SchVG 2009 §§5). In-court 
bond modifications are also feasible under an insolvency plan, but require agreement by the 
simple majority of each creditor class by value as well as number of participants. Therefore, 
the high out-of-court threshold might not pose substantially higher transaction costs in Ger-
many as compared to in-court proceedings.  
Despite the potential of bond negotiations via exchanges in the US and via new legal provi-
sions in Germany, Mooradian (1994) as well as Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) argue 
that public debtholders suffer from substantial information asymmetries that hinder them from 
making efficient restructuring concessions. Therefore the latter authors suggest that more effi-
cient in overcoming the information asymmetry might be the presence of banks as insiders 
whose actions signal the condition of the firm. Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) argue 
that while existing private debtholders will usually receive offers with more senior debt char-
acteristics to prevent freeriding of uninvolved junior investors, seniority covenants, no possi-
bility for more senior claims or liquidation risk resulting from higher collateralization might 
                                                 
29
  Roe (1983) explains that the by legal design higher propensity to file for Chapter 11 under the presence of 
public debt has been chosen on purpose to protect individual bondholders from institutional investors under 
the supervision of the court.  
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lead to no such issue. Given the latter obstacles, banks may receive junior debt or equity of-
fers that when accepted indicate the good condition of the firm sending positive signals to 
bond- and (potential) equity holders. In line with this logic, James (1996) suggests that public 
debt restructurings, which are accompanied by concessions of impaired bank lenders, are sub-
ject to less information- and holdout issues. 
The presence of bank debt might therefore still play a decisive role even when public debt can 
be renegotiated out-of-court. Bedendo, Cathcart and El-Jahel (2016) and Lim (2015) recently 
confirm the still prevailing ambiguous relation between a firm’s debt composition and its re-
structuring choice calling for further empirical evidence (previously e.g. Chatterjee, Dhillon 
and Ramirez, 1996).
30
 However, before proceedings to a discussion of the empirical findings 
the following section will highlight recent trends in investment, financing and legal proce-
dures that are likely to impact the reorganization decision. 
 
4.1.3 Recent Bargaining Trends 
The theoretical literature discussed so far has outlined a rather rigid bargaining procedure 
standing behind a firm’s reorganization choice, which seems to be driven by the level of col-
lateralization and impairment of bank debt and / or upon the negotiability of public debt. Giv-
en these dynamics, the question arises whether new forms of financing, contracts or legal pro-
cedures are used to either avoid bargaining inefficiencies or create new bargaining settings in 
situations of financial distress. 
One such form is the prepackaged bankruptcy reorganization with McConnell and Servaes 
(1991) as the first authors documenting their increasing prevalence and Crystal Oil being the 
first major company to implement the proceeding in 1986. Prepacks are a hybrid form of out-
of-court- and traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations in that bankruptcy is simultaneously filed 
together with an out-of-court designed reorganization plan, which can either be voted upon 
prior or subsequently to filing under the common majority voting rules (Tashjian, Lease and 
McConnell, 1996). In this way, time spent in bankruptcy and attached costs are reduced, but 
                                                 
30
  Lim (2015), for example, states that “the relative importance of public to bank debt (and vice versa) in bar-
gaining difficulties remains an empirical issue” (p.1328). Similarly, Chatterjee et al. (1996) highlight: “The 
importance of public and bank debt on the choice of restructuring method remains an empirical issue” (p.7).  
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advantages of voting rules, resolved holdout issues (Baird and Rasmussen, 2002) and tax ad-
vantages (Betker, 1995) can be exploited for the US market.  
Also in Germany, prepackaged insolvency plans are fostered that are discussed with the major 
investors outside of court and are simultaneously submitted with the insolvency filing. Un-
dritz (2010) as well as Schulze, Bert and Lessing (2012) attribute the highest success potential 
to such plans providing for fast enactment by the insolvency administrator or under debtor-in-
possession procedures (Eigenverwaltung) by management itself.  
Furthermore, debtor-in-possession financing (DIP) is a widely used US-specific instrument of 
in-court restructurings (Skeel, 2003) that can be of different priority as well as security and 
has to be fully repaid before exiting Chapter 11. A motion for court approval is required for 
all DIP loans of same or senior priority to administrative expenses and / or of secured status 
(Dahiya, John, Puri and Raḿrez, 2003). With the senior (secured) condition, lenders might be 
willing to provide additional financing also in financial distress, but often considerable re-
strictions are attached introducing new control rights to the bankruptcy procedure while exist-
ing covenants of pre-bankruptcy loans are unenforceable under the automatic stay provi-
sions
31
 of Chapter 11 (Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramírez, 2004; McGlaun, 2007). 
Baird and Rasmussen (2006) put forth that via the control rights fixed in DIP financing the 
length and form of bankruptcy proceedings can be dictated by creditors overruling the by de-
sign debtor-friendly set-up and moving more towards a by Schwartz (1998) demanded con-
tractually defined proceeding. Although DIP financing only comes into play when a firm al-
ready decided for an in-court filing, it is still considered in the discussion of reorganization 
choice, because of its importance to creditor control influencing bargaining dynamics and the 
decision for or against filing. 
As a third trend, the increasing involvement by private equity- (PE) and hedge funds will be 
discussed. In simplified form, Brecher, Breslow, Harris, Horgan and Martini (2007) explain 
activist investors’ strategy as first establishing a fund, secondly investing in the most senior 
expectedly impaired debt class, i.e. fulcrum investment, at discounted prices and thirdly offer-
ing senior debt or DIP financing with strict covenants controlling the restructuring process 
                                                 
31
  The automatic stay automatically comes into effect with bankruptcy filing and represents a period of time, 
during which no repossessions of property, collection- or foreclosure activities are to be enacted by any hold-
ers of claims originating from before the in-court proceeding (11 US Code §362). 
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and allowing for a debt-for-equity swap. However, the third step might not even be necessary 
when the fulcrum investment is exchanged for equity (Lim, 2015) leading to a loan-to-own 
strategy and an influence over the strategic direction of the firm. 
As Kahan and Rock (2009) point out while traditional institutional investors restructure to 
reduce losses, activist investors actually want to achieve gains and for that purpose might crit-
ically disrupt coalition building structures between bank lenders and shareholders (Ellias, 
2016). Kucher and Meitner (2004) attest only a minor role of activist investors for the German 
restructuring market, but with help of a survey find expectations on a growing trend, which 
the empirical section 4.2.4 will further elaborate on. 
Next to the presented theoretical foundation, economic models analysing the bargaining dy-
namics behind the reorganization choice stay – to the author’s best knowledge – largely silent 
on these new trends. However, the empirical literature is growing in this field that will be dis-
cussed in the following section next to the ambiguous relation between bank and public debt. 
 
4.2 Empirical Evidence 
4.2.1 Bank Debt Versus Public Debt in the US 
As most of the empirical literature, which examines the relation between a firm’s capital 
structure and its reorganization choice, controls for and attests a significant role to bank debt, 
figure 2.2 summarizes these findings and provides an overview on the sample sizes and peri-
ods. Thereby, it is interesting to note that empirical studies on the US have starting with the 
introduction of the new bankruptcy code in 1978 covered all years up to 2012 with the only 
exceptions of 1993 and 1994. Despite the dense coverage, the years of publication show a gap 
of more than ten years after Chatterjee et al. (1996) before interest has sparked again concur-
rent with the onset of the recent financial crisis. 
Starting the discussion with the earlier empirical literature, Gilson, John and Lang (1990) ex-
amine a sample of stock listed companies with extreme price declines and debt restructurings, 
i.e. reductions in interest or principal payments, elongated maturities or equity-for-debt ex-
changes. In case debt restructurings lead to Chapter 11 filings within one year, they are classi-
fied as in-court reorganizations thus subsuming all failed workouts. The authors find that a 
greater number of distinct debt classes increases the likelihood for in-court reorganizations 
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but when controlling for the proportion of bank debt the latter relation loses in significance 
and out-of-court restructurings become more likely. Therefore, bank debt – similar to the ar-
gumentation in section 4.1.1 – seems to overtake a coordinating function. Furthermore, Gilson 
et al. (1990) show that when bank debt is present, it is renegotiated in 90% of out-of-court 
cases with principal reductions in half of all cases comparing to only 38% of public debt re-
negotiations.  
Franks and Torous (1994) cannot confirm the evidence of the latter authors as they do not find 
a significant relation for the number of long-term debt securities or the proportion of bank 
debt. However, they suggest considering how their sample impacts results. In order to filter 
financially distressed firms, rating downgrades of public debt issues to CCC or worse are de-
tected and checked for successful workouts or Chapter 11 filings with consequent emergence. 
Given the precondition of public debt, the average firm of their sample is larger than in Gilson 
et al. (1990) and less dependent on bank debt with the median workout firm being financed 
with no long-term bank debt at all. 
The sample choice also seems to impact a study by Asquith et al. (1994) who examine all 
firms with public equity that issue high-yield public junk bonds
32
 between 1976 and 1988 and 
record insufficient coverage ratios within two years after issuance. Similar to Franks and To-
rous (1989) their sample firms are larger in size than in Gilson et al. (1990) with an average 
liability structure of around 50% public debt and 50% private debt, of which 56% is secured 
and 60% is provided by banks (excluding insurances). In difference to Gilson et al. (1990), 
the authors bring forward that banks barely ever provide principal reductions, but focus on 
concessions such as covenant waivers and maturity extensions or even tighten conditions. 
However, the authors also find that banks are more likely to loosen conditions if they are se-
cured and less prone to tighten conditions when also public debt is restructured.
33
  
The dependence on public debt being restructured is also confirmed with empirical evidence 
by James (1995), who argues that under the presence of public debt banks only take equity if 
also bondholders exchange their claims for equity. Firms, for which banks accept equity ex-
                                                 
32
  Junk bond issuers were chosen for their high leverage and public debt outstanding. With the high leverage 
criteria, the authors intended to focus on financial distress that would be triggered by small decreases in prof-
itability. However, a detailed examination uncovers that the majority of sample firms suffers from economic 
inefficiency.  
33
  Economic conditions are not found to significantly differ between banks‘ concession decisions. However, 
this might also be due to the majority of the sample suffering from economic distress.  
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changes, are significantly more dependent on bank debt with the median firm having no pub-
lic debt outstanding. However, if banks give into concessions they also considerable reduce 
their principal, a finding in line with Franks and Torous (1994), who observe deviations in 
absolute priority for bank debt especially in out-of-court proceedings. Consequently, the find-
ings – despite being based on different sampling approaches34 – are consistent and seem to 
highly depend on the proportion of bank debt and the wealth transfer effects to public 
debtholders following bank concessions.  
However, the role of secured debt and the concept of impaired debt remain unclear. James 
(1995) approximates the level of bank impairment via a firm’s solvency ratio, i.e. the book 
value of total debt devided by the sum of debt and the market value of equity, and does not 
find bank debt for equity exchanges more unlikely for greater proportions of secured debt.
35
 
However Asquith et al. (1994),
36
 Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995), Chatterjee et al. (1996)
37
 
and also the more recent studies by McGlaun (2007),
38
 Fischer and Wahrenburg (2012) and 
Bedendo, Cathcart and El-Jahel (2016) present evidence for secured debt significantly driving 
the decision to restructure in-court given banks’ unwillingness to provide concessions and 
their threat of filing for liquidation to receive immediate payout.  
In line with the argumentation of impaired bank claims, Lim (2015) presents evidence that 
under the presence of undercollateralized bank debt, which is marked by a dummy variable 
and approximated with bank debt exceeding the value of fixed assets, out-of-court restructur-
ings are significantly more likely. In the context of the other empirical findings on secured 
                                                 
34
  The different sampling approaches highlight the difficulty of filtering out-of-court reorganizations. Aspeli 
and Iden (2010) point out that while a bankruptcy filing is straightforward to identify, there is no legal defini-
tion of an out-of-court restructuring. Furthermore, Jostarndt (2007) criticizes that sampling methods often fo-
cus on specific firm characteristics (e.g. junk bond issuers, rating downgrades), events (e.g. default) or re-
structuring outcomes (e.g. failed workouts and consequent Chapter 11 filings). 
35
  James (1995) suggests an ambiguous impact, because neither secured bank debt holders would have an inter-
est to accept equity nor unsecured bank debt holders who following the logic by Brown et al. (1993) would 
be offered secured claims.  
36
  In a probit regression analysis, the authors find that the proportion of secured private debt (including bank 
debt) and the number of public debt issues significantly increase the likelihood for in-court reorganizations, 
while neither the proportion of public debt nor operational efficiency is found to be significant. 
37
  Although one of the first empirical studies incorporating prepackaged bankruptcies as a reorganization alter-
native, Chatterjee et al.'s (1996) sample does not include cases with simultaneous private and public debt re-
structurings. Also Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995) provide evidence of limited use as general Chapter 11 
cases (incl. various distress triggers and restructuring methods, e.g. governance- or labour reorganizations) 
are studied and analysed for preceding out-of-court financial restructurings.  
38
  McGlaun (2007) exclusively analyses bankruptcy filings and finds liquidation to be significantly more likely 
under the presence of senior bank lenders. 
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debt, the latter study suggests that not only the proportion of bank debt but also its level of 
collateralization impacts the reorganization choice. Bedendo et al. (2016) present further evi-
dence to the latter claim by observing significantly higher proportions of secured bank debt 
amongst in-court restructuring firms. However, the authors also suggest that bank debt has 
become substantially more complex.  
In a targeted study, Demiroglu and James (2015) indeed find that only “solo bank lenders” 
significantly increase the likelihood for out-of-court proceedings. The latter authors, thereby, 
examine one of the longest sample periods, from 1999-2012, and follow a sampling method 
similar to Gilson et al. (1990) filtering out firms with extreme stock price shortfalls, but addi-
tionally exclude small firms with low leverage and high interest coverage ratios. Although the 
authors – similar to Gilson et al. (1990) – find the proportion of traditional loans, i.e. provided 
by banks and insurance companies, to significantly increase the likelihood for out-of-court 
reorganizations, the authors note that “traditional loan ‘specialness’ is reduced when bank 
loans are diffusely held and traded in the secondary market” (p.194). Public debt and a firm’s 
debt complexity, i.e. the standardized number of debt claims, are found to significantly in-
crease the likelihood for in-court proceedings.  
Comparing the latter results to the earlier study by Gilson et al. (1990), a greater proportion of 
bank debt still seems to favour out-of-court restructurings in the more recent sample period. 
Nevertheless, in the US the role of banks seems to have diminished, representing on average 
only 7.7%
39
 in the study by Demiroglu and James (2015), and their loan structures appear to 
have considerably changed (consistent with Bedendo et al., 2016) eroding the in the theoreti-
cal literature commonly assumed lower negotiation costs. Furthermore, the empirical evi-
dence is by no means conclusive especially with regard to the role of secured bank debt.  
While Demiroglu and James (2015) do not control for the latter characteristic in their regres-
sion analysis, Fischer and Wahrenburg (2012) studying a similar sample period do not differ-
entiate by bank debt or its characteristics (e.g. traditional bank debt, syndicates or solo bank 
lenders). Furthermore, the different sampling techniques for detecting financially (but prefer-
ably not economically) distressed firms complicate a direct comparison of the relatively large 
set of empirical studies on the US. 
                                                 
39
  Interesting to highlight is that for the subsample of companies with traditional bank debt the average 
proportion of traditional bank debt amounts to 27.9% exceeding the share of public debt of 19.5%. 
Capital Structure and the Choice Between In- and Out-of-Court Reorganization: A Literature Review 
 
37 
  
Figure 2.2: Empirical Evidence of Bank Debt’s Influence on the Reorganization Choice 
 
Source: Own creation.  
Notes: The figure above provides an overview on bank debt’s role for the in- or out-of-court procedural choice. 
Studies finding that certain characteristics of bank debt encourage out-of-court proceedings are depicted above 
the time line and below the time line when encouraging in-court proceedings (without differentiation between 
reorganization, liquidation or prepacks). For each study, the authors, country of study, total sample size, sample 
period (arrow), bank debt characteristics and sampling method (with filtering criteria 1 and 2) is depicted. With 
regard to filtering criteria 2 covering debt contract amendments, Lim (2015) as well as Bedendo et al. (2016) 
follow the slightly modified definition by Moody’s extending that the amendment / exchange helped avoiding 
payment default or bankruptcy.  
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4.2.2 Bank Debt Versus Public Debt in Germany 
The empirical evidence on Germany highlights the decisive role of banks in firms’ reorgani-
zation choices. Brunner and Krahnen (2008) identify for a sample of medium sized, private 
firms the mechanism of bank pools, that are formed as a coordination device by uncollat-
eralilzed junior debt holders in situations of corporate distress. With the pool, all actions by 
unsecured bank lenders are concerted and information are shared and even secured bank lend-
ers sometimes join with a standstill agreement on their collateral thus limiting their potential 
liquidation bias. 
The authors observe that the typical medium sized firm of their sample has no public debt 
issues outstanding and has an average fraction of 76% bank debt to total liabilities. Therefore, 
the coordination issues with public debtholders – as discussed for the US – are not a major 
concern of their study. Brunner and Krahnen (2008) ultimately find that bank pools signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood of out-of-court proceedings, but only for small pools with no 
more than five participants thus similarly to Demiroglu and James (2015) introducing the 
number of bank lenders into syndicate / pooling mechanisms.  
Jostarndt and Sautner (2010) build upon the latter authors’ evidence and find also for a set of 
public companies that the presence of bank pools increases the probability of out-of-court 
restructurings as does the proportion of bank debt. Also for the set of large German compa-
nies, the average share of bank financing makes up with 56% more than half of total liabili-
ties. However, significant differences in the proportion of bank debt are observable between 
the private workout and bankrupt samples with 68% versus 47% respectively. Public debt 
only plays a minor role. Also the proportion of secured debt is controlled for and found to 
significantly increase the chances of an insolvency proceeding, but the level of secured bank 
debt in particular and the number of bank lenders is not analysed so that the potential adverse 
effects of bank loans for out-of-court restructurings are not studied and similar gaps in under-
standing remain as for the US. 
Blatz, Kraus and Haghani (2006) state the importance of bank pools as well, but suggest a 
diminishing role of the coordination mechanism, because the individual banks’ terms and col-
lateralization levels differ together with their loss exposure in case of insolvency so that they 
have varying incentives to involve in out-of-court reorganizations also given their own com-
petitive and regulatory pressures. Furthermore, the impact of public debt seems to evolve. 
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Although in a recent study Bendel, Demary and Voigtländer (2016) confirm bank financing to 
be the main long-term debt source of German small, medium and large sized firms with pub-
lic debt only playing a minor role, the recent accumulation of payment defaults on mini-bond 
issuances (Mittelstandsanleihen) with following restructurings or insolvencies calls for more 
empirical evidence. Examples of such payment defaults in the past two years include German 
Pellets, KTG Agrar, Steilmann, Strenesse or MIFA and in total Schier (2017) approximates 
that one third of the volume issued in the mini-bond segment in the founding year, 2010, is 
either already bankrupt or subject to some kind of payment default on interest or principal. 
The results of a survey among 120 restructuring specialists conducted by the consultancy firm 
Dr. Wieselhuber & Partner (2015) in 2014 provides additional evidence on the growing im-
portance of public bond restructurings in the German market, but also the higher complexity, 
the longer time requirement and the greater restructuring risk. Nevertheless out-of-court re-
structurings are appraised as feasible particularly due to the revision of the German Debenture 
Law in 2009 and the majority of survey participants has no strict preference for in-court pro-
ceedings thus making an investigation of the underlying dynamics an interesting field of re-
search. 
The above presented, non-academic studies suggest a changing impact of public debt and 
bank pools for the procedural choice in Germany that combined with the legislative changes 
call for more academic studies in the field. With the last academic examination by Jostarndt 
and Sautner (2010) covering a sample period up to 2004, a clear gap in understanding of the 
bargaining dynamics and the underlying capital structure influences prevails for Germany. 
 
4.2.3 Alternative Funding in the US 
Next to renegotiations and concessions on prevailing debt contracts, debtor-in-possession 
(DIP) financing (for explanation refer to section 4.1.3) provides a way for the financially dis-
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tressed firm to receive new financing after filing for a prepackaged
40
 or normal Chapter 11 
procedure in the US. Thereby, Chatterjee et al. (2004) find that for the majority of DIP loans 
the underlying terms limit the use to satisfying firms’ working capital requirements. The au-
thors furthermore detect attached negative and affirmative covenants that monitor firms’ capi-
tal expenditures, operating activities as well as the disposition of assets (to protect collateral) 
thus allowing for close control over the reorganization process. Ayotte and Morrison (2009) 
even uncover that control over the firm’s state goes so far that 72% of the examined DIP 
loans include specific line item budget limits. 
Furthermore, the latter authors find that in the two years leading up to filing, median firms’ 
secured debt amounts increase by eleven times (while the median asset amounts decrease) and 
suggest that the super-ordinated DIP financing might be the only way for the financially dis-
tressed firm to obtain more funding. Under-collateralized lenders might have an incentive to 
provide such funding to on one hand prevent liquidation as well as participate in the restruc-
turing success and on the other hand closely control the process via attached covenant provi-
sions. Approximating the level of under-collateralization via the proportion of bank debt to 
total liabilities, Li and Wang (2016) provide supporting evidence that a greater degree of un-
der-collateralization together with a good operating performance indeed increases the likeli-
hood for a firm to receive DIP financing by pre-petition bank lenders. 
The discussion so far suggests that although DIP financing is a tool applied for together with 
or after bankruptcy filing, its availability and suitability critically depends on a firm’s pre-
filing capital structure, e.g. with its proportion of secured assets, its lenders’ under-
collateralization or its extent of payables, thus influencing the procedural choice and making 
DIP financing relevant for the discussion of this paper.
41
 Furthermore, it is interesting to re-
vert back to the discussion of section 4.2.2 on bank impairment and under-collateralization, 
                                                 
40
  The trend of prepackaged bankruptcies identified in section 4.1.3 was first empirically examined as an alter-
native to Chapter 11 and out-of-court restructuring by Chatterjee et al. (1996), who find that greater propor-
tions of current debt triggering a liquidity crisis make such proceedings more likely. While the latter authors 
do not control for DIP financing, neither Dahiya et al. (2003) nor Li and Wang (2014) find a (positive) rela-
tion. Thus, instead of providing alternative funding, prepacks seem to resolve holdout problems common to 
US out-of-court restructurings in a fast and efficient way (e.g. Lim, 2015). However, empirical research 
could further elaborate on those effects, because while many of the recent studies include prepacks in their 
sample design only few differentiate their methodology between normal Chapter 11 proceedings and pre-
packs as illustrated in table 2.A.1.  
41
  Altman and Karlin (2009) confirm this argumentation documenting that the rise of out-of-court restructurings 
in the US in 2008 and 2009 is closely connected to the restricted availability of DIP- and Chapter 11 exit fi-
nancing in those years. 
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which in combination with a liquidity shortage might lead to in-court instead of out-of-court 
procedures given the possibility of DIP financing and the attached control rights.  
However, this suggested relation represents a mere hypothesis up for further research since 
neither Ayotte and Morrison (2009), McGlaun (2007) or the more recent study by Li and 
Wang (2016) control for out-of-court restructurings in their sample design. Moreover, the 
presented empirical evidence on DIP financing supports the view expressed by Baird and 
Rasmussen (2006) as well as Skeel (2003) that the by legal design debtor-friendly Chapter 11 
is becoming a much more creditor-controlled process driven by the contractual design of cov-
enants. 
While the finding by McGlaun (2007) that the majority of DIP loans is obtained from senior 
(prepetition) bank lenders still seems to hold also for the extended sample by Li and Wang 
(2016), Jiang, Li and Wang (2012) suggest that the provision by hedge- and private equity 
funds increases since 2003. Furthermore, the latter authors observe that half of all DIP fi-
nancings provided by activist investors lead via triggering clauses and debt-for-equity ex-
changes to loan-to-own strategies. However, according to Jiang et al. (2012) as well as Lim 
(2015), DIP financing is not the only entry possibility, but investment into usually unsecured 
debt, i.e. the fulcrum security, represents a much more common way.  
The likelihood for a debt-side investment and a consequent influence over the firm’s in-court 
reorganization via participation in the unsecured creditor committee or via a loan-to-own 
strategy is according to Jiang et al. (2012) significantly influenced by the level of under-
collateralized secured debt, measured as the amount of secured debt over the book value of 
assets. The more of such debt being present the less probable is the debt-side involvement by 
hedge funds as the active renegotiation role is already overtaken by the impaired secured debt 
holders. On the contrary, a higher level of over-collateralized secured debt, which is common-
ly attested a liquidation bias, attracts activist investors’ reorganization efforts so that the au-
thors describe their role as balancing out “the power between the debtor and secured credi-
tors” (p.513). 
For a more recent sample period reaching up to 2011, Lim (2015), however, finds that instead 
of influencing the balance of power hedge- and private equity funds enhance the efficiency of 
contracting among different creditor classes. Controlling for contracting problems via the 
number of long-term debt classes outstanding, the proportion of long-term debt classes, the 
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presence of bank- and public debt as well as a combination of the latter two measures, the 
author finds a significant positive relation to the involvement of hedge funds for all variables. 
The evidence suggests that activist investors specifically target firms with a greater potential 
for creditor coordination problems and according to further investigations lead these compa-
nies with a greater likelihood into prepackaged bankruptcies, facilitate faster proceedings as 
well as greater debt reductions. 
Both of the latter studies suggest that hedge- and private equity funds significantly change the 
bargaining dynamics of in-court reorganizations. However, similarly to section 4.2.2 there is 
no conclusive evidence with regards to the number of lenders approximating for the bargain-
ing complexity and their economic interest in the reorganization with the level of impairment. 
Although Lim (2015) controls for both influences, under-collateralization, i.e. whether bank 
debt exceeds the amount of fixed assets, is only marked with a dummy instead of using its 
level. Furthermore, as the latter author points out more research potential lies in examining 
the new bargaining dynamics introduced by single or particularly multiple groups of hedge 
funds also through theoretical models. 
 
4.2.4 Alternative Funding in Germany 
The previous section has shown that US academic research on activist investors’ restructuring 
involvement is a quite new research area and for Germany there is – to the author’s best 
knowledge – barely any academic evidence available yet. Nevertheless, comparing recent 
statistics by the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2015) to numbers 
reported by Kucher and Meitner (2004), turnaround investment amounted to 53.4 million euro 
in the year 2015 and therefore doubled compared to 2003. However, relative to the total in-
vestment by activist investors across all company stages, turnaround investments only made 
up for 1% and funded around 25 companies in Germany in 2015. Although small in number, 
the traditional buyout market also funded only approximately 100 companies in 2015 in Ger-
many and Jowett and Jowett (2011) further suggest a high importance of distressed private 
equity investments especially for small and medium sized companies in Germany. Therefore, 
controlling for activist investors’ impact especially for samples of small, private companies 
like in the study by Brunner and Krahnen (2008) could reveal interesting insights.  
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Particularly worthwhile examining would be the bargaining dynamics with involved banks 
that according to section 4.2.2 still form the prevailing financing source of German compa-
nies. Blatz et al. (2006) for example reiterate that venture capital or forms of mezzanine fi-
nancing only play a minor role and crisis funding mostly depends on available cash reserves, 
renegotiations with banks or the potential for equity recapitalization.
42
 Nevertheless, based on 
a German survey among 60 banks in 2005 the latter authors also find that 86% of all inter-
viewed participants are occasionally involved in the distressed debt market mostly as sellers 
of deteriorating loan portfolios indicating that there might indeed be a market for distressed 
debt. However, prevailing bank pool agreements often hinder such divestitures further ques-
tioning the still existing prevalence of the coordination mechanism as found by Brunner and 
Krahnen (2008) or Jostarndt and Sautner (2010). 
 
5. Research Implications and Discussion 
The above discussion has shown that the relation between a distressed firm’s capital structure 
and its reorganization choice is a dynamically evolving field of research, which is at least 
since the last financial crisis of great academic interest again and highly covered especially in 
the US. Nevertheless, through the comprehensive review several potential areas for further 
research were identified that will be summarized again in the underlying section. Thereby, 
points 1-3 highlight research implications for the US, 4-6 for Germany and 7 focuses on po-
tential cross-country inferences. 
1. Bank debt’s influence on the reorganization choice remains ambiguous. 
As was shown, the theoretical literature widely attests a more positive effect of bank lend-
ers on private workouts due to the lower negotiation costs, their insider status and alterna-
tive problematic negotiations with public debtholders (holdout). However, empirical re-
search remains departed upon the consequences depending on the proportion of bank debt 
(wealth transfers), the level of collateralization (liquidation bias) as well as the rising com-
plexity of bank debt (negotiation costs). Also the differing sampling designs used and the 
                                                 
42
  Jostarndt (2009) explains that equity recapitalizations in situations of financial distress are a German particu-
larity because of the difficulty of raising new funds given the non-existence of super-ordinated DIP financing 
mechanisms in Germany. For a sample of 267 financially distressed German, public companies in the years 
from 1996 to 2004, the author detects equity issues amongst 46% of the sample that are – following the logic 
by James (1995) – more likely under the presence of bank concessions.  
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resulting specific focus on a subset of distressed firms complicates direct comparisons of 
the empirical evidence. Moreover, the possibility of DIP financing with commonly ob-
served strict control rights might change the relation and trigger existing, under-
collateralized bank lenders to support in- rather than out-of-court reorganizations. 
2. Activist investors’ role in reorganizations should be further examined. 
While activist investors’ role in reorganizations is a comparatively young field of research, 
their involvement in practice is already considerable in the US, with e.g. Lim (2015) iden-
tifying private equity- and hedge fund investments for 63% of the analysed sample of 469 
distressed firms between 2001 and 2011. Although the discussed literature agrees upon the 
changing restructuring dynamics introduced by activist investors, evidence on applied 
funding strategies, on investment determinants (level of collateralization vs. negotiation 
complexity) and on the effects of multiple involved activist investors is not conclusive yet. 
3. The evolving bargaining dynamics should be reflected upon theoretically. 
The past theoretical literature exclusively focused on the bargaining dynamics between 
bank lenders and public debtholders often treating liquidation as the only alternative to out-
of-court restructurings (refer to discussion in Senbet and Seward, 1995). To the author’s 
best knowledge, there exists barely any theoretical literature reflecting upon the resulting 
bargaining dynamics from for example activist investors involvement, from new restruc-
turing strategies such as prepackaged bankruptcy filings or from greater control rights ex-
erted by creditors during bankruptcy proceedings. Models incorporating such realities 
could be of high use to our understanding of the new and evolving bargaining dynamics 
underlying the restructuring process as well as the procedural choice. 
4. The role and prevalence of bank pools should be analysed for more recent sample periods. 
Brunner and Krahnen (2008) as well as Jostarndt and Sautner (2010) identify the im-
portance of bank pools for the restructuring of private as well as public German firms dur-
ing the sample periods from 1991 to 1999 and 1997 to 2004 respectively. However, Blatz 
et al. (2006) start questioning their prevalence for reasons of banks’ differing loss exposure 
and following interest in complex restructurings as well as their limited flexibility of sell-
ing distressed loan portfolios to hedge funds and other activist investors. 
5. The prevalence and restructuring procedures of public debt should be investigated. 
Although Bendel et al. (2016) confirm that the majority of long-term debt of small to large 
German companies is still financed by banks, recently accumulating anecdotal evidence on 
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restructurings of mini-bonds (Mittelstandsanleihen) lead to questioning public debt’s reor-
ganization impact. Especially with the in 2009 revised German Debenture Law allowing 
for wide-reaching out-of-court debenture changes by majority vote, private workouts are 
made more likely on one hand but are according to Dr. Wieselhuber & Partner (2015) also 
highly complex on the other hand. The circumstances and evolution of public debt’s influ-
ence on the reorganization choice in Germany would thus form an interesting research 
question.  
6. The importance and bargaining dynamics of activist investors should be studied especially 
for small and medium sized companies.  
Although the prevalence with which activist investors are involved in distressed targets 
seems to be much lower in the German than the American market (Blatz et al., 2006; Ger-
man Private Equity and Venture Capital Association; 2015; Kucher and Meitner, 2004), 
their roles in a restructuring and bargaining strategies with prevailing bank lenders would 
be interesting to study. Jowett and Jowett (2011) as well as statistics by the German Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (2015) suggest a more frequent private equity in-
volvement among small and medium sized German companies. 
7. The restructuring dynamics observable in the US should help to educate the German mar-
ket and lead to a greater country convergence. 
While many legal revisions to the German insolvency regime target a facilitation of in-
court reorganizations, Blatz et al. (2006), Undritz (2010) or more recently Geiwitz (2014) 
point out that those procedural arrangements are barely applied in practice and in-court 
proceedings are often entered as a last resort towards liquidation. With a great range of in-
court restructuring options such as an insolvency plan or the debtor-in-possession managed 
procedure that were introduced according to the role model of Chapter 11, the German re-
structuring market has the potential of becoming more dynamic and academia’s role in this 
process should be to raise awareness via further comparative literature and exemplary case 
studies of successful restructurings in- and out-of-court. Such research would be of high 
practical relevance since it could diminish the still prevailing stigma of insolvency and ed-
ucate about negotiation scenarios and possible courses of actions, which are important to 
have at hand in the often time-critical situations of financial distress. 
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6. Conclusion 
The discussion of the underlying paper has shown that the feasibility of out-of-court reorgani-
zations is highly dependent upon efficient negotiations with already or threatened to be im-
paired parties that are ready to make concessions to prevailing debt contracts or grant addi-
tional funding. However, the latter willingness highly depends – next to the state of the firm – 
upon the involved lenders and their lending terms to the firm as well as upon the interrelations 
to and wealth effects for other creditors of the firm.  
The underlying paper illustrated these dynamics via a discussion of the existing theoretical 
research and systematized the empirical body of literature highlighting the significance of 
capital structure characteristics such as the proportion of bank debt, the level of collateraliza-
tion or the number of involved parties for the in- or out-of-court reorganization decision in 
Germany and the US. With in-court reorganizations providing an alternative to informal 
workouts and introducing new bargaining mechanisms to the filing firm, the underlying paper 
includes a discussion of the bankruptcy codes of both countries as well as their revisions. 
The high dynamics of capital markets affecting firms’ funding schemes as well as the evolu-
tion of bankruptcy provisions by law – as for Germany – or by contractual design – as for the 
US – called for a summary and critical discussion of the existing literature that to the author’s 
best knowledge does not exist in a comparable form. Through the comprehensive review are-
as for future research are identified relating for the US especially to the still ambiguous influ-
ence of bank financing, the exact role of activist investors and the by them changed bargain-
ing dynamics. For Germany, new academic research should examine the recent role of bank 
pools, the dynamics of public debt restructurings and the role of private equity investors.  
Furthermore, changes to the German insolvency regime incorporating elements of the Chapter 
11 procedure are reported to still be largely unused (e.g. Blatz et al., 2006; Geiwitz, 2014; 
Undritz, 2010) thus calling for a generally broader academic coverage of the topic raising 
awareness for the set of restructuring options via exemplary case studies or further compara-
tive examinations to the dynamic US restructuring market. The underlying paper makes the 
first step in this direction in that it synthesized the complex bargaining dynamics found in the 
theoretical and empirical academic literature so far and stresses the still prevailing gaps in 
understanding. 
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Appendix 
Table 2.A.1: Summary of Academic Literature Covering the Relation Between Capital Struc-
ture and Reorganization Choice in the US and Germany 
Authors Country 
Method 
Sample 
Reorganization Key findings 
In-
court 
Pre-
packs 
Out-
of-
court 
Bedendo, 
Cathcart and 
El-Jahel (2016) 
US 
Empirical 
 2007-2011 
 98 Chapter 11 
cases (incl. 
prepacks), 65 
out-of-court 
cases 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ √ √ In-court and prepacks: Significantly more likely for 
higher leverage, greater proportion of current debt (li-
quidity crisis) and secured debt. Presence of CDSs not 
found to be significant. As compared to out-of-court, no 
significant difference found for proportion of public 
debt or of bank debt in general, but proportion of se-
cured bank debt significantly higher in-court.  
Out-of-court: Significantly more likely for greater num-
ber of debt tiers (diversification) and applicable taxation 
incentives for distressed exchanges from 2009 to 2010.  
Ivashina, Iver-
son and Smith 
(2016) 
US 
Empirical 
 1998-2009 
 111 Chapter 
11 cases, 25 
prepacks 
 Public and 
private firms 
√ √ − In-court (as compared to M&A or liquidation): Signifi-
cantly more likely for concentrated ownership of the 
largest ten creditor groups at the time of filing and 
when prepacks are present.  
Li and Wang 
(2016) 
US 
Empirical  
 1996-2013 
 658 Chapter 
11 cases (incl. 
prepacks) 
 Public firms 
√ √ − In-court: Significantly more likely to receive DIP fi-
nancing by prepetition bank lenders for greater propor-
tions of bank debt, presence / proportion of relationship 
lenders and higher operational performance (ROA) but 
low cash reserves. Presence of prepacks not found to be 
significant. Significantly more likely to receive DIP 
financing by activist investors for smaller companies 
and lower proportions of bank debt indicating over-
secured lenders with little incentives for further fund-
ing. Cash and operational performance not found to be 
significant. 
 63% of sample firms receive DIP financing: in 40% 
from prepetition bank lenders and in 13% from activ-
ist investors. 
Lou and Otto 
(2016) 
US 
Empirical  
 2001-2010 
 1,557 firms 
with 4,537 
new loans 
 Public, non-
utility and 
non-financial 
firms 
− − √ Out-of-court: More likely for firms with highly dis-
persed debt to have more covenants in new loans to 
control for creditor conflicts – especially when firm is 
financially distressed or highly leveraged. 
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Authors Country 
Method 
Sample 
Reorganization Key findings 
In-
court 
Pre-
packs 
Out-
of-
court 
Demiroglu and 
James (2015) 
US 
Empirical 
 1999-2012 
 106 Chapter 
11 cases, 59 
prepacks, 171 
out-of-court 
cases 
 Public, non-
utility and 
non-financial 
firms 
√ √ √ In-court and prepacks: Significantly more likely for 
higher debt complexity, a greater proportion of operat-
ing leases and underfunded pension liabilities. No sig-
nificant difference found for the proportion of secured 
debt.  
Prepacks (as compared to out-of-court): Significantly 
more likely for a greater proportion of loans held by 
CLOs, greater proportions of operating leases, under-
funded pension liabilities, NOLs and COD income. 
Out-of-court: Significantly more likely for presence of 
CDSs and greater proportions of bank financing. Latter 
relation holds especially for single bank lenders. 
 84% of the firms with public debt are restructured via 
forgiveness of payment and equity exchanges. Among 
traditional bank- and institutional lenders, maturity ex-
tension most common. Without public debt restructur-
ings, bank concessions are rare.  
Lim (2015) US 
Empirical 
 2001-2011 
 271 Chapter 
11 cases, 119 
prepacks, 79 
out-of-court 
cases 
 Public and 
private firms 
√ √ √ In-court: Significantly more likely for (multiple) 
(un)secured hedge fund involvement and greater pro-
portions of current debt. 
Prepack (as compared to in-court): Significantly more 
likely with (un)secured hedge fund involvement, greater 
proportions of public debt and higher leverage. 
Out-of-court (as compared to in-court): Significantly 
more likely for greater proportions of public debt, pres-
ence of under-secured bank debt and higher leverage.  
Hotchkiss, 
Smith and 
Strömberg 
(2014) 
US 
Empirical 
 1997-2010 
 358 Chapter 
11 cases, 119 
prepacks, 144 
out-of-court 
cases 
 Public and 
private firms 
√ √ √ Prepack (as compared to in-court): Significantly more 
likely for private equity backed firms with good operat-
ing performance (EBITDA margin) and high leverage.  
Out-of-court (as compared to in-court and prepacks): 
Significantly more likely for private equity backed firms 
and receivers of capital injections, with private equity 
backed firms being significantly more likely to receive 
such funding.  
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Authors Country 
Method 
Sample 
Reorganization Key findings 
In-
court 
Pre-
packs 
Out-
of-
court 
Fischer and 
Wahrenburg 
(2012) 
US 
Empirical 
 1999-2010 
 319 Chapter 
11 cases, 116 
out-of-court  
 Public, non-
utility and 
non-financial 
firms 
√ − √ In-court (complete sample): Significantly more likely 
for greater proportions of current debt, secured debt and 
higher industry adjusted leverage.  
Out-of-court (complete sample): Significantly more 
likely for firms in financial as compared to economic 
distress and with CDSs being present. 
In-court (succeeding subsample): Significantly more 
likely for greater proportions of public- and current debt 
as well as higher leverage. Proportion of secured debt 
not found to be significant. 
Out-of-court (succeeding subsample): Significantly 
more likely for CDSs being present. Most firms in sub-
sample are financially distressed so that no significance 
found.  
Jiang, Li and 
Wang (2012) 
US 
Empirical 
 1996-2007 
 474 Chapter 
11 cases (incl. 
prepacks) 
 Public firms 
√ √ − In-court and prepacks: Significantly altered outcomes 
due to hedge fund involvement with evidence for influ-
encing creditor conflicts via representation on unse-
cured debt- or equity committees and loan-to-own strat-
egies.  
Aspeli and 
Iden (2010) 
US 
Empirical 
 1995-2010 
 132 Chapter 
11 cases, 86 
out-of-court 
cases 
 Public firms 
√ − √ In-court: Significantly more likely for higher leverage, 
greater proportions of public debt and trade credit. 
Presence of CDSs not found to be significant. 
Out-of-court: Significantly more likely for greater num-
ber of private debt contracts as compared to public debt 
contracts. No significant difference found for the num-
ber of debt contracts in general or the proportion of 
bank debt.  
Jostarndt and 
Sautner (2010) 
Germany 
Empirical 
 1997-2004 
 59 bankruptcy 
cases, 57 out-
of-court cases 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ − √ In-court: Significantly more likely for greater propor-
tions of secured debt, longer distress duration and mul-
tiple restructurings. 
Out-of-court: Significantly more likely for higher lever-
age ratios, greater proportions of bank debt and the 
presence of bank pools. 
 Substantial bank concessions granted with principal 
waivers, new contracts and maturity extensions occur-
ring most frequently. Debt-to-equity swaps only ob-
served for 11% of subsample. 
Ayotte and 
Morrison 
(2009) 
US 
Empirical 
 2001 
 141 Chapter 
11, 12 pre-
packs 
 Public and 
private firms 
√ √ − In-court (as compared to M&A or liquidation): Signifi-
cantly more likely for junior debt and under-secured 
debt. Extent to which senior debt is over-secured not 
found to be significant. 
 75% of sample receives pre-petition credit facilities 
(PCF) of which 97% are secured increasing secured 
debt for median public firm by 11 times. 
 50% of sample receive additional secured DIP financ-
ing after filing that comes with restrictive covenants. 
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Jostarndt 
(2009) 
German 
Empirical 
 1996-2004 
 76 bankruptcy 
cases, 191 out-
of-court cases 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ − √ Out-of-court and in-court: Significantly more likely to 
receive new equity funding under presence of default 
and granted bank concessions and significantly more 
unlikely for higher leverage (debt overhang problem) 
and liquidity. 
 46% of sample firms receive funding via distressed 
equity offerings. 
Kahan and 
Rock (2009) 
US 
Theoretic 
− − √ Out-of-court: Significant hedge fund involvement in 
potentially defaulting firms with aim of generating 
gains instead of just reducing losses as traditional insti-
tutional investors.  
Lemmon, Ma 
and Tashjian 
(2009) 
US 
Empirical 
 1991-2004 
 505 Chapter 
11 cases 
 Public, non-
utility and 
non-financial 
firms 
√ − − In-court (as compared to M&A or liquidation): Signifi-
cantly more likely for financially distressed (high oper-
ating performance, high leverage) than for operationally 
distressed firms (low operating, low leverage). 
 Decrease in leverage pre- versus post-bankruptcy sig-
nificantly higher for financially distressed firms (de-
crease total liabilities but sell fewer assets) and for 
DIP financing recipients. 
Brunner and 
Krahnen 
(2008) 
Germany 
Empirical 
 1991-1999 
 18 liquidation, 
83 out-of-court 
cases 
 Private firms 
(√) − √ Out-of-court: Significantly more likely to succeed (i.e. 
rating upgrade to investment grade) under presence of 
banking pools, whose formation is more likely for a 
greater number of bank lenders with similar financing 
shares and for highly distressed firms. However, re-
structuring success found to be significantly less likely 
for large bank pools with more than four member 
banks. 
Baker (2007) Germany 
Case study 
√ − − In-court (as compared to liquidation): Case study of 
German retail company, “Mein Platz”, as first Chapter 
11 like in-court restructuring target applying German 
insolvency statue of 1999 in 2005.  
Brecher et al. 
(2007) 
US 
Theoretic 
√ − − In-court: More likely involvement of private equity and 
hedge funds following aim of return generation or cor-
porate control via (1) creating a fund for investments, 
(2) investing in expectedly impaired creditor class at 
discounted prices, and (3) providing senior credit or 
DIP financing with strict covenants and debt-for-equity 
swap provisions. 
Dhillon, Noe 
and Ramírez 
(2007) 
US 
Theoretic model 
and empirical 
 1988-2004 
 434 Chapter 
11 cases (incl. 
prepacks) 
 Public firms 
√ √ − In-court: More likely to obtain DIP financing if eco-
nomically viable, solvent but financially distressed 
firm. DIP loan serves as signalling mechanism for firm 
quality, because for economically inefficient or insol-
vent firms, manager (as assumed partial owner) does 
not expect equity value from additional financing 
sources. 
Prepack: More likely for economically viable but insol-
vent firms renegotiating debt to reduce debt overhang 
so that manager is incentivized to exert effort again.  
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McGlaun 
(2007) 
US 
Empirical 
 1997-2004 
 58 Chapter 11 
cases, 32 pre-
packs 
 Public firms 
√ √ − In-court and prepack: More likely to receive DIP fi-
nancing or cash collateral order if pre-bankruptcy (in-
formation intensive) senior loans are present. Bankrupt-
cy financing comes with considerable, tailored control 
rights.  
 Liquidation more likely if senior bank loans are pre-
sent. 
Baird and 
Rasmussen 
(2006) 
US 
Theoretic 
√ − √ In-court: More likely as DIP financing provides power-
ful tool to control bankruptcy process, e.g. via defining 
exclusivity period or removing cramdown provisions. 
Out-of-court: More likely as control over cash accounts 
provides powerful tool to monitor the state of the firm, 
to fine-tune control  and to avoid use of cash as collat-
eral for new firm financing.  
Bris and 
Welch (2005) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court: Smaller number of creditors pre-default 
serves as a signalling device for quality of the firm due 
to higher likelihood of repayment when entering finan-
cial distress but also higher renegotiation waste. 
Chatterjee, 
Dhillon and 
Ramírez 
(2004) 
US 
Empirical 
 1988-1997 
 609 Chapter 
11 cases (incl. 
prepacks) 
 Public, non-
regulated and 
non-financial 
firms  
√ √ − In-court and prepacks: More likely to receive DIP fi-
nancing to meet working capital requirements that are 
for 63% of the sample prescribed as the only use in the 
loan terms.  
 Attached affirmative and negative covenants provide 
ample control rights with 90% restricting operating 
expenses and operating activities, 85% capital expend-
itures and 95% the disposition of assets (collateral). 
Kucher and 
Meitner (2004) 
Germany 
Theoretic 
√ − √ Out-of-court: More likely as private equity investors are 
less vulnerable to (changes in) the insolvency code that 
can be avoided via debt-for-equity swaps.  
Dahiya, John, 
Puri and 
Raḿrez (2003) 
US 
Empirical 
 1988-1997 
 467 Chapter 
11 cases, 71 
prepacks 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ √ − In-court: Significantly more likely to receive DIP fi-
nancing when no prepack has been filed, for large firms 
and greater proportions of current assets (as collateral).  
 31% of sample firms receive DIP financing. 
Skeel (2003) US 
Theoretic 
√ − − In-court: More likely due to DIP financing mechanism 
that comes with attached restructuring conditions. DIP 
financing favoured by greater proportions of secured 
debt within firms’ capital structures as compared to the 
1980s.  
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Baird and 
Rasmussen 
(2002) 
US 
Theoretic 
√ √ √ Prepack: More likely when Trust Indenture Act triggers 
holdup by bondholders. 
Out-of-court: More likely with sensibly allocated con-
trol rights (fixed in corporate charter, securities or debt 
contracts) and low associated transaction costs. 
 Contracts better anticipate incentives of managers (for 
non-liquidation) and secured creditors (for inefficient 
sales) in states of financial distress. 
Bigus (2002) US vs. Germany 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court: More likely when senior, impaired debt 
holders transfer a side payment to equity holders en-
couraging investment in the preferred safe project. Al-
ternatively, junior debt and equity holders might form a 
coalition to benefit from risky investment projects re-
ducing expected payback to large senior debt providers.  
 For Germany, criminal penalties introduce threat to 
coalition between junior debt and equity holders and 
senior debt can file for bankruptcy to ensure payment. 
 For the US, bankruptcy filing induces no change of 
control and shareholders might still receive revenues 
decreasing incentive for high risk projects. 
Gilson (1997) US 
Empirical 
 1979-1989 
 51 Chapter 11 
cases, 57 out-
of-court cases 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ − √ In-court: Significantly reduced leverage due to lower 
transaction costs. Post-contracting debt repayment flex-
ibility (covenants) and ownership concentration of pri-
vate debt significantly increased while complexity of 
capital structure, i.e. number of debt contracts, signifi-
cantly decreased. 
Out-of-court: Significantly lower reduction in leverage 
due to number of long-term debt contracts and propor-
tion of bank- and insurance debt. Post-contracting only 
debt repayment flexibility significantly increased.  
Chatterjee, 
Dhillon and 
Ramirez 
(1996) 
US 
Empirical 
 1989-1992 
 70 Chapter 11 
cases, 21 pre-
packs, 110 
out-of-court 
cases 
 Public firms 
√ √ √ In-court: Significantly more likely for firms with greater 
proportions of trade credit and bank debt (as a proxy for 
senior secured bank debt).  
Prepacks: Significantly more likely for larger propor-
tions of current debt due (liquidity crisis). 
Out-of-court (via public workouts): Significantly more 
likely for firms with greater leverage. 
James (1996) US 
Empirical 
 1980-1990 
 68 out-of-court 
cases 
 Public, non-
regulated utili-
ty and non-
financial firms 
− − √ Out-of-court (via exchange offers): Significantly more 
likely with bank concessions and under greater financial 
distress (solvency ratio). However, bank concessions 
are more unlikely for a greater number of bond issues. 
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Tashjian, 
Lease and 
McConnell 
(1996) 
US 
Empirical 
 1980-1993 
 49 prepacks 
 Public and 
private firms 
− √ − Prepacks: More likely due to lower direct fees and less 
time spent in bankruptcy than under traditional Chapter 
11 proceedings.   
Betker (1995) US 
Empirical 
 1986-1993 
 49 Prepacks 
 Public firms 
− √ − Prepacks (as compared to out-of-court): More likely as 
substantial tax benefits from ownership change excep-
tions become effective under Chapter 11. Not more 
likely as only minor tax benefits on COD income be-
come effective for debt-for-equity exchanges. 
 No significantly lower direct costs compared to ordi-
nary Chapter 11 proceeding since fees paid prior to 
filing as precondition for renegotiations.  
 Significantly lower indirect costs as ordinary business 
operations continued by filing first-day orders (e.g. 
paying trade creditors, employee salaries, retention- 
and customer programs). 
Datta and Is-
kandar-Datta 
(1995) 
US 
Empirical 
 1980-1989 
 135 Chapter 
11 cases (incl. 
71 out-of-court 
cases) 
 Public and 
private, non-
financial firms 
√ − − In-court: More likely for failed out-of-court restructur-
ings and inability to obtain (short-term) financing.  
Out-of-court (preceding in-court): Significantly more 
likely for greater proportions of short-term creditors and 
higher leverage. Significantly less likely to succeed un-
der presence of secured bank debt.  
James (1995) US 
Theoretic model 
and empirical 
 1981-1990 
 102 out-of-
court cases 
 Public, non-
regulated utili-
ty and non-
financial firms 
− − √ Out-of-court: Significantly more likely for banks to ac-
cept equity offer under presence of impaired claims, 
public debt restructurings and low proportions of public 
debt. 
 Median sample firm with bank debt concessions has 
no public debt outstanding.  
Asquith, 
Gertner and 
Scharfstein 
(1994) 
US 
Empirical 
 1976-1989 
 42 Chapter 11 
cases, 34 out-
of-court cases 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ − √ In-court: Significantly more likely for greater propor-
tions of secured private debt as well as greater numbers 
of public debt issues. 
Out-of-court: More likely when public debt exchanges 
succeed including permanent relief via principal reduc-
tions and asset sales. Not more likely when banks loos-
en existing loan conditions only extending time until 
filing. 
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Franks and 
Torous (1994) 
US 
Empirical 
 1983-1988 
 37 Chapter 11 
cases, 45 out-
of-court cases 
 Public, non-
financial firms 
√ − √ In-court: Significantly lower current ratios (liquidity 
crisis) than out-of-court. No significant differences 
found for number of long-term debt securities, propor-
tion of long-term bank debt or face values of long-term 
debt securities. 
Mooradian 
(1994) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ In-court: More likely for inefficient firms that reveal 
their true state during official Chapter 11 proceedings. 
In exchange, preservation of equity value is expected 
(via deviations from absolute priority) that must exceed 
the gain from mimicking efficient firms out-of-court.  
Out-of-court: More likely for efficient but distressed 
firms under the presence of Chapter 11 regulation that 
leads inefficient firms to file thus allowing for firm 
segmentation, which will support the funding decisions 
by the uninformed public debtholder base. 
White (1994) US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ In-court: Preferable to creditors if proposed reorganiza-
tion plans disclose whether firm is inefficient and fail-
ing or efficient and failing. While managers of both 
types of firms are incentivized to offer low payment to 
increase own remuneration, the firm’s ability to offer 
high payment and the probability of creditors rejecting 
low payment can filter out failing firms.  
Out-of-court: Lower costs can increase creditors’ ex-
pected value from low paying plans leading to ac-
ceptance and failure of filtering.  
Brown, James 
and Mooradian 
(1993) 
US 
Theoretic model 
and empirical 
 1980-1990 
 70 out-of-court 
cases 
 Public firms 
− − √ Out-of-court (via private workout): More likely to issue 
senior debt to private debt holders to avoid freeriding of 
other creditors. However, if a senior debt issue is not 
feasible, equity is offered that when accepted by the 
informed bank lenders sends positive signals to the 
market.  
Out-of-court (via public workout): More likely to issue 
senior (unsecured) debt in exchange for public debt in 
high quality firms and equity in low quality ones. 
Bondholders only know firms’ general distribution in 
the market so that good companies are undervalued and 
bad companies are overvalued.  
Gertner and 
Scharfstein 
(1991) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court: More likely if senior debt is offered to 
original bondholders incentivizing hold-ins while in-
creasing burden for hold-outs. Public debt financing 
introduces inefficiencies as there is no direct negotia-
tion possible. If all debt were held by banks there would 
be no inefficiencies reducing financial distress costs to 
zero. 
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Gilson, John 
and Lang 
(1990) 
US 
Empirical 
 1978-1987 
 89 Chapter 11 
cases, 80 out-
of-court cases 
 Public firms 
√ − √ In-court: Significantly more likely for a greater number 
of distinct debt classes outstanding. 
Out-of-court: Significantly more likely for greater pro-
portions of bank debt. In combination with bank debt 
the number of distinct debt classes outstanding loses in 
significance.  
 90% of all bank debt and 38% of all public debt of 
subsample is renegotiated.  
Brown (1989) US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court: More likely as structure and rules of bank-
ruptcy code dictate proceeding and reduce strategic risk 
as well as holdout. Assuming perfect information and 
cross-default provisions, the only acceptable plan to all 
claimants is the same as in-court.  
Giammarino 
(1989) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court: Less likely given information asymmetries 
on the true state of the firm (insolvent versus solvent) 
and the consequent value of the outstanding debt. Vari-
ous negotiation scenarios exist that lead the creditor to 
reject negotiations and create considerable bargaining 
costs.  
Jensen (1989) US 
Theoretic 
√ − √ Out-of-court: More likely for firms with high leverage 
and going concern value but comparably low liquida-
tion value. 
 Active investors can add value by closely monitoring 
management or gaining corporate control. 
Haugen and 
Senbet (1988) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court: More likely for economically efficient but 
financially distressed firms with capital structure having 
no impact on choice of proceeding. 
 Decision to liquidate is independent of bankruptcy and 
driven by liquidation value exceeding going concern 
value. 
 Freerider problems can be solved via buying out orig-
inal security holders and redistributing fraction of 
saved bankruptcy costs or via contractual agreement in 
corporate charters or bond indentures. 
 Asymmetric information is not specific to bankruptcy 
setting and should be priced into lending conditions.   
Roe (1987) US 
Theoretic  
√ − √ Out-of-court: Less likely as unanimous consent to term 
changes of public debt incentivizes holdouts and failing 
of out-of-court proceedings. 
 Non-bondholder creditors less likely to recontract 
without substantial bondholder involvement. 
 Holdouts substantially harmed by exit consent to cov-
enants and thin residual market with suspended ana-
lyst coverage. 
Aivazian and 
Callen (1983) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ In-court: More likely for more than two recontracting 
parties involved as number of feasible contracts can 
shrink to zero elongating negotiations. Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings may reduce costs due to majority voting rules. 
 If multiple contracts exist strategic risk is introduced 
to renegotiations with what party arbitrating most. 
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White (1980) US 
Theoretic model 
√ − − In-court (as compared to liquidation): More likely if the 
residual liquidation value after all payments to bond-
holders is positive upon immediate liquidation. With 
liquidation in the following period, payments to bond-
holders might still be reduced.  
Bulow and 
Shoven (1978) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ Out-of-court (via private workout as compared to liqui-
dation): More likely if the expected residual value after 
all payments to bondholders exceeds bank debt’s liqui-
dation value when the bank and shareholders are treated 
as a coalition.  
 Relation is influenced by bond maturity, bank debt 
liquidation value, variability of future firm value and 
percentage of liquid assets to meet the liquidity short-
age. Independent of firm’s liquidation and continua-
tion value. Ambiguous impact of the proportion of 
bank debt. 
Haugen and 
Senbet (1978) 
US 
Theoretic model 
√ − √ In-court: Insignificance of capital structure for reorgan-
ization choice under assumption of large number of 
rational market participants that are all price-takers. 
Only if transaction costs to avoid transfer (e.g. new 
equity issue buying out debtholders, senior debtholders 
buying out residual debtholders to profit from priced in 
bankruptcy costs) outweigh (direct and indirect) bank-
ruptcy costs are in-court-proceedings chosen. 
 
Notes: The table above summarizes the key findings on how capital structure influences the choice for out-of-
court, hybrid or in-court reorganizations by German and American academic literature published in or after 1978 
with the US bankruptcy reform and the introduction of in-court reorganization procedures. The studies are sorted 
firstly by date of publication and secondly by alphabet. For each paper, the country- and method of analysis as 
well as the covered reorganization procedure is presented. “Theoretic” studies usually cover a legal discussion 
while “theoretic models” establish economic models. For each empirical examination, the sample is further de-
scribed with the sample period, sample size, applied reorganization procedure and types of studied companies 
(private / public and sector exclusions). The used abbreviations stand for the following: DIP – debtor-in-
possession, CDS – credit default swap, CLO – collateralized loan obligation, COD – cancellation of debt, NOL – 
net operating losses. 
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1.  Case Manuscript 
1.1  Introduction 
From his office, Stephen Mayer was watching the third shift of workers arriving at the site of 
“The Cycle Company” – TCC in short – Germany’s leading bicycle manufacturer. Located in 
the sleepy town of Teterow, out in the county in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, TCC was 
not only the most important employer of the region but also received exceptional news cover-
age. With its successful turnaround strategy from a low-cost bicycle producer to Germany’s 
avant-garde manufacturer of high-quality and electric bikes, TCC regularly hit the national 
headlines of the leading business newspapers reading: 
Figure 3.1: Exemplary Newspaper Excerpts of TCC 
 
Source: Own creation.  
 
04.07.2011 
20.03.2014 
 
18.12.2013 
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For TCC to accomplish its turnaround strategy, significant investments into new production 
lines and software as well as the acquisition of a startup company were necessary. To raise the 
required funding, various external sources had to be tapped introducing a new complexity to 
TCC’s corporate finance and accounting departments. Working long hours had therefore be-
come the new norm for Stephen, the CFO of TCC. However, tonight Stephen is observing the 
working crowd with a, for him, unusual trace of resignation as July 15, 2014 could enter into 
TCC’s history as the sudden turning point of its success story. 
In the afternoon, the German postal service announced that it had started to develop and pro-
duce its own bike series for its crew of postmen. Consequently, neither the envisaged regular 
production of 20 000 high-quality bikes nor the special order of 15 000 e-bikes would be allo-
cated to TCC. The cancelation came as a shock since the German postal service had been one 
of TCC’s major clients. They had regularly ordered a great batch of custom-made bicycles 
that were expected to contribute nearly 30% of revenues and 50% of profits in 2014.  
An emergency meeting with Peter Schulz, head of accounting, uncovered even more bad 
news: Due to the drastic collapse in forecasted income, some of TCC’s contractual loan 
agreements would be breached triggering the early repayment of a significant share of the 
company’s debt by the end of the year. After the evening session with Peter, Stephen was 
sorting his thoughts trying to find a way out of the seemingly hopeless situation that could 
drive TCC into bankruptcy. Although he felt tired of going through the corporate finance 
toolbox again to make TCC’s strategy work, he was sure that capital and financial restructur-
ing measures would be at the very top of his agenda for the coming months. 
A knock on the door from his personal assistant, who wanted to call it a day, interrupted his 
pondering: “Could you just get me Thomas on the phone before leaving?” Stephen needed to 
desperately discuss his thoughts with someone. After three rings, Thomas answered the phone 
with “Silverman Sachs, capital markets advisory, Thomas Claasen speaking.” – “Hi Thomas, 
this is Stephen.” 
 
1.2  Background 
Founded as a family business in the 1870s, TCC had produced bicycles consistently for the 
past 140 years spanning all different kinds of clients from the Prussian postal service in the 
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Wilhelminian era to the racing cyclists of the 1972 Summer Olympics. In the 1990s, TCC 
shifted its focus from the complete production of two-wheelers to the pure assembly of bicy-
cle parts that, in the course of globalization, could be imported at a much lower cost from the 
Eastern European and Asian markets.  
Following a mass production approach, TCC continuously expanded its output and gained a 
market share of a quarter of the total German bicycle production. Thereby, the majority of 
TCC’s production consisted of low-budget city and mountain bikes that were sold to German 
discounter chains. To generate profits in this very low margin business, the assembly process-
es were geared towards efficiency and working capital management was declared a top priori-
ty. Nevertheless, to secure favorable pricing in the international markets, bicycle parts were 
procured in batches weighting heavily on TCC’s inventory position while the payment terms 
were largely dictated by the discounter chains limiting TCC’s influence upon receivables.  
Although TCC generated positive returns due to its large production output und the resulting 
economies of scale, profits had stagnated in recent years. To trigger a new phase of earnings 
growth, TCC decided in 2011 to exploit the potential of higher priced racing and city bikes. 
Industry experts had long predicted great expansion opportunities in this segment as the two-
wheeler was expected to turn into a lifestyle product. Convinced of the growth outlook; TCC 
started building a new assembly line that – with the promise of regional job creation – was 
financed by the business development bank of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
While the construction proceeded smoothly, the company faced great challenges with design-
ing a lifestyle product, establishing it in the market and finding the appropriate distribution 
channels. Only with the German postal service could a major order be arranged that was in 
need of high-quality, tailor-made bicycles for its crew of postmen. To advance its product 
placement capabilities and polish up its stale brand reputation, TCC acquired the trendy Ber-
lin-based bike and e-bike startup, ESpeed, in June 2012. The transaction was financed with 
the stock-listing of TCC in the beginning of 2012 that was also used by the then controlling 
shareholders to exit their engagement. Due to the good relation to the target, the takeover was 
executed in a timely fashion and all accounting implications were processed by the end of 
2013. 
As part of the takeover agreement, the target’s founder, Andreas Mann, became the new CEO 
of TCC and the personifying figure of the company’s turnaround strategy. As the CEO’s first 
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act, ESpeed’s well-known brands were rolled out in TCC’s new production facilities, multi-
plying the output of the highly demanded bikes. To further integrate and expand ESpeed’s 
margin-rich e-bike production, Andreas Mann was planning on a second new assembly line to 
be built in 2014, for which funding was still needed. Since TCC’s cash reserves were strained 
by the interest payments for the loan of the business development bank, external funds would 
need to be raised in order to stabilize TCC’s financial situation and to invest in the next ex-
pansion phase. 
TCC has a credit rating of BBB- and prepares its consolidated financial statements according 
to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Its fiscal year covers the months 
from January to December. 
 
1.3  Funding the Expansion of TCC 
Going one year back in time, TCC’s future looked all too bright  
with no signs of financial distress ahead… 
Since nine o’clock sharp, Stephen was waiting for the CEO, Andreas Mann, known as Andy, 
who was already running five minutes late. The two had arranged an appointment to go over 
Andy’s storyline for the meeting with Thomas Claasen. Thomas was an old university friend 
from Stephen’s days at EAA Business School who was now working in the capital markets 
advisory division of the investment bank Silverman Sachs in London. Just three months ago, 
they had met at an alumni gathering in Barcelona, where Thomas talked extensively about his 
new girlfriend and to Stephen’s greater interest, about his unusually empty deal pipeline. 
When Stephen told him that TCC was in need of capital to finance its e-bike expansion strate-
gy, they decided to stay in close contact and after consultations with Andy set up a meeting in 
TCC’s headquarters for today, September 12, 2013 at 11 am. Stephen felt very content about 
the forthcoming collaboration with Thomas as, on the one hand, he trusted in the fairness and 
support of his old university friend during the deal. On the other hand, Silverman Sachs was 
one of the best known market intermediaries providing TCC access to a promising pool of 
funding. Just recently, Silverman Sachs had launched a new broker platform targeted at com-
panies in the lower ranks of investment grade ratings. In times of zero interest yields, inves-
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tors’ increasing risk appetite encouraged such placements and Thomas was keen to stand up 
as a rainmaker and present TCC in front of the board of Silverman Sachs. 
Ten minutes past nine, the bell of the elevator rang and Andy exited accompanied by the new-
est trial version, the trendy e-bike TX5005 that he was testing as a pilot driver. In a good 
mood, he passed his personal assistant and entered his office greeting Stephen with a: “Sorry 
for running late, so much traffic this morning!” Stephen tried his best to respond with a smile 
as one actually needed to search for cars on the empty roads of Teterow. After Andy’s obliga-
tory first cup of coffee, the two finally got down to preparing today’s presentation. 
 
1.3.1  Corporate Financing Tactics 
For Thomas to get a more detailed picture of the company, a virtual data room was estab-
lished containing all types of documents like TCC’s annual reports, its recent budget plans, its 
loan contracts and its articles of association. Although Stephen knew most of these docu-
ments, he also needed to prepare for the meeting. First and foremost, he had to gain a better 
understanding of how the different types of funding instruments would affect TCC’s corpo-
rate finances. He was especially focused on the leverage ratio, as he knew that an increase 
would further deteriorate TCC’s rating and raise its capital costs due to the adverse effects of 
indebtedness. 
To enter the negotiations thoroughly prepared, Stephen instructed Peter Schulz, head of ac-
counting, to evaluate the most likely funding scenarios. Peter explained during the CFO brief-
ing that in a first scenario a bond could be issued. This would raise TCC’s leverage ratio and 
as the instrument was expected to trade on the broker platform of Silverman Sachs, the bond 
would enter the balance sheet at its prevailing market value in each reporting date. Any fair 
value adjustments would be included in the income statement and change the amount of equi-
ty thus impacting TCC’s leverage ratio. Although Stephen knew it would be an uphill battle to 
explain to the other executive board members why the fair value adjustments impact TCC’s 
financial performance, he was convinced that issuing a bond on the broker platform would be 
proof of TCC’s professionalism in the corporate finance sphere. 
Regarding the capital costs of the instrument, Peter was advocating a zero bond to avoid fur-
ther straining the company’s cash flows on top of all the ongoing investments. Nevertheless, a 
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zero bond – of this Peter was sure – would still impact the income statement although no cash 
interest payments would occur. As soon as the terms were known, he would definitely need to 
dive into the exact calculation approach!  
In a second scenario, Peter was considering a mezzanine funding instrument called a partici-
pation certificate that was a particularity of the German capital markets. The certificate’s 
payments were usually fixed but also included a step up clause in the form of a right to partic-
ipate in a company’s profits. Peter recalled that this alternative construct would classify as 
equity if (1) the maturity of the participation certificate was perpetual, (2) TCC held the right 
to terminate the certificate and (3) the full amount of payments was triggered by the distribu-
tion of dividends to common shareholders. 
The head of accounting proclaimed that the charm of the latter solution was twofold: On the 
one hand, the equity instrument would improve TCC’s capital structure due to its classifica-
tion as equity. On the other hand, the full amount of annual costs could be influenced by TCC, 
because the participation rights would be directly linked to the company’s dividend policy. 
Peter dived further into the logic explaining that in years of greater investment needs, TCC 
could decrease its distributions to shareholders and in this way, also lowers its payments to 
participation holders. Therefore, TCC would be able to retain enough capital to internally 
fund its strategic initiatives – also with the participation certificates! Combined with the infi-
nite lifetime of the mezzanine instrument that could be terminated only by TCC the contractu-
al obligation for repayment could be managed very flexibly.  
Even without looking into the numbers, the outlined options mixed with the accounting jargon 
sounded quite complex to Stephen. For the negotiations with Thomas, he decided to stick to 
his key take-away of Peter’s briefing, namely to link the annual repayments of the new in-
vestments to TCC’s dividends. To Stephen, this appeared to be the optimal financing strategy 
as it would grant the company a great degree of financial leeway in the years of its ambitious 
e-bike expansion project. 
 
1.3.2  The Negotiation 
Thomas arrived punctually at the production site with a cab from Rostock airport. Stephen 
greeted him personally at the entrance of the administration tower and guided him up to the 
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conference room, where Andy was already waiting. After distributing the slides and going 
through the agenda, Stephen handed over to the CEO who started to supplement the sales fig-
ures with his story on TCC’s past turnaround strategy from a producer of low-budget to high-
quality bikes. He continued his presentation by talking about the next milestone: the expan-
sion into the e-bike segment that was expected to generate sales of 40 000 e-bikes in 2014 and 
80 000 by 2018.  
With the intention of preparing the following negotiation session, Stephen politely interrupted 
the strategic part of the presentation leading over to the financials with the question: “And 
what does the boost in sales mean for TCC’s results? This brings us to the next slide.” 
Figure 3.2: Selected Income Positions, 2012-2018e 
Source: Own creation. 
 
Stephen illustrated that with the expansion into the margin-richer e-bike segment, TCC would 
not only expand its total volumes sold, but also planned to double its EBITDA results with a 
target of 10 million euro for 2014 and net income of 5.4 million euro. For the following years, 
EBITDA Net Income Dividends
in 000 € in 000 € in 000 €
FY2012 2 513 691 380
FY2013 4 448 1 948 1 072
FY2014e 10 058 5 432 2 988
FY2015e 11 678 6 485 3 567
FY2016e 13 298 7 538 4 146
FY2017e 14 918 8 591 4 725
FY2018e 16 538 9 644 5 304
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the slide showed a continuous increase in EBITDA and net income, of which more than half 
was assumed to be distributed to TCC’s shareholders. Stephen used the promising profit fore-
casts to announce his proposal: “With TCC’s growth outlook, we see great potential for inves-
tors to participate in the company’s success and therefore, suggest funding our capital needs 
with participation certificates.” 
Thomas seemed surprisingly content about the proposal, but asked for a short break to under-
take some calculations mumbling: “Assuming a nominal amount of 35 million euro, a risk-
adjusted interest rate of approximately 7% and a maturity of five years…” After a couple of 
minutes, the negotiations resumed. Thomas reopened the meeting explaining that the terms 
looked acceptable to him but as Silverman Sachs would underwrite the issue he needed to 
reconfirm with the risk guys back in London. From experience, he was already sure that they 
would want a covenant as to better monitor the financial situation of TCC for the duration of 
the investment. 
Concretely, Thomas was advocating the interest coverage ratio, being defined as EBITDA 
over total interest expenses, as a covenant. To bring the well-developing negotiations to a 
concise conclusion, Stephen reassured that such a contractual add-on should not be a problem. 
TCC was already following this ratio very closely in its internal reporting systems because of 
its loan agreements with the business development bank of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
Thomas remembered having seen the loan documentation in the data room, but asked Stephen 
to remind him of the exact conditions. The CFO recalled the key points of the contract: “10 
million euro borrowed in January 2011 at an annual interest rate of 7% and with a maturity of 
10 years including the covenant ratio EBITDA over net interest expenses with a threshold 
level of 350%. If the ratio falls below this level, the bank has the right to withdraw its fund-
ing.” 
Again Thomas sank into calculations, but after a few seconds concluded: “Ok, that should be 
fine. We would include a not that restrictive threshold level of 250%. As to the other terms, I 
will talk to my colleagues and get back to you, Stephen, with the final terms within the next 
weeks.” After closing the meeting, Andy insisted on showing Thomas the production facili-
ties. However, Thomas had to catch the next flight and get back to his office for an all-
nighter.  
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One week later, Thomas sent the contract and the prospectus for the upcoming road shows. In 
his e-mail, he expressed his confidence in being able to raise the 25 million euro within the 
coming months or during the expected Christmas rally, at the latest. For its advisory and issu-
ance services, Silverman Sachs would charge a transaction fee of 1% of the nominal value of 
the bond.  With the exact documentation and a copy of the signed contract in hand, Stephen 
asked Peter to double-check the papers. However, the head of accounting proclaimed not to 
be an expert on the complex classification of financial instruments and proposed to get an 
external opinion. Therefore, Stephen approached a trusted financial auditor who directly clas-
sified the issued financial instrument as a liability.  
The CFO was surprised by this outcome as according to the external opinion the initially as-
sumed equity instrument somehow had turned into a financial liability. He wondered where 
Peter had gone wrong in his assessment. Or did Stephen miss out on something amongst all 
the complex accounting assertions? Should he have asked Peter to join the meeting? 
 
1.4  Can Financial Restructuring Avert the Crisis? 
TCC’s complex capital structure combined with its operational difficulties 
causes the CFO quite a headache on the night of July 15, 2014… 
Stephen was relieved to hear his old friend at the other end of the line and continued the con-
versation: “I am calling as we have a problem here at TCC and at this late hour I better get 
straight to the point.” – “Sure, fire away Stephen. I am all ears.” Stephen briefly illustrated the 
happenings of the day with the order cancellations of the German postal service. He knew that 
he would not need to go into the details in order to receive a well-founded advice as Thomas 
had extensively studied TCC’s financials for the bond issue one year ago.  
Therefore, Stephen focused his description on the effects of the lost customer. He explained 
that although the negative accounting consequences concerning impairments could be held at 
a minimum, the sales collapse in the margin-rich bikes segment would weigh heavily on the 
company’s EBITDA figures for 2014 and the foreseeable future. Combined with the higher 
interest expenses due to the bond issue, TCC’s adjusted forecasts predicted a breach of the 
loan covenant with the business development bank. 
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Table 3.1: Revised Income Statement for 2014e 
in 000 € 2014e 
Sales 118 250 
EBITDA          7 328 
EBIT          6 328 
Net Income           3 658 
Dividends                 0 
Source: Own creation.  
 
According to the contractual agreements, the breach would grant the counterparty the right to 
reclaim the outstanding loan by the end of the year. However, within just four months, TCC 
would not be able to raise the necessary capital especially not in its current crisis state. Thom-
as had a fast solution at hand: “Get rid of the loan by executing a debt-for-equity swap! The 
terms are much too restrictive – quasi a relic of the financial crisis. However, that said, I 
would not get involved in renegotiations of the conditions or even a postponement of the fi-
nancial covenant. In the end, you might even have to report this mess and thus raise uncertain-
ties in the capital markets. Just get the loan swapped into tangible equity before the end of the 
reporting period. The number of new shares should definitely lie within the ranges of your 
articles of association so that you don’t even need a shareholder vote.”  
Table 3.2: Term Sheet Debt-for-Equity Swap 
in 000 € As of July 2014 
Book Value Loan         10 000 
Fair Value Loan          8 000 
Fair Value of Additional Equity          8 000 
Advisory Fees            100 
Source: Own creation. 
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To Stephen, the call uncovered a, to date, unconsidered way out of imminent insolvency. He 
asked Thomas to put together an official document with a summary of the necessary actions 
so that Peter could prepare the negotiations with the business development bank. Stephen 
ended the call by insisting on a bill for the probably company-saving advice.  
Calmed down, Stephen left his office shortly before midnight. After a good night sleep, he 
would arrange a meeting with the bank tomorrow. Then, TCC’s future and the jobs of 1 200 
people would lie in the hands of the county of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
 
1.5 Requirements 
1.5.1 Presentation of Financial Instruments 
1) Please provide the definition of a financial instrument according to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
2) What are the prerequisites according to IAS 32.11 and IAS 32.16 to classify a financial 
instrument as equity? Please ignore the specific exemptions in IAS 32.16A-F for your 
answer. 
3) Do you agree with Peter that the participation certificate discussed in the CFO briefing 
classifies as equity? For your answer, interpret how the following three characteristics 
influence TCC’s contractual obligation according to IAS 32.16 (a):  
(1) The issuer’s right to terminate the participation certificate. 
(2) The determination of payment to participation holders. 
(3) The maturity of the participation certificate. 
4) Consider the final terms of the participation certificate in the prospectus  and explain:  
(1) Why the financial auditor classifies the participation certificate as a liability. 
(2) What role the included financial covenant plays for the classification according 
to IAS 32.25. 
5) What is the correct accounting treatment of the debt-for-equity swap according to 
IFRIC 19? Please provide the booking entries for the transaction detailed in table 3.2. 
1.5.2 Measurement of Financial Instruments 
1) Is Peter right that the fluctuating market values of the bond have to be reflected in the 
income statement? What alternative accounting treatment would be possible? 
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2) Due to the zero bond structure of the bond, TCC has to apply the effective interest 
method according to IFRS 9.B5.4.1-B5.4.7. Please complete the table below assuming 
that no dividends will be paid by TCC for the duration of the bond. 
Fiscal  
Year 
Opening Balance  
in € 
Interest Expenses  
in € 
Closing Balance  
in € 
2014    
2015    
2016    
2017    
2018    
3) Calculate the interest coverage ratio for the years 2014 and 2015 as defined in the pro-
spectus in figure 3.3 of the appendix. Include the EBITDA forecasts of figure 3.2 in 
your calculations.  
4) How does the sales collapse impact the interest coverage ratio? Please use the revised 
income statement from table 3.1 for your calculations. 
1.5.3 Disclosure of Financial Instruments 
1) Why is Thomas pressuring to close the debt-for-equity swap before the end of the fiscal 
year? What disclosures would otherwise be needed according to IFRS 7.18? 
2) What year-end fair value disclosure would be necessary for the loan according to 
IFRS 7.25? 
1.5.4 Related Corporate Finance Issues 
1) What is the optimal leverage ratio for TCC according to the Modigliani and Miller 
proposition I? 
2) Please challenge your answer to the previous question with the trade-off theory. 
3) What kind of signals do equity issuances convey to the capital market? Please discuss 
your answer within the pecking order theory. 
4) Which corporate finance measure does TCC use to resolve the capital structure issue? 
Which of the above capital structure theories best explains TCC financial restructuring 
decision?
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Appendix to Case Manuscript 
Figure 3.3: Participation Certificate Conditions (Excerpts of the Prospectus) 
Source: Own creation.
 
 Issuer:  The Cycle Company 
Specified Currency:  EURO 
Nominal Amount:  35 000 000 
Issue Amount: 25 000 000   
Issue Date:  01.01.2014 
Maturity Date:  31.12.2019 
Interest Basis:  Zero Coupon  
 
 
§ 9 
(Termination of Participation Certificates) 
1. During the lifetime of the instrument, TCC reserves the right to terminate the partic-
ipation certificates at the end of each calendar year, with the first date being 
31.12.2014.  
2. In the event that the interest coverage ratio should amount to less than 250%, the 
holder is granted the right to terminate the certificate and demand immediate re-
demption.  
“Interest coverage” ratio is thereby defined as (1) earnings before interests, taxa-
tion, depreciation and amortization over (2) net interest expenses of the consolidated 
financial statements. Net interest expenses equal the sum of all interests, compensa-
tions and commissions that relate to the liabilities recognized in the balance sheet, 
irrelevant of whether these costs are capitalized or expensed. 
 
 
§ 10 
(Determination of Participation Right) 
1. Starting from fiscal year 2014, holders of the certificate will additionally receive a 
right to participate in TCC’s profit development. The yearly payment will amount to 
35% of paid cash dividends per common share.  
2. Should no dividends be distributed to common shareholders, TCC is also not re-
quired to make any payments to the holders of the participation certificate.  
3. In case of a negative consolidated net income, no share of loss will be attributed to 
the holders of the certificate.  
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2. Case Guidance 
The subsequent sections discuss the motivation, the learning objectives and the contribution 
of our teaching case. Furthermore, we complement our assertions with the feedback that was 
received from students as part of testing the effectiveness of our instructional resource and 
share our experience for a successful case implementation. 
 
2.1 Motivation and Objectives 
The case is built around TCC AG, a fast-growing bicycle production company and headed by 
an ambitious top management team that wants to reinforce the growth strategy with a sophis-
ticated funding scheme. Whereas the characters and the dates of events are fictitious, the ac-
counting challenges resulting from financial restructurings are derived from real-life situa-
tions. Anchoring the case in a corporate scenario of financial distress
44
 allows the lecturer to 
discuss the interdependencies between the complex accounting for financial instruments, the 
mechanisms of financial restructurings and the related theories on capital structure. 
Students are introduced to the commonly applied corporate finance toolset of financial cove-
nants and of debt-for-equity swaps. Both play a central role in the restructuring context where 
financial covenants – as contractually agreed upon monitors of the borrower’s profit and li-
quidity situation – can act as early warning signals of potential financial bottlenecks (Nash, 
Netter and Poulsen, 2003). Alongside such measures as time extensions or waivers on debt 
repayments, debt-for-equity swaps represent a common out-of-court procedure to revert an 
imminent illiquidity crisis (Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin, 2004). 
Aside from their importance within the realms of financial restructuring, we decided to im-
plement these tools in our story so that an integrated understanding of the accounting for fi-
nancial instruments could be fostered. To achieve this purpose, students need to apply their 
knowledge to a diverse set of case scenarios involving financial instruments and are chal-
lenged by considering the wider economic consequences resulting for TCC’s corporate fi-
                                                 
44
  In our definition of “financial distress”, we follow Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2005) who state: „Financial 
distress is a situation where a firm’s operating cash flows are not sufficient to satisfy current obligations […]. 
Financial distress may lead a firm to default on a contract, and it may involve financial restructuring between 
the firm, its creditors, and its equity investors” (p.830). 
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nances. A first such consequence is triggered by the classification of the newly issued finan-
cial instrument as a liability (instead of equity) that raises TCC’s interest expenses and, com-
bined with the revenue decline, leads to the breach of a financial covenant. The infringement, 
in turn, initiates the need for financial restructuring whereby the imminent crisis can be re-
solved by exchanging the loan provided by the regional business development bank into equi-
ty. Students are thus faced with a reclassification scenario. 
The authors’ teaching experience has shown that students are so caught up in the accounting 
technicalities for financial instruments that they lose sight of the broader economic conse-
quences that result from a change in capital structure. In order to be well prepared for the 
practical realities, however, an in-depth knowledge of accounting for financial instruments 
should cover not only their respective recognition and measurement, but also their effects for 
contractual relations with lenders, for communication with capital markets and for the value 
of the firm itself. Therefore, we chose an integrated case approach that not only spans the 
recognition, measurement and disclosure of financial instruments, but also shows the econom-
ic consequences of accounting decisions. That there is a great need for such an integrative 
approach is emphasized by Barth (2008) who states: 
“Financial reporting educators also need to ensure their students learn the foundational 
theories that underlie financial reporting. These theories include micro- and macro-
economics, finance, information economics, the role and effects of incentives, rational ex-
pectations, and portfolio pricing. The conceptual framework states that the objective of fi-
nancial reporting is to provide information useful for making economic decisions (IASB 
2001, para. 12). Thus, it is clear that understanding economic concepts, including those re-
lating to information for investors and creditors, is fundamental to understanding financial 
reporting” (p.1164). 
Accordingly, the learning objectives of the underlying teaching resource are: 
1. To learn the accounting provisions for non-derivative financial instruments according to 
the IFRS. 
The objective is achieved by applying the accounting standards IAS 32 and IFRS 9 for the 
initial recognition and the subsequent measurement of non-derivative financial instruments 
(section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of the requirements). 
2. To understand the interlinkages between recognition, measurement and disclosure of non-
derivative financial instruments under the IFRS. 
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Students learn that the subsequent measurement of financial instruments is determined by 
their initial recognition (section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2) and that business incidents trigger disclo-
sure requirements (section 1.5.3 of the requirements). 
3. To raise students’ awareness for the economic consequences of accounting decisions on 
non-derivative financial instruments. 
This objective is achieved by showing how decisions on the classification and measure-
ment of non-derivative financial instruments can affect relations with capital providers (in 
the form of financial covenants, section 1.5.2) and the firm’s capital structure as a whole 
(section 1.5.4 of the requirements). 
4. To study the common financial restructuring measure of a debt-for-equity swap and its 
accompanying accounting treatment. 
Students get to know the common restructuring tool of a debt-for-equity swap whose im-
plications are evaluated from both an accounting (section 1.5.1) as well as a corporate fi-
nance perspective (section 1.5.4 of the requirements). 
5. To strengthen students’ analytical skills by having them assess different negotiation out-
comes and the corresponding business consequences. 
With the case, students learn to critically assess different business scenarios and are asked 
to evaluate the outcomes from both an accounting perspective (section 1.5.1) and from a 
corporate finance perspective (section 1.5.4 of the requirements). 
 
2.2 Development and Contribution 
Although the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has overhauled the IFRS on 
financial instruments completely within the last ten years,
45
 the standards still pose a huge 
challenge for students, practitioners and standard setters. These challenges stem from the in-
herent complexities and the ongoing amendments of the financial instrument standards (Ernst 
& Young, 2015). Considering the usefulness of case-based teaching (see Boyce, Williams, 
Kelly and Yee, 2001; Chen, 2013) and the aforementioned educational and practical difficul-
ties, the case at hand covers the most current IAS / IFRS on financial instruments: IAS 32 
                                                 
45
  IFRS 7 was published in 2005 and replaced disclosure requirements previously incorporated in IAS 32. The 
IASB subsequently published versions of IFRS 9 that introduced new classification and measurement re-
quirements (in 2009 and 2010), a new hedge accounting model (in 2013) and a final version in July 2014. 
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Financial Instruments: Presentation, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and IFRS 9 
Financial Instruments. 
In particular, IAS 32 attracts considerable attention from the standard setters and various in-
terest groups (IASB, 2008). One of the main reasons is its purpose to regulate the recognition 
of capital issuances as equity or debt in the financial statements. Therefore, the standard effec-
tively determines the loss-absorption capacity of an economic entity. Despite its central role, 
the standard is, however, very difficult to apply, because of its widely criticized complexity 
(IASB, 2008; IASB, 2009) mainly originating from its casuistic nature,
46
 which as a matter of 
fact struggles to capture all existing funding structures. Keeping this shortcoming in mind, we 
added specific indications of the relevant accounting standards and paragraphs to the case 
requirements to ensure that students spend time on the application of accounting standards 
instead of on finding the correct paragraphs.  
The requirements of section 1.5.1 encourage a detailed discussion on the recognition of finan-
cial instruments (IAS 32) asking students for the definitions of financial instruments and their 
applicability. Following the structure of accounting standards, the requirements continue with 
the subsequent measurement (IFRS 9) and the notes to the consolidated financial statements 
(IFRS 7) in sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. This integrative approach of combining recognition, 
measurement and disclosure along one business transaction is often missing in accounting text 
books and is consequently underrepresented in the curriculum (Ruhl and Smith, 2013). 
As the central means to motivate students’ interest in financial instruments accounting, the 
case highlights the significance of accounting decisions for the financial rescue of a financial-
ly distressed firm. All financial measures to avert the imminent illiquidity are centred on the 
core question of TCC’s capital structure and funding strategy. Students working on the re-
structuring case experience how contract details change throughout negotiations and how im-
portant a continuous and proactive accounting assessment is for a successful financial restruc-
turing. 
There is one strand of recent case studies that covers the accounting treatment of capital 
measures such as stock buybacks (Kimmel and Warfield, 2008; Mohrmann and Stuerke, 
2014) or preferred stocks issuances (Margheim, Hora and Kelley, 2008). Other cases are cen-
                                                 
46
  See, for example, the specific exemptions in IAS 32.16A – F. 
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tred on derivatives accounting as part of hedging relationships (Smith and Kolbeck, 2008; 
Ebrahim, Schultz and Hollister, 2010). Whereas all of these cases deal with financial instru-
ments, they are mainly focused on isolated accounting discussions according to the US-
GAAP and do not include an assessment of the resulting economic consequences. 
To our best knowledge, the case at hand is the first comprehensive educational resource that 
deals with the complex financial instruments accounting according to the IFRS in a financial 
restructuring setting. The case targets the specific needs of an integrative accounting and fi-
nance curriculum raising students’ awareness for the economic consequences of accounting 
decisions (Bianco, Levy, Marcel, Nixon and Osterheld, 2014). Therefore, we understand our 
case as an innovative contribution to the existing educational literature on accounting. 
 
2.3 Implementation Guidance 
The case was implemented twice in an advanced accounting course of the Master of Sciences 
program at the authors’ graduate business school. The course is an accounting elective with 
the learning objective of deepening students’ understanding for the IFRS. Students at this 
stage of the curriculum are required to know the accounting basics and to have attended cor-
porate finance classes dealing with the fundamental theories of capital structure and firm val-
ue. If students are not familiar with the foundations of capital structure theory, the modular 
setting of the case requirements allows instructors to leave out section 1.5.4. Nevertheless, we 
encourage instructors to debate the capital structure theories at least briefly during the in-class 
discussion of the case, because the learning outcome seems to – as is intended by our case 
design – be positively impacted by integrating the topic with financial instruments accounting 
(see further details in section “2.4 Student Assessment”). 
We provided students with the case and the relevant accounting standards four weeks in ad-
vance of the in-class discussion. In order to set an incentive to work on the case at home and 
to actively participate in the case discussion, we informed students via the course outline that 
one-sixth of the final exam would relate to the accounting concepts covered by the case. To 
ensure a basic knowledge on the relevant accounting topics, we gave a comprehensive intro-
duction on accounting for financial instruments under the IFRS one lecture before the in-class 
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discussion. This mandatory preparation session took 90 minutes and was sufficient for cover-
ing all foundations. 
The discussion revealed that the understanding of the accounting technicalities was signifi-
cantly improved by encouraging a reflection upon the economic consequences resulting from 
accounting decisions and judgements. Thereby, all accounting aspects were analysed in the 
case framework of TCC’s efforts to restructure its financial position. During the entire class, 
we encouraged students to discuss the corporate finance implications of the accounting deci-
sions and asked whether and how accounting alternatives could be realized by TCC’s man-
agement. Furthermore, the international heterogeneity of our graduate students inspired a dis-
cussion of the participation certificate in the context of different corporate governance struc-
tures. Due to the fact that for the majority of the class the discussed funding instrument was 
unknown, students had to assess the extracts from the prospectus in great detail to be able to 
respond to the asked for accounting consequences during the in-class discussion. 
For the exam, we asked questions on case-related topics like accounting for debt-for-equity 
exchanges and the assessment of contractual clauses with regards to the IAS 32 classification. 
In previous accounting classes, where no case-based teaching was implemented, the exam 
results for financial instruments questions were significantly lower than the average outcomes 
in our exams. This observation is in line with the high complexity of financial instruments 
accounting (Ernst & Young, 2015). Furthermore, the significantly better exam results and 
students’ oral feedback provide initial evidence that the integrated nature of case-based teach-
ing helped to achieve this improved learning outcome. The effectiveness of the underlying 
case was, however, further analysed with a structured survey, the results of which are present-
ed in the following section.  
While the authors chose the in-class discussion for case implementation, the structure of the 
pedagogical resource also allows for various alternatives. An in-class discussion that is mod-
erated by the students themselves could be particularly effective as it would foster an inde-
pendent elaboration of the accounting issues. The answers to the different requirement blocks 
regarding recognition, measurement, disclosure and corporate finance could be presented by 
student groups via a presentation leaving the interrelations and economic consequences up for 
a discussion moderated by the lecturer.  
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2.4 Student Assessment 
Following the effectiveness testing of recent case studies, we assessed the pedagogical use-
fulness of the case with a structured survey (see Churyk and Stenka, 2014; Davis and Matson, 
2014; Holtzblatt and Tschakert, 2014). A questionnaire with 12 statements similar to the one 
used by Detzen, Hoffmann and Zülch (2013) as well as Detzen, Stork genannt Wersborg and 
Zülch (2015) was distributed to students after the in-class discussion. Students were asked to 
indicate their level of agreement based on a five-point Likert-type scale with one indicating 
strong- and five weak agreement. Table 3.3 presents the results of our survey. 
Table 3.3: Aggregated Student Responses to Questionnaire 
Statement 
 
N = 47 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) 
Agree 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
(3) 
Disagree 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(5) 
Average 
 
 
1. In general, case studies are useful for 
learning accounting. 
35 12 0 0 0 1.26 
2. Prior to the case, my understanding of the 
accounting treatment of financial instru-
ments was weak.  
11 28 6 1 1 2.00 
3. The case increased my knowledge of the 
accounting treatment of financial instru-
ments. 
15 29 2 1 0 1.77 
4. The case study provided "real-world" 
application of what I learned in class. 
20 20 6 1 0 1.74 
5. The case required me to integrate 
knowledge of several accounting topics. 
10 25 11 1 0 2.06 
6. The integration of corporate finance top-
ics helped me to understand the practical 
application of accounting standards on fi-
nancial instruments. 
15 24 7 1 0 1.87 
7. The case study was too difficult.  1 8 17 18 3 3.30 
8. The case was too easy. 0 1 17 21 8 3.77 
9. Overall, the case provided a beneficial 
learning experience.  
12 31 2 2 0 1.87 
10. Overall, the case study served the pur-
pose of this course well. 
10 33 2 2 0 1.91 
11. I enjoyed working on the case study. 11 26 8 2 0 2.02 
12. The case study enhanced my problem-
solving skills. 
11 18 15 3 0 2.21 
Source: Own creation following Detzen et al. (2013; 2015) 
Notes: The table above illustrates our effectiveness questionnaire and summarizes for each of the 12 questions 
the level of agreement by the in total 49 surveyed students.  
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As the table above shows, the vast majority of students expressed the opinion that case studies 
are highly useful (average of 1.26) for learning accounting. Furthermore, statements 2 and 3 
of the survey indicate that participants’ knowledge in accounting for non-derivate financial 
instruments according to the IFRS was improved by the implementation of our teaching re-
source also via the application of the learned accounting technicalities to a realistic case sce-
nario (see statement 4). Consequently, we see our first formulated learning objective (LO) of 
the case approved by the student-feedback.  
Moreover, the learning experience seemed to be particularly enhanced via embedding related 
accounting and corporate finance topics in a real world restructuring context. The strong re-
sults for statements 4 to 6 approve the integrative nature of our case that is defined by LO 2 to 
LO 4. The holistic understanding of financial instruments relating to the accounting interlink-
ages, the respective application to the restructuring environment and the resulting economic 
consequences is, in our opinion, highly important for business students to practice because 
they are likely to face such complex situations along their potential career paths in the bank-
ing- and consulting industry. 
Overall, working on case studies in general was perceived as effective (LO 5) and the level of 
difficulty – taking into account the complexity of financial instruments and financial restruc-
turing – was approved as being appropriate. This appropriateness was underpinned by stu-
dents’ feedback that they spent 4.2 hours on average preparing the in-class discussion.  
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3. Case Solutions 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
The following solutions are intended to facilitate the use of the educational resource for a 
case-based and integrative accounting education. The integrative nature of the case allows 
instructors to teach the interrelation between different accounting topics and corporate finance 
theories. In particular, the case asks students to work on the recognition, measurement and 
disclosure of non-derivative financial instruments embedded within a financial restructuring 
environment.  
We give instructional guidance in italics where helpful that should not be asked for of stu-
dents as solutions to the requirements. The intention of the instructional guidance is to share 
teaching experiences and the reasoning behind specific requirements. Therefore, the teaching 
notes are solely meant to equip instructors; a distribution to the students is not intended. By 
distributing solutions to the class, the impression might be created that the issues are less con-
troversial undermining the case’s “real-life” approach. 
 
3.2 Recommended Solutions 
3.2.1 Presentation of Financial Instruments 
1) Please provide the definition of a financial instrument according to the International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
In order to lay the foundations for the discussion of the accounting for financial instruments, 
students are requested to define the term “financial instruments” according to IAS 32. Alt-
hough the requirement only asks for the definition according to IAS 32.11, we recommend 
drawing students’ attention to the importance of the term “contract” and to the definition in 
IAS 32.13. In particular, the understanding of “discretion” and “enforceable by law” is piv-
otal for an effective in-class discussion of “contractual obligations”. 
Answer: According to IAS 32.11, a financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to a 
financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity.  
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The term contract is important to the definition and refers to “an agreement between two or 
more parties that has clear economic consequences that the parties have little, if any, discre-
tion to avoid, usually because the agreement is enforceable by law” (IAS 32.13). 
2) What are the pre-requisites according to IAS 32.11 and IAS 32.16 to classify a financial 
instrument as equity? Please ignore the specific exemptions in IAS 32.16A-F for your answer. 
After providing the general definition of a financial instrument in the previous question, the 
students are now asked to describe how an equity instrument is specifically defined under 
IAS 32. The first definition of the requirement according to IAS 32.11 should be used to re-
mind students of the basic function of equity as the “residual item” particularly in the wake of 
dismantling the respective company (e.g. after financial distress). The in-class discussions 
where the case was tested brought to light that students are so focused on the accounting de-
tails that they miss the economic function and therefore, the real-life importance of the classi-
fication of equity in business in general (e.g. the loss absorption function of the “residual 
item”). 
The second part of the requirement asks for the definition according to IAS 32.16 (excluding 
exemptions in the paragraphs 16A-F) covering the “contractual obligations” and the “set-
tlement in the issuer’s own equity instruments”. The instructor is advised to emphasise that 
especially the part of the equity definition in IAS 32.16 (a) regarding the “contractual obliga-
tions” are important for the coming discussions in the teaching case, due to the utmost im-
portance of the concept of contractual obligation in the assessment of an equity instrument 
under IAS 32. 
The last parts in paragraph IAS 32.16 (b) deal with instruments that are settled in the entity’s 
own equity instruments and usually structured as options (see IAS 32.AG27). For pedagogical 
reasons, we focus on non-settlement structures as outlined in IAS 32.16 (a) in order to direct 
students’ awareness to the general points of the debt versus equity discussion within the IFRS 
regime. With the same rationale, we left out the specific exemptions in IAS 32.16A-16F. 
Answer: An equity instrument is any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets 
of an entity after deducting all of its liabilities (IAS 32.11). The instrument includes no con-
tractual obligation either (IAS 32.16 (a)): 
 to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or 
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 to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions 
that are potentially unfavourable to the issuer. 
If the instrument will or may be settled in the issuer’s own equity instruments, it is 
(IAS 32.16 (b)): 
 a non-derivative that includes no contractual obligation for the issuer to deliver a varia-
ble number of its own equity instruments; or 
 a derivative that will be settled only by the issuer exchanging a fixed amount of cash or 
another financial asset for a fixed number of its own equity instruments. For this pur-
pose, rights, options or warrants to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s own equity in-
struments for a fixed amount of any currency are equity instruments if the entity offers 
the rights, options or warrants pro rata to all of its existing owners of the same class of 
its own non-derivative equity instruments. 
 
3) Do you agree with Peter that the participation certificate discussed in the CFO briefing 
classifies as equity? For your answer, interpret how the following three characteristics influ-
ence TCC’s contractual obligation according to IAS 32.16 (a): 
Due to the fact that a contractual obligation is the central characteristic for whether an in-
strument is classified as a financial liability or an equity instrument according to IAS 32, the 
question is drafted to foster the evaluation of various contract clauses that are usually em-
bedded in mezzanine funding schemes like participation certificates (Ernst & Young, 2015).  
(1) The issuer’s right to terminate the participation certificate. 
According to information provided in the CFO briefing, it can be assumed that the participa-
tion certificate is redeemable only at the issuer’s discretion. Consequently, the certificate con-
tains no contractual obligation according to IAS 32.16 (a) (Ernst & Young, 2015). 
Answer: Peter is correct that TCC’s right to redeem the participation certificate does not lead 
to the classification of a financial liability according to IAS 32, because the redemption is 
solely at TCC’s discretion and therefore not a “contractual obligation” to deliver cash. 
(2) The determination of payment to participation holders. 
Because the delivery of cash to participation holders is solely linked to the occurrence of div-
idend payments to TCC’s shareholders, the clause does not constitute a contractual obliga-
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tion according to IAS 32.16 (a) (Ernst & Young, 2015). We recommend discussing this verdict 
in comparison to dividend payments on ordinary shareholders whereby shareholders can 
expect a dividend payment from the entity in which they own a share but still do not have the 
“right” to receive them. Within the IAS 32 framework this situation does not lead to the clas-
sification of common shares as financial liabilities. 
Answer: Again, Peter’s accounting opinion is correct because the payments are at the discre-
tion of the issuer and the distribution of dividends to ordinary shareholders can be suppressed 
by TCC’s management. Therefore, the “dividend blocker” clause does not constitute a con-
tractual obligation. 
(3) The maturity of the participation certificate. 
The maturity of any financial instrument and the resulting legal obligation to repay the out-
standing principal amount is the prime example of a contractual obligation to deliver cash 
according to IAS 32.16 (a). Although not specifically addressed in the case, the lecturer is 
encouraged to mention at this point that the combination of a perpetual instrument (e.g. per-
petual debt without the legal obligation to repay the principal amount) with fixed interest 
payments (the interest payments are not at the management’s discretion) also leads to the 
classification of a financial liability according to IAS 32, because the coupon payments pre-
sent contractual obligations (IAS 32.AG6). 
Answer: Peter’s accounting opinion is correct, because the participation certificate is perpet-
ual and therefore presents no contractual obligation for TCC to repay the bond. 
 
4) Consider the final terms of the participation certificate in the prospectus and explain:  
The authors’ experience from real-life transactions is that the contractual terms of the trans-
action change throughout the negotiation and this has been implemented in the case to main-
tain its relevance for practice. Hence, adaptations result from misunderstandings between 
TCC’s CEO and the head of accounting. With the communication problems, we intend to 
highlight the importance of an integrated understanding of accounting as well as corporate 
finance issues. Students are required to analyse the various outcomes of the negotiation and 
to adjust – if necessary – the accounting treatment. 
(1) Why the financial auditor classifies the participation certificate as a liability. 
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Although the finite maturity and the financial covenant both independently lead to the con-
tractual obligation that forces TCC to classify the participation certificate as a financial lia-
bility, we recommend discussing only the finite maturity at this point. The accounting impact 
of financial covenants is discussed in detail in the next question. In the in-class discussion, we 
stressed that no matter how many criteria in the prospectus are equity-like according to 
IAS 32 the existence of only one criterion that creates a contractual obligation is sufficient to 
force TCC to classify the instrument as a financial liability according to IAS 32.16. 
Answer: The contractual obligation to deliver cash in the future (e.g. repaying the bond after 
five years) is a criterion that leads to the liability classification according to IAS 32.16 (a). 
(2) What role the included financial covenant plays for the classification according to 
IAS 32.25. 
The accounting standard specifies in IAS 32.25 “Contingent settlement provisions” as uncer-
tain future events that may require the entity to deliver cash or another financial asset, lead-
ing to the financial liability classification of the concerned instrument. In particular, the 
standard provides “the issuer’s future revenues, net income or debt-to-equity ratio” as exam-
ples for such an event. In accordance with the latter example, the teaching case lays out that 
fundamental reason of the deterioration of TCC’s financial situation are the declining reve-
nues due to a customer order cancelation. This loss in revenues eventually triggers the cove-
nant breach. 
At this point of the in-class discussion, we recommend to recap the specific terms of the finan-
cial covenant (see the definition of the interest coverage ratio in figure 3.3), briefly discuss 
the economic consequence of a breach (e.g. the right of the bank to ask for repayment of the 
loan) and the rationale behind the covenant from a bank’s perspective. In order to ensure that 
students understand the importance of covenants from a corporate finance perspective, we 
provided them with a definition and common characteristics of covenants (see second part of 
the recommended answer) during the in-class discussion. Moreover, to understand the bank’s 
intention to demand a financial covenant, it is important to interpret two of the listed three 
criteria in IAS 32.25 that could lead to the classification as an equity instrument according to 
IAS 32 despite the existence of a contingent settlement provision (e.g. financial covenant). 
First, IAS 32.25 (a) stipulates that if the contingency is “not genuine” then it does not lead to 
the financial liability classification. IAS 32.AG28 defines that “not genuine” means that 
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events are extremely rare, highly abnormal and very unlikely to occur. Students should un-
derstand that the breach of a financial covenant is obviously not highly abnormal, because 
the banks insist on having them due to risk management requirements and concrete experi-
ences to incorporate these contractual clauses in the loan agreement. 
Secondly, IAS 32.25 (b) mentions the liquidation of the respective entity as contingency that 
does not lead to the financial liability classification. According to the provided prospectus, 
the repayment of the loan is only connected to the covenant breach and not to the liquidation 
of the company. Moreover, the rationale of the financial covenant is to trigger the repayment 
of the loan before financial distress hinders the company’s ability to repay the financial lia-
bility.  
The third criterion mentioned in IAS 32.25 (c) specifically deals with the exemptions in 
IAS 32.16A and IAS 32.16B in combination with IAS 32.25. Due to the pedagogically moti-
vated scope of the teaching case (as explained for question 2) on the “Presentation of Finan-
cial Instruments”), we recommend skipping the criterion in IAS 32.25 (c). 
Answer: According to IAS 32.25, the event of the occurrence or non-occurrence of uncertain 
future events (e.g. lack of future revenues) is beyond TCC’s control. Therefore, TCC does not 
have the unconditional right to avoid delivering cash (e.g. repay the loan) in case of a finan-
cial covenant breach. 
Financial Covenants: “A financial covenant is an undertaking given by a borrower to its lend-
er to maintain a minimum or maximum level of a financial measure such as gearing or net 
worth or interest cover” (Moir and Sudarsanam, 2007). Covenants are generally defined as 
additional contractual agreements that come in various forms including positive (e.g. the bor-
rower is required to invest the borrowed money in a specific asset), negative (e.g. the borrow-
er must not invest the borrowed money in a specific asset) and financial covenants (e.g. inter-
est coverage ratio). A breach of an agreed upon debt covenant can give the borrower the right 
to cancel the contract irrespective of the lenders’ ability to repay the bond or loan. 
 
5) What is the correct accounting treatment of the debt-for-equity swap according to 
IFRIC 19? Please provide the booking entries for the transaction detailed in table 3.2. 
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The requirement provides the lecturer with the opportunity to introduce the common restruc-
turing measure “Debt-for-equity swap” (Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin, 2004), including the 
required accounting treatment according to the IFRS. Furthermore, the requirement gives the 
lecturer the chance to briefly explain the role of the International Financial Reporting Inter-
pretations Committee (IFRIC) within the rules-based IFRS framework. The IASB explains 
“The objectives of the Interpretations Committee are to interpret the application of IFRS, 
provide timely guidance on financial reporting issues that are not specifically addressed in 
IFRS […]”. Because neither IAS 32 nor IFRS 9 specifically deal with the accounting treat-
ment of the extinguishment of a financial liability due to the issue of equity instruments to the 
creditor, the IASB issued IFRIC 19 “Extinguishing Financial Liabilities with Equity Instru-
ments” in 2009. The interpretation offers guidance on how to account for transactions like 
debt-for-equity swaps. 
The in-class discussion of the debt-for-equity swap should briefly touch upon the reasons for 
the difference between the nominal amount of the loan (10 million euro) and the (credit risk 
adjusted) fair value (8 million euro). Students should learn that the deteriorated credit risk 
situation of TCC induces the bank to accept an extinguishment of the liability lower than the 
original principal amount of the loan. Technically speaking, the credit risk adjusted fair value 
of the loan is less than the nominal value due to the bank’s revised cash-flow expectation to 
not receive full repayment of the outstanding loan. 
TCC’s equity increase (e.g. credit equity booking) of 7.9 million euro is the result of subtract-
ing the incremental transaction costs of 0.1 million euro from the fair value of the considera-
tion of 0.8 million euro. The deduction of the transaction costs from equity is required by 
IAS 32.35, because the costs are directly linked and incremental to the issuing of TCC’s addi-
tional equity (Ernst & Young, 2015). The booking entry assumes that the transaction costs are 
paid directly and therefore, the account “cash and cash equivalents” is credited by 0.1 mil-
lion euro. 
IFRIC 19.6 requires that the fair value of the equity instruments should be measured first. 
Only if the measurement of the fair value of the issued equity instruments is not reliably pos-
sible the fair value of the liability can be used as a valuation of the new equity. Due to the 
pedagogical focus of the case, the fair value of the new equity instruments is given and no 
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valuation issues (e.g. changes in shareholdings) are raised. The provided numbers assume 
that the fair value of the new equity equals the fair value of the liability.  
This situation is in line with the expected rational behaviour of the development bank and the 
existing shareholders. It can be assumed that both parties only accept fair values in line with 
IFRS 13 because the measurement of the capital injection and the extinguishment of the lia-
bility is a value that would be seen in an “orderly transaction between market participants” 
(IFRS 13.9). 
Answer: A debt-for-equity swap is a common restructuring measure to improve the financial 
position of a company. Debt is exchanged for a predetermined amount of equity. The differ-
ence between the carrying amount of the financial liability extinguished, and the fair value of 
the consideration (e.g. the capital injection), shall be recognised in profit or loss (IFRIC 19). 
Incremental costs attributable to an equity transaction are debited directly to equity 
(IAS 32.35). 
Table 3.4: Booking Entries for the Debt-for-Equity Swap 
in 000 € As of July 2014 Accounting Treatment 
Book Value Loan         10 000 
Carrying Amount 
(IFRIC 19.9) 
Fair Value Loan          8 000 
Fair Value of the Consideration 
(IFRIC 19.9) 
Advisory Fees            100 
Incremental Transaction Costs  
(IAS 32.35) 
Source: Own creation. 
 
Debit “Other financial liabilities”  €10 000 
Credit “Share Capital”   €7 900 
Credit “Other income”   €2 000 
Credit “Cash and cash equivalents”  €100  
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3.2.2 Measurement of Financial Instruments 
1) Is Peter right that the fluctuating market values of the bond have to be reflected in the in-
come statement? What alternative accounting treatment would be possible? 
According to IFRS 9.4.2.1 financial liabilities are measured at amortised cost or at fair value 
through profit or loss (FVTPL). The FVTPL categorization is only allowed for instruments 
that are held for trading, for instruments with embedded derivatives, stand-alone derivatives 
or to avoid an accounting mismatch. 
 According to IFRS 9 Appendix A, a financial liability has to be classified as “held for 
trading” if the instrument is hold for the purpose of selling or repurchasing, is managed 
within a portfolio to generate short-term profit or is a derivative according to IFRS 9. 
Based on the information provided in the case, all of these three held for trading crite-
ria can be rejected.  
 Secondly, the FVTPL category has to be used for instruments with embedded deriva-
tives. In accordance with IFRS 9.4.3 an embedded derivative is a component of a hybrid 
contract that generates cash-flows like a stand-alone derivative. The information pro-
vided in the case does not lead to the conclusion that the contractual clauses of the par-
ticipation certificate are embedded derivatives.  
 Thirdly, as a matter of fact, the issued bond itself is not a derivative according to 
IFRS 9 Appendix A.  
 Lastly, in accordance with IFRS 9.4.2.2, the FVTPL category can be used to avoid an 
accounting mismatch (between financial liabilities that are linked to specific financial 
assets (Ernst & Young, 2015)), or if the key management personnel evaluates the per-
formance of the financial liability on a fair value basis. According to the provided in-
formation, this is not the case for TCCs treasury management. 
Therefore, the measurement at amortised cost is the correct way according to IFRS 9.4.2.1 
and the fair value accounting would be non-compliant with the IFRS rules. 
Answer: According to IFRS 9, financial liabilities are measured at amortised cost calculated 
under the effective interest method except for liabilities measured at “Fair Value Through 
Profit or Loss (FVTPL)”. The FVTPL category includes: Held for trading, derivatives or 
“Fair Value Options (incl. instruments with embedded derivatives)”. 
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Peter’s statement is incorrect, because the bond does not fit into the FVTPL category. There-
fore, the financial liability from the issuance of the bond has to be measured at amortised cost. 
In conclusion, TCC’s income statement should report the corresponding interest income from 
the application of the effective interest method and no gains or losses due to fluctuating fair 
values of the traded bond. 
 
2) Due to the zero bond structure of the bond, TCC has to apply the effective interest method 
according to IFRS 9.B5.4.1-B5.4.7. Please complete the table below assuming that no divi-
dends will be paid by TCC for the duration of the bond.  
According to IFRS 9 Appendix A, the amortisation using the effective interest method for the 
zero bond has to be reflected in TCC’s IFRS financial statements. The effective interest meth-
od recognizes and allocates the interest expenses over the life time of the financial liability. 
The allocation of the interest expenses is done by discounting the difference between the ini-
tial amount and nominal amount with the effective interest rate. The calculation of the effec-
tive interest rate has to include the relevant transaction costs (IFRS 9 Appendix A). The 
transaction costs have to be deducted from the financial liability at inception and to be ac-
crued via the effective interest method with an effective interest rate of about 7.26%: 
Step – Calculation of the initial amount 
 Issue amount of €25 million 
 ./. Transaction costs of €0.350 million 
 = Initial amount of €24.65 million 
Step – Calculation of the effective interest rate 
 The general equation based on the compounded interest method: 
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 × (1 + 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
 Transformed equation to calculate the effective interest rate: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  √(
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
− 1 
 Using the given data in the teaching case: 
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𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  √(
35 000 000
24 650 000
)
5
− 1 
Effective Interest Rate ~ 7.26% 
The requirement explicitly specifies that no dividend distribution by TCC should be assumed 
and therefore no participation of the profit has to be reflected in the calculation of the effec-
tive interest rate and the resulting discount. If TCC had distributed dividends, the holders of 
the participation right would have received an additional payment. 
Answer: 
Table 3.5: Effective Interest Method Calculation 
Fiscal  
Year 
Opening Balance  
in € 
Interest Expenses  
in € 
Closing Balance  
in € 
2014 
(Initial Amount) 
24 650 000.00 
(Opening Balance * Effective Interest Rate) 
1 790 346.83 
(Opening balance + Interest Expenses) 
26 440 346.83 
2015 26 440 346.83 1 920 380.98 28 360 727.82 
2016 28 360 727.82 2 059 859.60 30 420 587.42 
2017 30 420 587.42 2 209 468.66 32 630 056.08 
2018 32 630 056.08 2 369 943.92 
(Nominal Amount) 
35 000 000.00 
Source: Own creation. 
 
3) Calculate the interest coverage ratio for the years 2014 and 2015 as defined in the prospec-
tus in figure 3.3 of the appendix. Include the EBITDA forecasts of figure 3.2 in your calcula-
tions. 
As given in figure 3.3 of the case appendix, the interest coverage ratio is defined as (1) earn-
ings before interests, taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over (2) net interest 
expenses of the consolidated financial statements. The interest expenses have to include the 
interest expenses for the issued bond as calculated under the previous question and the inter-
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est expenses for the loan from the business development bank (10 million euro and an annual 
interest rate of seven percent). 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
  
Answer: 
Table 3.6: Interest Coverage Ratio Calculation I 
in € 2014e 2015e 
EBITDA 10 058 000.00 11 678 000.00 
Loan Interest      700 000.00      700 000.00 
Bond Interest   1 790 346.83   1 920 380.98 
Interest Coverage Ratio 403.88% 445.66% 
Source: Own creation. 
 
In both fiscal years, the interest coverage ratio is met, because the ratio is higher than the 
350% required by the business development bank. 
 
4) How does the sales collapse impact the interest coverage ratio? Please use the revised in-
come statement from table 3.1 for your calculations.  
Answer: 
Table 3.7: Interest Coverage Ratio Calculation II 
in € 2014e 
EBITDA 7 328 000.00 
Loan Interest   700 000.00 
Bond Interest 1 790 346.83 
Interest Coverage Ratio 294.25% 
Source: Own creation. 
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The interest coverage ratio is breached, because the ratio is lower than the 350% required by 
the business development bank. 
 
3.2.3 Disclosure of Financial Instruments 
Because disclosure requirements in general are not at the centre of (under)graduate account-
ing curriculums (Ruhl and Smith 2013), we consider it useful to give students the following 
brief overview regarding the scope of the accounting standard IFRS 7 “Disclosure of Finan-
cial Instruments”. According to IFRS 7.1, the aim of the standard is to provide users of finan-
cial statements with disclosures that enable them to evaluate: 
 The significance of financial instruments for the entity’s financial position and perfor-
mance; and 
 The nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments, to which the entity is 
exposed during the period and as of the reporting date, and how the entity manages 
those risks. 
The IFRS 7 applies to all entities, including corporates like TCC that have few financial in-
struments and those that have many financial instruments like banks or insurance companies. 
During the in-class discussion, we provided students with the following hypothetical user 
questions that IFRS 7 disclosures target: 
 What IFRS 9 measurement categorizations are used by the entity? 
 Are there any financial assets and liabilities that are offset against each other? 
 Does the company pledge financial assets as collateral? 
 What are the fair values of the at amortized costs categorized instruments?  
 Were there any covenant breaches in the respective reporting period?  
 What are the gains and losses of the IFRS 9 categories? 
 What credit risk, liquidity risk or market risk exposure faces the entity due to the finan-
cial instruments? 
 
1) Why is Thomas pressuring to close the debt-for-equity swap before the end of the fiscal 
year? What disclosures would otherwise be needed according to IFRS 7.18? 
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The board of the IASB concluded that disclosures of defaults and breaches of loan payables 
(e.g. bank loans, bonds) are relevant information for users about the entity’s creditworthiness 
and its prospects of obtaining future loans (IFRS 7.BC32). This particular reasoning is exact-
ly the kind of information that TCC tries to hide by executing the debt-for-equity swap and 
therefore, avoiding the potential negative capital market effects of such a disclosure. 
Although the teaching case and the requirements do not deal with IAS 1 “Presentation of Fi-
nancial Statements”, we encourage lecturers to briefly explain that, according to IAS 1.60, 
preparers of IFRS statements are required to disclose whether a liability is current, i.e. a ma-
turity within the next twelve months after the reporting date, or non-current, i.e. a maturity 
beyond the next twelve months after the reporting date. Due to the covenants breach and the 
imminent loan repayment, TCC would have been required to reclassify the loan as a current 
liability indicating that a repayment of the loan would be required within the next twelve 
months. 
Answer: Thomas is aware of the IFRS 7.18 requirement to disclose the carrying amount of 
loans when breaches of the loan agreement terms occurred during the reporting period (unless 
the breaches were remedied on or before the reporting period). The debt-for-equity swap leads 
to the extinguishment of the respective financial liability (the bank loan) and consequently, 
the IFRS 7 disclosure is not necessary, because the standard only requires this disclosure for 
financial liabilities that are on the balance sheet at the reporting date. 
An example of such a disclosure would be: “As of 31 December 2014, TCC was in breach of 
its borrowing covenants with respect to a banking loan with a carrying amount of 10 million 
euro. As a result, the amount was reclassified as a current liability reflecting the right of the 
lender to call these funds immediately”. 
 
2) What year-end fair value disclosure would be necessary for the loan according to 
IFRS 7.25? 
The requirement introduces to the students the concept of IFRS 7 to disclose fair values ac-
cording to IFRS 13 “Fair Value Measurement”, despite the fact that the respective financial 
instruments are measured on the balance sheet at amortized costs. The IASB argues in 
IFRS 7.BC36 that fair values are “[…] relevant to many decisions made by users of financial 
statements because, in many circumstances, it reflects the judgement of the financial markets 
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about the present value of expected future cash flows relating to an instrument. […]”. There-
fore, IFRS 7.25 requires disclosing fair values for financial assets or liabilities not measured 
on a fair value basis according to IFRS 9 “Financial Instruments”. Students should be re-
minded that the financial statement category “other financial liabilities” is measured at 
amortized costs and are therefore, reported with their carrying amount.  
During the in-class discussion, we drew students’ attention to the significant difference of 2 
million euro between the carrying and fair value amount of the loan that TCC would be re-
quired to disclose. As already discussed under question 5 on the “Presentation of Financial 
Instruments”, due to the deteriorated business outlook for TCC, it can be assumed that the 
difference is mainly caused by the increased credit risk that the loan represents for the devel-
opment bank. The decreased likelihood of full repayment of the loan is reflected in the calcu-
lation of the fair value. Through this kind of financial disclosure, TCC would be forced to 
report the judgment of the capital providers about its overall financial situation. 
The lecturer should stress that fair values need not be given for instruments for which the 
carrying amount reasonably approximates their fair values, for example short-term trade 
receivables and payables (IFRS 7.29(a)). If the fair values for financial instruments cannot be 
reliably measured according to IFRS 13, the entity has to provide information that assists 
users in making their own judgments about possible differences between the carrying and fair 
value amount (IFRS 7.30; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
Answer: IFRS 7.25 explicitly requires reporting the fair value of each class of financial liabil-
ity in a way that permits comparison with the corresponding carrying amounts. One possible 
way for TCC to meet the requirements would be the following table: 
Table 3.8: IFRS 7 Fair Value Disclosure 
IFRS 9 Financial Liability 
Classification 
Carrying Amount 
 
Fair Value Amount 
 
“Other Financial Liabilities” €10 million €8 million 
Source: Own creation. 
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3.2.3 Related Corporate Finance Issues 
In order to improve the learning outcome of the teaching case, we drafted accompanying cor-
porate finance related requirements. The corporate finance issues ask the students to reflect 
upon the classification of the financial instrument. Although the main learning objectives of 
the teaching case are centred on accounting issues, the in-class discussion showed that the 
understanding of the accounting-related learning objectives was significantly improved by 
placing the accounting technicalities in a corporate finance context.
47
  
Despite the fact that the corporate finance related questions are presented as the last ones, 
the lecturer might consider it useful to start the in-class discussion of the teaching-case with 
the related corporate finance issues precisely to illustrate the economic consequences of equi-
ty-vs-debt decisions.  Derived from a neoclassical inspired theory it can be argued that the 
mix of the entity’s capital structure does not matter in perfect capital markets and the ques-
tion of whether to issue equity or debt is not worthwhile being considered.  
However, as the practical realities reveal, the classification of financial instruments as equity 
or debt does matter and therefore, the accounting treatment of an issued security has an im-
pact on the market value of the entity (Myers, 2001). In order to ensure that students grasp 
the importance of the equity versus debt discussion, we introduced the basic concepts of the 
Modigliani / Miller theory, the trade-off theory and the signalling effects of corporate finance 
measures. Based on our experience, advanced undergraduate students and graduate students 
should be familiar with the presented corporate finance issues due to specific corporate fi-
nance courses in the curriculum. Therefore, the solutions and the requirements are solely 
targeted to refresh students’ understanding of capital structure questions and the economic 
consequences of corporate finance measures. If the lecturer wants to present more details we 
refer to standard corporate finance textbooks.
48
 
 
1) What is the optimal leverage ratio for TCC according to the Modigliani and Miller propo-
sition I?  
                                                 
47
  Please see section “Student Assessment” in the implementation guidance for further details. 
48
  See for example Brealey, Myers and Allen (2008) as a comprehensive teaching book to discuss these capital 
structure issues in more detail. 
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Answer: According to the Modigliani and Miller proposition I, the market value of a compa-
ny is not affected by its capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Within the frame-
work, it is argued that the value of the company is entirely derived from the cash-flows that 
are generated by the total assets of the company (“the left hand side of the balance sheet”). 
Decisions regarding the funding structure (“the right hand side of the balance sheet”) do not 
have any impact on the firm value.  
Therefore, assuming that the equity from TCC’s shareholders is limited, TCC’s optimal capi-
tal position would be funded with a maximum of debt because TCC’s existing shareholders 
would have no incentive at all to finance TCC’s strategy with (additional) equity. Conversely, 
it would be not in the (rational) interest of the existing shareholders to dilute the decision 
making power of the current shareholders with new shareholders. 
But: The irrelevance theorem of the capital structure is based on the assumption of the effi-
cient market. 
 
2) Please challenge your answer to the previous question with the trade-off theory.  
Answer: The irrelevance theory of the capital structure (Modigliani Miller proposition I) ex-
cludes the benefits of the “debt tax shield” and ignores “financial distress costs”. However, 
both of these aspects have to be considered by TCC’s management in finding the optimal cap-
ital structure. Therefore the optimal funding structure, i.e. the structure with the maximum 
firm market value, is determined by the costs and benefits of debt. Figure 3.4 illustrates this 
point with the maximum of the red line (the value of the levered firm). The maximum point of 
the value of the levered firm indicates the pivot point of the benefits of leverage because at 
this point the marginal financial distress costs are higher than the marginal tax shield benefits 
for additional leverage. 
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, a company balances the value of the tax 
benefit from deductibility of interest with the present value of the costs of financial distress. 
The “debt tax shield” is the additional value of the firm that stems from the deduction of in-
terest expenses (e.g. from issued debt) from the taxable income of the company. Ceteris pari-
bus, the higher the interest expenses for a given profit, the lower the taxes the company has to 
pay. Because tax payments can be interpreted as costs that lower the firm value, the higher 
leverage (with a lower tax take) has a positive impact on the firm value (see Graham, 2000). 
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But, increasing the leverage of a corporation raises the bankruptcy costs in the event of finan-
cial distress. Direct bankruptcy costs like legal or administration fees occur when the compa-
ny defaults and creditors have to go to court to get a least part of the borrowed money back. In 
addition, there are indirect bankruptcy costs to a bankruptcy filing (see Ross, Westerfield, 
Jaffe, and Bradford, 2007). A typical example of indirect cost is a supplier who abandons a 
customer due to the prospect of losing a financial claim during bankruptcy procedures. 
Figure 3.4: Impact of Leverage on the Market Value of the Firm 
 
Source: Brealey et al. (2008). 
 
3) What kind of signals can equity issuances convey to the capital market? Please discuss 
your answer within the pecking order theory. 
Answer: The pecking order theory introduces asymmetric information to the question of the 
optimal capital structure. In contrast to the firm’s management, the capital market has limited 
knowledge about the financial prospect of the firm. The theory states that rational manage-
ment uses internal financing when available and chooses debt over equity when external fi-
nancing is required. This prioritization of funding sources is the “pecking order” and reflects 
the firm’s management funding decision in connection with the expected risk and reward pro-
file of investment projects (Myers, 1984). 
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Based on the pecking order theory, firms that announce equity issuances have therefore no 
internal funding available and no access to debt or believe that the share price is too high. 
Obviously, all characteristics can be interpreted as signals to the capital market that the finan-
cial outlook of the company requires reassessment. 
 
4) Which corporate finance measure does TCC use to resolve the capital structure issue? 
Which of the above capital structure theories best explains TCC financial restructuring deci-
sion? 
Answer: TCC renegotiates the terms of the outstanding loan from the development bank and 
issues its own equity instruments to the bank to fully repay the loan. The debt-for-equity swap 
is a common measure to improve the capital structure within financial restructuring (Weston 
et al., 2004). 
TCC’s finance function weighs up the costs (e.g. the negative capital market reactions due to 
the covenant breach) and benefits of the outstanding loan (e.g. the potential tax benefits of the 
loan) and comes to the conclusion that the issuance of additional shares to repay the loan is 
the best way to solve TCC’s capital structure issue under the specific circumstances. Due to 
the specific consideration of financial distress costs (e.g. the potential covenant breach as a 
first step towards a financial distress situation) the trade-off theory best explains TCC’s cor-
porate finance measures. 
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1. Introduction 
When introducing the current requirements for the treatment of negative goodwill arising up-
on the application of the purchase method for accounting of a business combination, the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB) argued that cases in which the acquirer’s 
interest in the fair value of the net assets acquired exceeds the cost of acquisition are rare phe-
nomena (IFRS 3.BC147, 2004). Accordingly, claims that the accounting for negative good-
will under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
50
 is of minor practical rele-
vance can be found in the literature (e.g. Theile and Pawelzik, 2012). However, the fact that 
the so-called “bargain purchases” have recently been the explicit main focus area of financial 
reporting institutions such as the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) 
indicates that the issue is yet of importance.
51
 Moreover, during the recent Post-
implementation Review on IFRS 3 Business Combinations (PIR), national standard setters 
and auditors of Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom argued that 
negative goodwill is “not as rare as the standard would suggest” or occurs in “ordinary trans-
actions rather than only in anomalous transactions”.52 
To date, these claims are only supported by few international studies which indicate that 
“bargain purchases” are more frequent than expected and have the potential to materially af-
fect the performance conveyed by financial statements (Comiskey, Clarke and Mulford, 2010; 
ESMA, 2014). Moreover, normative and practice-oriented publications discuss several theo-
retically possible reasons for the occurrence of a negative goodwill. The actual prevalence of 
and the reasons for negative goodwill transactions, however, still constitute an open empirical 
question. 
These gaps in understanding motivate our paper, in which we examine the frequency of and 
the reasons for the occurrence of transactions resulting in negative goodwill and being recog-
nized as an immediate gain by the acquirer of a business. Covering a period from 2005 to 
2013 and a sample of 1,440 firm-year observations of the largest German listed companies, 
                                                 
50
  In this paper, we use the abbreviation IFRS when we refer to the accounting standards developed by the 
IASB or its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) as well as the related 
SIC / IFRIC interpretations. The standards that were issued by the IASC are called International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). 
51
  See the “Main Focus Areas” 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016 available at FREP (2016). 
52
  See the respective comment letters available at IASB (2014b). 
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we find negative goodwill transactions to be not as rare as might be expected. Our exploratory 
analysis further sheds light on the characteristics of the 96 negative goodwill transactions 
identified with a focus on their impact on the financial performance of the acquiring entity 
and the question why negative goodwill occurs. Our results indicate that the gains which are 
almost unanimously recognized in operating income have the potential to materially affect the 
operating performance of the acquirer. Specifically we find that the operating income increas-
es through the recognition of negative goodwill by 16 percent on average. 
Our analysis of the reasons for the occurrence of negative goodwill shows that the typical 
“lucky buy”, addressed by the IASB as “bargain purchase”, indeed accounts for the most fre-
quently disclosed reason. However, we further find that alternative reasons such as future re-
structuring activities or market conditions are together equally likely to explain the existence 
of negative goodwill in our sample. In combination with the frequency and materiality of 
negative goodwill transactions, that document the relevance of the issue, these results ques-
tion whether the current treatment of negative goodwill as an immediate gain is always most 
appropriate. 
Our study contributes to the literature on business combinations accounting which only pro-
vides limited evidence on bargain purchase transactions (see Boennen and Glaum, 2014). 
Documenting the frequency as well as the reasons of negative goodwill as provided by the 
acquirers, we identify fruitful avenues for future research which should further examine the 
determinants and consequences of bargain purchase transactions. Moreover, our findings are 
of interest beyond academic literature. Standard setters, especially the IASB which just con-
ducted its Post-implementation Review on IFRS 3, are provided with a detailed analysis of 
business combinations with negative goodwill that should help in improving future financial 
reporting and disclosure regulations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the conceptual back-
ground of the accounting for negative goodwill under IFRS. Section 3 provides empirical evi-
dence on negative goodwill transactions by a review of prior research as well as our examina-
tion of the frequency and materiality of such transactions in Germany. Moreover, section 3 
contains an analysis of the reasons for the occurrence of negative goodwill. Section 4 outlines 
avenues for future research opportunities and concludes. 
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2. Conceptual Background 
2.1 Development of Accounting Principles 
Each revision of the accounting for business combinations under IFRS also included a sub-
stantial revision of the treatment of negative goodwill arising upon the application of the pur-
chase- or acquisition method (Wirth, 2005)
53
 which shows the controversial nature of the is-
sue under consideration. By laying out the development of the accounting standards from 
1983 until today, we intend to show how the separate revisions have affected the calculation 
and recognition of negative goodwill and thus its frequency, materiality and reasons for oc-
currence. Consequently, the discussion of the revisions and an in-depth understanding of the 
accounting provisions, especially from 2004 onwards, will lay the groundwork for our further 
analysis. 
 
2.1.1 Pre-IFRS 3 Accounting for Business Combinations: 1983-2004 
The first international standard on Accounting for Business Combinations, International Ac-
counting Standard 22, was issued in 1983. It allowed two methods to account for a business 
combination, pooling of interests or purchase accounting. With regard to instances in which 
“the cost of an acquisition is lower than the aggregate fair value of identifiable assets and lia-
bilities acquired” (IAS 22.25, 1983) and the purchase method was applied, the standard al-
lowed the difference “either [to] be treated as deferred income, and recognised in income over 
the period similar to that considered in paragraph 21 [which described factors to be consid-
ered in determining the useful life of goodwill], or allocated over individual depreciable non-
monetary assets acquired in proportion to their fair values” (IAS 22.25, 1983). 
The initial standard on business combinations accounting was superseded in 1993 (see Cam-
fferman and Zeff, 2007). IAS 22 Business Combinations (1993) generally acknowledged two 
types of business combinations, the acquisition of one entity by another and a uniting of inter-
                                                 
53
  With the introduction of IFRS 3 (2008) the term “purchase method” was substituted by the “acquisition 
method”. Both concepts refer to the separate recognition and measurement of identifiable assets and liabili-
ties at their fair value in the balance sheet of the acquirer in the event of gaining control over the target com-
pany. Only when applying the purchase- or acquisition method can a (negative) goodwill arise and be recog-
nized by the acquirer.  
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ests
54
 in which none of the combining entities can be identified as acquirer (IAS 22.Objective, 
1993). For “acquisitions” which the standard described as the main type of a business combi-
nation, the purchase method was required (IAS 22.18, 1993), i.e. a comparison of the acquisi-
tion cost to the fair value of the identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed (e.g. 
IAS 22.28, IAS 22.40, 1993). In case this resulted in negative goodwill, the standard de-
scribed a proportionate reduction of the fair values of the non-monetary assets acquired as the 
“Benchmark Treatment”.  
Any remaining excess of the acquired net assets over the cost of the business combination 
was required to be treated as deferred income and “should be recognised as income on a sys-
tematic basis over a period not exceeding five years unless a longer period, not exceeding 
twenty years from the date of acquisition, can be justified” (IAS 22.49, 1993). The underlying 
rationale of reducing the fair values of the non-monetary assets was that those assets were 
effectively acquired at a discount which would be realized as income subsequent to the trans-
action, i.e. when the respective assets are sold or used (IAS 22.50, 1993). Alternatively, the 
total negative goodwill should be treated as deferred income and recognized as income subse-
quent to the transaction as described above (IAS 22.51, 1993). 
In 1998, the standard on business combinations was revised again. IAS 22 Business Combina-
tions (1998) retained the distinction of two types of business combinations. With regard to 
“acquisitions”, it also prescribed the purchase method of accounting (IAS 22.17, 1998). How-
ever, with regard to the treatment of negative goodwill, IAS 22 (1998) contained substantial 
changes. First, the standard required differentiating whether any excess of the fair value of the 
net assets acquired over the cost of acquisition (negative goodwill) is related to expected, sub-
sequent losses and expenses that are based on the acquisition plan of the acquirer. To the ex-
tent that this was the case, negative goodwill had to be carried forward until the period in 
which these losses and expenses occurred and recognized as income contemporaneously. The 
remaining negative goodwill was treated as follows: The amount which did not exceed the 
total fair value of the identifiable non-monetary assets acquired had to be recognized “on a 
systematic basis over the remaining weighted average useful life of the identifiable acquired 
                                                 
54
  “A uniting of interests is a business combination in which the shareholders of the combining enterprises 
combine control over the whole, or effectively the whole, of their net assets and operations to achieve a con-
tinuing mutual sharing in the risks and benefits attaching to the combined entity such that neither party can 
be identified as the acquirer” (IAS 22.9, 1993). According to IAS 22.61 (1993), such transactions were ac-
counted for using the pooling of interests method. 
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depreciable / amortisable assets” (IAS 22.62(a), 1998). Any remaining negative goodwill had 
to be recognized as income immediately.
55
 
 
2.1.2 Accounting for Business Combinations Under IFRS 3: 2004-Today 
The last fundamental step in the development of the accounting for negative goodwill arising 
upon a business combination under IFRS was taken during the first phase of the IASB’s pro-
ject on business combinations in the beginning of the current century. With the issuance of 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations in 2004, the IASB eliminated the pooling of interests method 
and requires the use of the purchase method for any transaction that meets the definition of a 
business combinations (IFRS 3.IN7(a), IFRS 3.IN9, 2004).
56
 Besides identifying the acquirer, 
i.e. the entity which obtains control of the acquired entity, the purchase method requires the 
acquirer to measure the cost of acquisition
57
 (purchase price plus any acquisition-related costs 
such as professional fees paid to consultants) as well as to recognize the identifiable assets 
acquired and liabilities assumed
58
 at the acquisition date (IFRS 3.16, 2004). Thereby, the ac-
quired assets and liabilities assumed are generally measured at their fair values (IFRS 3.36, 
2004) and any interest of other parties in the acquiree (minority / non-controlling interest) is 
measured at the respective share of fair value of net assets (IFRS 3.40, 2004). 
Comparing (1) the cost of acquisition to (2) the acquirer’s interest in the fair value of the net 
assets acquired results in either goodwill (1 > 2) which is recognized as an asset (IFRS 3.51, 
2004) or negative goodwill (2 > 1). In the latter case, the acquirer is required to perform a 
reassessment with regard to the identification and valuation of the assets and liabilities recog-
                                                 
55
  For details about the treatment of negative goodwill under IAS 22 (1998) see IAS 22.59-63 (1998). 
56
  According to IFRS 3 (2004).Appendix A, a business combination was defined as “[t]he bringing together of 
separate entities or businesses into one reporting entity”. 
57
  IFRS 3.25 clarifies that a business combination may involve more than one transaction. In this case, the cost 
of acquisition is the total of the costs of the individual exchange transactions (e.g. share purchases) measured 
as of each individual exchange date. IFRS 3.58 further states that “each exchange transaction shall be treated 
separately by the acquirer, using the cost of the transaction and fair value information at the date of each ex-
change transaction, to determine the amount of any goodwill associated with that transaction. This results in 
a step-by-step comparison of the cost of the individual investments with the acquirer’s interest in the fair val-
ues of the acquiree’s identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities at each step”. 
58
  In this context, IFRS 3.41 explicitly states that “(a) the acquirer shall recognise liabilities for terminating or 
reducing the activities of the acquiree as part of allocating the cost of the combination only when the acquiree 
has, at the acquisition date, an existing liability for restructuring recognised in accordance with IAS 37 Pro-
visions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets; and (b) the acquirer, when allocating the cost of the 
combination, shall not recognize liabilities for future losses or other costs expected to be incurred as a result 
of the business combination.” See IFRS 3.BC70 (2004) for the IASB’s respective reasoning. 
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nized as a result of the business combination as well as the cost of acquisition. This reassess-
ment aims to ensure that negative goodwill is not caused by errors. After that reassessment, 
any remaining negative goodwill is recognized immediately as income (IFRS 3.56, 2004). 
Importantly, IFRS 3 (2004) does not prescribe a specific line item in the statement of income 
and, thus, the acquirers’ management is given discretion in that respect (Gros, 2005). Howev-
er, the amount of negative goodwill recognized as a gain as well as the specific line item in 
the income statement in which it is included have to be disclosed (IFRS 3.67(g), 2004). 
Moreover, IFRS 3.67(h) (2004) requires firms to describe the nature of any such gain. 
In 2008, the second phase of the IASB’s business combinations project was completed with a 
revised version of IFRS 3. IFRS 3 (2008) was to be applied mandatorily to business combina-
tions which were closed in the first annual reporting period starting on or after July 1, 2009 
(IFRS 3.64, 2008). It retained the principle that any business combination must be accounted 
for using the purchase method (IFRS 3.4, 2008) as well as the requirement to recognize any 
resulting negative goodwill immediately in profit or loss (IFRS 3.34, 2008). The standard also 
carried forward the requirement to perform a reassessment with regard to the recognition and 
measurement of the individual components affecting the amount of goodwill before recogniz-
ing a gain due to the existence of negative goodwill (IFRS 3.36, 2008). The determination of 
(negative) goodwill is described in IFRS 3.32 (2008) which requires the acquirer to “recog-
nise goodwill as of the acquisition date measured as the excess of (a) over (b) below: 
(a) the aggregate of: 
(i) the consideration transferred measured in accordance with this IFRS, which 
generally requires acquisition-date fair value; 
(ii) the amount of any non-controlling interest in the acquiree measured in accord-
ance with this IFRS; and 
(iii) in a business combination achieved in stages, the acquisition-date fair value of 
the acquirer’s previously held equity interest in the acquiree. 
(b) the net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets acquired and the lia-
bilities assumed measured in accordance with this IFRS.” 
 
Negative goodwill arises in case the amount in (b) exceeds the aggregate of the amounts in (a) 
above (IFRS 3.34). As in the preceding standard, in general, the acquirer measures the ac-
quired assets and liabilities assumed at their fair values at the acquisition date (IFRS 3.18, 
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2008).
59
 However, as compared to IFRS 3 (2004) changes with effects on the amount of (neg-
ative) goodwill have been introduced with regard to the components (i) to (iii) above. First, 
the consideration transferred comprises the assets transferred and any liabilities incurred by 
the acquirer to the seller as well as any equity interests issued by the acquirer that are all 
measured at their acquisition-date fair values (IFRS 3.37, 2008). Importantly, unlike the cost 
of the business combination under IFRS 3 (2004), acquisition-related costs are not included in 
the consideration transferred which, ceteris paribus, reduces goodwill. 
Second, in a stepwise acquisition, the acquirer now has to remeasure any equity interest in the 
acquiree which it held prior to obtaining control at its fair value at the acquisition date and 
recognize any resulting difference in profit or loss (IFRS 3.42, 2008). This methodological 
change also potentially leads to a different amount of (negative) goodwill as compared to the 
previous requirements (see footnote 57). Third, IFRS 3 (2008) introduced an option with re-
gard to the measurement of any non-controlling interests in the acquiree. According to 
IFRS 3.19 (2008), interests in the investee held by parties other than the acquirer can either be 
measured at their respective proportionate share of the identifiable net assets of the acquiree 
or at fair value. As described in IFRS 3.32(a)(ii) (2008) above, the measurement of non-
controlling interests has an impact on the resulting (negative) goodwill. 
With regard to the disclosure requirements, it is noteworthy that the IASB now requires the 
disclosure of the reasons for the bargain purchase rather than “the nature of the gain” (see 
explanation for IFRS 3.67(h) (2004) above). Importantly, the note disclosures regarding the 
factors giving rise to goodwill or a gain on a bargain purchase have been one of the main fo-
cus areas of the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) in recent years.
60
 
Nevertheless, it is an open empirical question how these disclosure requirements were inter-
preted in practice and whether the substance of the additional information improved since the 
change. 
 
                                                 
59
  IFRS 3 (2008) contains explicit guidance regarding exceptions from the principle to measure all assets and 
liabilities at their acquisition-date fair values, e.g. with regard to deferred tax assets and liabilities (see 
IFRS 3.24-31, 2008). 
60
  See the “Main Focus Areas” 2014 and 2016 available at FREP (2016). 
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2.1.3 Post-Implementation Review of IFRS 3 (PIR): 2013-2015 
From 2013 to 2015, the IASB conducted its so-called Post-implementation Review on IFRS 3 
(PIR) in which it aimed to assess the effects of the new accounting standard on financial re-
porting practice. In a first phase, the standard setter evaluated which areas of the business 
combinations standard are the main areas to be considered during the second phase of review. 
The importance of the accounting for negative goodwill has been emphasized by including 
the topic as an explicit question in the IASB’s formal Request for Information (RfI) which has 
been open for public comment (see IASB, 2014a). Considering the feedback received, the 
IASB decided to maintain the current guidance and defer possible further actions until it con-
ducted its 2015 Agenda Consultation (see IASB, 2015a).
61
 Nevertheless, the comment letters 
received by the IASB contained controversial discussions with recommendations of various 
alternatives for negative goodwill recognition (see table 4.1) that amongst others suggest the 
return to the previous treatments under IAS 22 (1993) or IAS 22 (1998). 
Table 4.1: Extracts From Comment Letters on Accounting for Negative Goodwill 
Bayer AG (Germany): 
We believe it is essential to disclose the relevant management estimation of the 'source' of the nega-
tive goodwill. Recognizing negative goodwill directly through profit or loss is conceptually ap-
propriate, but users need to be able to identify the future potential restructuring (or other) changes 
that led to such a 'bargain' purchase. 
Rio Tinto plc (UK): 
We would suggest that a better representation of the economics of the transaction would be pro-
ration against the identifiable net assets acquired [...]. This is particularly the case where the profit 
arises because of recognition or measurement exceptions for certain assets and liabilities e.g. post 
retirement liabilities measured on an IAS 19 basis may differ from those assumed in the purchase 
price. 
Ministry of Finance / China Accounting Standards Committee (China): 
[…] it is an unreasonable accounting mismatch to recognise all the negative goodwill in P&L and 
recognise loss in the following accounting periods, as it cannot reflect the economic substance appro-
priately. It is proposed hereby that the negative goodwill at the acquisition date should be treated as 
per its economic substance (that is, only the negative goodwill attributable to bargain purchases 
is recognised in P&L, and the other goodwill can be temporarily recorded in OCI or other liabil-
ity accounts at the acquisition date). 
                                                 
61
  For detailed information about the recent PIR on IFRS 3 including the results of the analysis of comment 
letters in response to the RfI and of a review of related academic research see IASB (2015b). 
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Austrian Financial Reporting and Auditing Committee (Austria): 
The recognition of negative goodwill [...] in profit or loss is conceptually unsatisfactory: good-
will is considered to be an asset, while negative goodwill is deemed to be a day one gain. [...] We also 
believe that negative goodwill often creates suspicion that artificial gains may have been recognised 
through the over-valuation of assets. We would therefore favour a cap on the recognition of intan-
gible assets if their capitalisation leads to an excess of the net identifiable assets over the fair value of 
the consideration. 
Allianz (Germany): 
In our opinion, positive and negative goodwill stem from the same reasons: In case of goodwill from 
additional future benefits which do not qualify as separate identifiable assets and in the case of nega-
tive goodwill from additional future costs for which no liability can be recognized as of the acquisi-
tion date. [...] we suggest to offset negative goodwill with the acquirer's equity instead of recog-
nizing a one-off profit. 
Source: IASB (2014b), emphasis added by the authors. 
 
2.2 Reasons for Negative Goodwill 
During the development of IFRS 3 (2004), the IASB considered most business combinations 
as exchange transactions between independent parties that receive the value they sacrifice 
(IFRS 3.BC146, 2004). Accordingly, the IASB argued that, theoretically, negative goodwill 
should not occur and assumed such transactions to be rare if the identification and measure-
ment of the cost of acquisition as well as the assets acquired and liabilities assumed are 
properly performed (IFRS 3.BC147, 2004). For cases in which the fair value of the net assets 
exceeds the cost of the business combination, the standard setter explicitly mentioned three 
possible components of this “excess” (IFRS 3.BC148, 2004): 
(a) “errors that remain, notwithstanding the reassessment, in recognising or measuring the 
fair value of either the cost of the combination or the acquiree’s identifiable assets, li-
abilities or contingent liabilities. 
(b) a requirement in an accounting standard to measure identifiable net assets acquired at 
an amount that is not fair value, but is treated as though it is fair value for the purpose 
of allocating the cost of the combination. 
(c) a bargain purchase. This might occur, for instance, when the seller of a business wish-
es to exit from that business for other than economic reasons and is prepared to accept 
less than its fair value as consideration”.62 
 
With regard to the latter, in the revised version of IFRS 3, the IASB states that “[a] bargain 
purchase might happen, for example, in a business combination that is a forced sale in which 
                                                 
62
  See also IFRS 3.57 (2004). 
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the seller is acting under compulsion” (IFRS 3.35, 2008). It is noteworthy that the immediate 
recognition of negative goodwill as a gain was generally not supported by respondents to the 
IASB’s exposure draft prior to issuing IFRS 3 (2004). One of their main objections was based 
on the view that “any such excess is likely to arise because of expectations of future losses 
and expenses” (IFRS 3.BC145(a), 2004).63 The IASB did not agree with this reasoning and 
argued that such expectations should be reflected in the fair values of the assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed (IFRS 3.BC149, 2004). Besides the current treatment, the IASB consid-
ered two alternative treatments of negative goodwill: (1) a reduction of the values of some of 
the identified net assets acquired and (2) the separate recognition of a liability in the amount 
of negative goodwill. Finally, however, the IASB decided that the immediate recognition in 
profit or loss would be the most representationally faithful method with regard to that part of 
the excess which is attributable to a bargain purchase, while the amounts attributable to the 
components (a) and (b) described above could not be determined separately (see 
IFRS 3.BC150-156, 2004). Consequently, the current treatment of negative goodwill is in 
difference to the previous approaches under IAS 22 (1983 / 1993 / 1998) fully aligned to the 
reason of bargain purchases. 
Ten years after the issuance of IFRS 3 (2004), however, the objection against the current 
treatment still seems to be existent. Thus, our analysis of the comment letters sent to the IASB 
during the recent PIR on IFRS 3 also revealed a considerable number of respondents that ar-
gue that negative goodwill may arise due to restructuring costs which cannot be recognized as 
provisions at the acquisition date or expected future operating losses of the acquiree. Howev-
er, both may be considered during negotiations and accordingly factored into the purchase 
price.
64
 
The potential reasons for negative goodwill transactions that have been discussed in the de-
velopment of IFRS 3 are not exhaustive (Oppermann et al., 2014). With regard to the occur-
rence of a bargain purchase or “lucky buy”, several additional reasons have been discussed, to 
                                                 
63
  Besides, the opponents of the current treatment of negative goodwill criticized that the immediate recognition 
in profit or loss would not lead to a representationally faithful presentation as far as the “excess” results from 
measurement errors or measurement bases other than fair values and that the treatment would be inconsistent 
with the historical cost principle (see IFRS 3.BC145, 2004). 
64
  See, for example, the comment letters of EFRAG, Mazars, PricewaterhouseCoopers, CPA Australia Ltd., 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Ministry of Finance [Peoples Republic of China] / China Accounting 
Standards Committee or Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW) available at IASB (2014b). Extracts 
from the comment letters quoted are provided in table 4.A.1. 
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date. For example, the management of the seller may view the business to be sold subjectively 
of minor importance or may not be willing to fund further investment projects to sustain a 
business due to alternative preferred opportunities (Oppermann, Pilhofer and Müller, 2014). 
With regard to the possibility that errors in recognition or measurement are the source of a 
negative goodwill, this may be a result of the inevitable uncertainty and subjectivity which is 
involved in valuation. Measurement errors resulting in negative goodwill may further result 
from the use of buyer-specific instead of market-based values or from differing views on val-
uation of the buyer and seller of a business. 
In addition to the above, negative goodwill may also result from changes in market condi-
tions. In general, it can be assumed that crisis situations such as the recent financial crisis in-
crease the probability of negative goodwill transactions since the number of distressed sales is 
higher and more sales may occur in which the speed of the sale is the seller’s priority. Fur-
thermore, Wirth (2005) argues that negative goodwill may occur as a result of an extreme 
downturn of the stock market. Due to the decline of share prices it could be possible to ac-
quire a firm for a price below the fair value of its net assets. In addition, negative goodwill 
may arise in situations in which (part of) the purchase price is paid in shares of the acquirer 
and the shares price decreases between the date at which the parties agreed on a fixed number 
of shares and the acquisition date. Other reasons for negative goodwill transactions include 
the measurement options for non-controlling interests, the recognition of acquisition-related 
costs as expenses or working capital guarantees. 
Concluding, despite the assumption that in theory transactions which result in negative good-
will should rarely occur, a number of reasons was identified which may cause the recognition 
of an immediate gain. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the reasons identified which forms 
the basis for our analysis of the disclosed reasons for negative goodwill transactions in Ger-
many in section 3.3 below. 
Frequency of and Reasons for Bargain Purchases: Evidence From Germany 
 
120 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of Potential Reasons for Negative Goodwill Under IFRS 3 
Examples of forced sales besides a 
financially distressed acquiree 
Expected future operating 
losses not recognized at acqu. 
date but factored in price  
(Comment Letters B/C/J/L)
Errors in recognition and 
measurement of the 
consideration transferred or the 
acquiree’s identifiable net assets
(IFRS 3, 2004, par. 57(a))
Bargain purchase (e.g. seller of 
a business wishes to exit from 
that business and is prepared to 
accept less than its fair value)
(IFRS 3, 2004, par. 57(c))
Forced or distressed sale, seller 
is acting under compulsion/
owners need to sell quickly
(IFRS 3, 2008, par. 35, BC371)
Seller views business to be sold 
of minor importance 
(Oppermann et al., 2014)
Recognition or measurement 
exceptions
(IFRS 3, 2004, par. 57(b);
IFRS 3, 2008, par. 35)
Entity is forced to leave a 
particular market quickly
(Comment Letter A)
Death of founder or key 
manager
(IFRS 3, 2008, BC371)
Negotiation success of acquirer 
(Oppermann et al., 2014)
Avoidance of reputational 
damage of declaring bankruptcy 
if loss-making subsidiaries are 
held (Schauerte, 2013)
Different views on valuation of 
seller/acquirer, e.g. regarding 
contingent consideration 
(Comment Letter G)
IFRS 13-based measurement of 
acquired assets without 
considering intention of acquirer 
(Comment Letter B)
Use of specific value to the 
acquirer (intrinsic value) instead 
of market-based valuation
(Comment Letter F)
Uncertainty and subjectivity of 
valuation, especially with regard 
to intangible assets
(Comment Letters C-E)
Information asymmetry/
different level of knowledge 
(Comment Letter H)
Measurement bases are 
different 
(Comment Letter H)
e.g. deferred tax assets and 
liabilities are recognized and 
measured in accordance with 
IAS 12  (IFRS 3, 2008, par. 24)
Expectation of future losses and 
(restructuring) expenses
(IFRS 3, 2004, BC145)
Restructuring costs not 
recognized at acqu. date but 
factored in purchase price  
(Comment Letters B/C/I/K)
Market conditions
Share price fluctuation of 
acquirer’s shares between date 
of agreement and acquitions date  
(Comment Letters G/I/M)
Extreme downturn in the stock 
market, low share prices may 
allow to acquire a firm for price 
below fair value (Wirth, 2005)
Economic crises increase 
probability of negative goodwill 
transactions in general 
(Comment Letters F/I)
Other reasons
Measurement of non-
controlling interests 
(Comment Letters B/G)
The group of assets acquired 
and liabilities assumed does not 
constitute a business 
(Comment Letters N/O)
Acquisition-related costs are 
expensed under IFRS 3 (2008), 
but considered by acquirer 
(Oppermann et al., 2014)
Working capital guarantees, 
working capital at acquisition 
date exceeds the ‘cap‘ agreed on 
(Oppermann et al., 2014)
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Source: Own creation.
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3. Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Prior Research 
As explained above, the IASB argues that transactions which result in negative goodwill 
should be rare in practice. However, only few academic studies exist that examine this as-
sumption. While there are some publications that selectively interpret the applicable standards 
for negative goodwill accounting in Germany, i.e. IFRS 3; (e.g. Gros, 2005; Haaker, 2014) as 
well as in the US (e.g. De Moville and Petrie, 1989; Ketz, 2005; Comiskey and Mulford, 
2008), there are only few studies that focus on an analysis of the relevance of negative good-
will transactions in terms of their frequency or materiality. 
With regard to US-GAAP, a comprehensive study was conducted by Comiskey et al. (2010) 
that document a total of 127 US firms with negative goodwill transactions in the time period 
from 2000-2007. However, business combinations during the sample period were subject to 
the Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 16 for the years 2000-2001 and to the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 141 afterwards. Both of these provi-
sions required to proportionally reduce the fair values of a set of qualifying assets by the 
amount of initial negative goodwill. Any remaining amount of negative goodwill was either 
amortized to income over the subsequent periods under APB Opinion No. 16 or included as a 
day-one extraordinary gain under SFAS No. 141. Thus, similar to the provisions of IAS 22 
explained in section 2.1.1, the prevalence of negative goodwill was reduced by the design of 
the standard.  
Nevertheless, in a detailed subsequent analysis for a subsample of 43 negative goodwill trans-
actions, the authors find a high materiality of the phenomenon. On average (median), the ratio 
of negative goodwill to the acquirer’s market capitalization amounted to 21 percent (seven 
percent). However, their event study did not show significant capital market reactions to the 
extraordinary gain resulting from negative goodwill.  
Regarding the low frequency, Lys, Vincent and Yehuda (2012) also come to the conclusion 
that negative goodwill is unusual and infrequent under SFAS No. 141. Although they find that 
in a sample of 2,123 business combinations of US filers for the years 2002-2006, 230 acquisi-
tions have a goodwill balance of zero that might result from a negative goodwill transaction, 
none of the examined companies explicitly disclosed such a situation. 
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With SFAS No. 141 (Revised 2007) becoming applicable for reporting periods starting on or 
after December 15, 2008,
65
 the frequency as well as materiality of negative goodwill transac-
tions was predicted to increase (Comiskey and Mulford, 2008). However, according to the 
annual Purchase Price Allocation Studies by Houlihan Lokey (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014) 
at least no significant increase in the number of negative goodwill transactions could be found 
for the US.
66
  
With regard to the IFRS reporting regime, consecutive merger and acquisition studies for Eu-
rope’s largest listed companies reveal with approximately three to eight percent of the total 
sample a relatively high frequency of negative goodwill transactions in the years 2005, 2007 
and 2009 (Glaum, Street and Vogel, 2007; Glaum and Vogel, 2008; Glaum and Wyrwa, 
2011).
67
 Thus, gains from bargain purchases appear to be indeed likely under IFRS 3. A study 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2014) strengthens the impression 
“that bargain purchases appear to happen more frequently than the IASB originally expected” 
(p. 3). In its analysis of the 2012 IFRS financial statements of 56 European listed companies 
with 66 business combinations during the reporting period, ESMA finds that negative good-
will was reported in 11 percent of all transactions. 
Consequently, some first evidence exists that the IASB’s assumption – negative goodwill 
transactions are rare in practice – might not be fully appropriate. As shown in this section, 
particularly studies examining business combinations under IFRS 3 indicate that “bargain 
purchases” are existent in today’s financial reporting. We take these initial insights together 
with the scarce academic research in this field as a motivation to study the frequency and ma-
teriality of negative goodwill transactions for a broad cross-section of IFRS-reporting acquir-
ers for the exemplary case of Germany. 
                                                 
65
  SFAS No. 141 (Revised 2007) was developed in a joint project with the IASB and abolished the previously 
required pro rata reduction of allocation assets. Just like in IFRS 3 the full amount of negative goodwill be-
came treated as a regular day-one profit. 
66
  Houlihan Lokey find that negative goodwill transactions account for 0 to 1.8 percent of all transactions meet-
ing the following search criteria for the years from 2009 to 2013, respectively: (1) the transactions are closed 
in the period of analysis, (2) the acquirer is a company traded publicly in the US, (3) the acquirer acquired 
more than 50 percent of the acquiree, and (4) explicit disclosures are provided for the business combination. 
67
  For 2005, the authors find 14 individually disclosed negative goodwill transactions on a total sample of 266 
disclosed transactions. For cases where only disclosures across all business combinations were available, two 
companies with aggregate negative goodwill were found on a total of 97 disclosures. For 2007, 10 of 377 in-
dividually disclosed and 5 of 161 aggregately disclosed negative goodwill transactions are reported. For 
2009, 17 of 212 individually disclosed and 3 of 82 aggregately disclosed negative goodwill transactions were 
found.  
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3.2 Sample Selection and Data Description 
Our initial sample consists of the firms listed in the main indices (DAX30, MDAX, TecDAX, 
SDAX) of the German stock exchange, Deutsche Börse AG.
68
 Starting from fiscal year 2005, 
i.e. the first year for which all business combinations had to be accounted for under IFRS 3 
(2004),
69
 we consider the yearly index composition until fiscal year 2013.
70
 Thus, our initial 
sample covers 1,440 firm-year observations. For this sample, we checked the item 
“IQ_Impairment_GW” on S&P Capital IQ for positive values71 in order to identify potential 
bargain purchases. This initial sample of 74 firm-year observations was then made subject to 
a detailed analysis of the respective annual reports further reducing the sample to 61 firm-
years which, in fact, contained business combinations resulting in negative goodwill.
72
 Fur-
thermore, the review of the annual reports allowed for a refinement of the dataset breaking the 
firm-year observations down into individual transactions. As there are firms with more than 
one negative goodwill transaction per year, our final sample of 61 firm-year observations in-
cludes a total of 96 transactions. 
Since the detailed disclosure requirements of IFRS 3 also apply to business combinations 
which result in negative goodwill, we were able to extract further relevant transaction data. 
Additional data that were hand-collected for our subsequent analyses include whether the 
transaction has been accounted for under IFRS 3 (2004) or IFRS 3 (2008) as well as the tar-
get’s profit and loss contribution since acquisition and for the full fiscal year. Moreover, the 
disclosures specifically relating to bargain purchases under IFRS 3.B64(n) (2008) and 
IFRS 3.67(h) (2004), respectively, i.e. the description of the reasons why the transaction re-
                                                 
68
  The DAX30, MDAX and SDAX are composed of the 130 largest companies by market capitalization of the 
prime standard segment. The TecDAX adds another 30 of the largest companies of the technology sector in 
the prime standard segment. For information on the individual indices refer to www.boerse-frankfurt.de (last 
retrieved on February 7, 2017). 
69
  According to IFRS 3.78 (2004), the guidance of IFRS 3 (2004) shall be applied to business combinations 
occurring from March 31, 2004 onwards. 
70
  Historical index compositions can be accessed on www.dax-indices.com (last retrieved on February 7, 2017). 
71
  This item contains the net amount of goodwill impairment charges and income from bargain purchase trans-
actions. Considering the rather low frequency of these two items, we examine all firm-years exhibiting a pos-
itive amount for “IQ_Impairment_GW”, acknowledging that this procedure may understate the prevalence of 
bargain transactions. We thank Dr. Tobias Stork genannt Wersborg for the provision of this data. 
72
  Observations which have been excluded from our sample include, for example, negative goodwills resulting 
from the acquisition of interests in joint ventures or from time differences between the transfer of control and 
full consolidation. An example of the latter situation poses the Deutsche Euroshop AG disclosing a negative 
goodwill of 0.692 million euro in its 2009 annual report resulting from the first-time consolidation of a pre-
viously controlled subsidiary. 
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sulted in a gain or the nature of such a gain, and the amount as well as line item under which 
the gain is recognized in the income statements are examined. 
 
3.2 Relevance of Negative Goodwill 
3.2.1 Frequency 
Due to the requirement to disclose the amount of negative goodwill recognized per transac-
tion and the respective description of the acquiree, we were able to attribute the aggregate 
firm-year negative goodwill amounts retrieved from S&P Capital IQ to a total of 96 individu-
al transactions.
73
 These correspond to a set of 61 firm-year observations and 39 individual 
companies with at least one negative goodwill transaction. Compared to the total sample of 
1,440 firm-year observations, 4.2 percent of the DAX30, MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX con-
stituents report a gain from negative goodwill between 2005 and 2013. Furthermore, compa-
nies that recorded a negative goodwill during the sample period have on average not just one 
– as the IASB’s description of the anomalous nature of negative goodwill transactions would 
suggest – but 2.5 negative goodwill transactions. 
In a more detailed analysis, we discovered that the company most regularly disclosing nega-
tive goodwill transactions is Arques Industries AG. Before changing its name and business 
model in 2010,
74
 the company focused its strategy on the acquisition of non-core business 
affiliates of international corporations
75
 and of restructuring targets. With this strategy, 
Arques Industries AG acquired a total of 24 targets with negative goodwill in the years from 
2006-2008. While an examination of the disclosed reasons is conducted in section 3.3, the 
described business model combined with the high sample contribution of 25 percent of all 
observed negative goodwill transactions indicates that negative goodwill might especially 
arise from the acquisition of targets in financial distress. 
                                                 
73
  For four firm-year observations, the amounts of negative goodwill were only disclosed in aggregate form. 
We split the sums evenly across the ten respective transactions that were described to have a negative good-
will. In this way, the frequency of negative goodwill transactions should not be distorted by the disclosure 
choices of the underlying sample firms. 
74
  In 2010, the company changed its name to Gigaset AG and shifted its strategy to becoming a producer and 
distributer of telecommunication equipment. 
75
  From his practical experience, Schauerte (2013) explains that large corporations often accept acquisition 
prices below the fair value for loss-generating affiliates as to avoid the damage to their corporate image by 
declaring bankruptcy. 
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The example of Arques Industries AG, an investment company specialized on the acquisition 
of restructuring targets, suggests an analysis of the distribution of negative goodwill transac-
tions per industry sector. Table 4.2 shows the 96 negative goodwill transactions by industry 
and illustrates the share each sector contributes to the negative goodwill sample. Arques In-
dustries AG is thereby shown as a separate line due to its exceptionally high contribution and 
its reclassification from an investment to an equipment company in 2010. 
Table 4.2: Frequency of Negative Goodwill Transactions by Industry 
Notes: The table above illustrates the frequency distribution of negative goodwill (NGW) transactions per indus-
try sector. The sectors are assigned with help of the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for 
the acquirer’s primary business activity as retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream and S&P Capital IQ. For 
23 firm-years the SIC codes could not be assigned reducing the sample to 1,417 observations. For the industries 
with the highest contribution to the sample of negative goodwill transactions, the frequencies of the subsectors 
are listed in brackets. 
 
As shown in table 4.2, the manufacturing sector contributes the greatest share to the sample of 
negative goodwill transactions with 29 percent followed by the finance, insurance and real 
estate sector with 20 percent. This industry distribution is consistent with Comiskey et al. 
(2010) who find that the manufacturing sector accounts for 56 percent and the financial sector 
Industry 
(by SIC Codes)
Number of NGW 
Transactions
Percent of 
NGW Sample 
Number of 
Firm-Years
Percent of 
Firm-Years
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing (01-09) 3 3.13% 17 17.65%
Mining (10-14) 6 6.25% 26 23.08%
Construction (15-17) 1 1.04% 32 3.13%
Manufacturing (20-39) 28 29.17% 683 4.10%
Apparel (23) (1) (1.04%) (31) (3.23%)
Chemicals (28) (2) (2.08%) (130) (1.54%)
Rubber and Plastic (30) (4) (4.17%) (35) (11.43%)
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products (32) (1) (1.04%) (24) (4.17%)
Primary Metals (33) (3) (3.13%) (20) (15.00%)
Equipment (35-37) (17) (17.71%) (374) (4.55%)
Transportation & Public Utilities (40-49) 7 7.29% 148 4.73%
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 4 4.17% 59 6.78%
Retail Trade (52-59) 2 2.08% 55 3.64%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate (60-67) 19 19.79% 209 9.09%
Depository Institutions (60) (1) (1.04%) (49) (2.04%)
Insurance Carriers (63) (1) (1.04%) (32) (3.13%)
Real Estate (65) (17) (17.71%) (73) (23.29%)
Services (70-89) 2 2.08% 188 1.06%
Arques Industries 24 25.00% - -
Total 96 100.00% 1417 6.77%
Frequency of Negative Goodwill Transactions by Industry
Table III
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for 19 percent of their sample of US-listed firms reporting negative goodwill transactions be-
tween 2000 and 2007.
76
 
A first interpretation of the high frequency of negative goodwill transactions in the manufac-
turing as well as other capital intensive industries such as the construction, mining and trans-
portation sectors which together contribute 44 percent to our sample suggests that the often 
mentioned reason of an incorrect (and subjective) valuation of intangible assets might not be 
the main trigger for the occurrence of negative goodwill transactions. However, the great 
quantity of negative goodwill transactions in the manufacturing sector has to be modified in 
light of the high number of firm-year observations from that industry sector in our overall 
sample. In comparison to all firm-year observations from the manufacturing sample, negative 
goodwill transactions can only be observed in 4.1 percent of the cases. Consequently, the dis-
tribution of negative goodwill transactions might simply stem from the index composition and 
the greater subsample of firm-year observations in the manufacturing sector.  
Regarding the financial industry, the observations for the real estate sector stand out. The sub-
sector does not only contribute 18 percent to our sample of negative goodwill transactions but 
also shows the highest percentage of firm-year observations with negative goodwill transac-
tions (23 percent). This indicates that sector-specific factors may contribute to the probability 
of negative goodwill transactions. In the analysis of the reasons in section 3.3, we will there-
fore place emphasis on the nature of negative goodwill in the real estate sector. 
While the industry analysis showed a high frequency of negative goodwill transactions in the 
real estate sector, our observations appear fairly equally distributed across the sample period 
between 2005 and 2013 (see table 4.3). This is especially the case when excluding the obser-
vations relating to Arques Industries AG. Furthermore, the revision of IFRS 3 with the chang-
es outlined in section 2.1 does not seem to have remarkably affected the frequency of negative 
goodwill transactions. Excluding Arques Industries AG, 40 percent of our observations fall 
under IFRS 3 (2008) that had to be applied to business combinations during fiscal years start-
                                                 
76
  The industry distribution found by Comiskey et al. (2010) is especially noteworthy as during the time of 
analysis the APB Opinion No. 16 or later the SFAS No. 141 required the allocation of negative goodwill 
against qualifying, acquired assets so that only transactions with excess amounts of negative goodwill be-
came part of their sample. The authors further explain that qualifying assets such as property, plant and 
equipment are mostly found in capital intensive industries such as in manufacturing, energy or metal firms. 
Therefore, an even greater sample contribution could be expected for the manufacturing sector under full 
gain recognition of negative goodwill. 
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ing on or after July 1, 2009. However, as none of our firms with negative goodwill transac-
tions start their fiscal year in the mid of 2009, IFRS 3 (2008) was applicable to business com-
binations in four out of the nine years of our sample period. Moreover, the analysis of nega-
tive goodwill transactions does not provide strong support for the assumption that the proba-
bility of negative goodwill transactions is higher in crisis periods. Excluding Arques Indus-
tries AG, the number of negative goodwill transactions during the years of the recent financial 
crisis (in particular, 2008 and 2009) does not differ substantially from earlier and subsequent 
periods. 
Table 4.3: Frequency of Negative Goodwill Transactions by Year and Standard 
 
Notes: The table above illustrates the annual frequency distribution of negative goodwill (NGW) transactions for 
the years 2005-2013 and for the applicable versions of IFRS 3 (2004 / 2008). Due to the high frequency of nega-
tive goodwill transactions observed for Arques Industries AG (or later: Gigaset AG), the third column separately 
depicts the yearly number of negative goodwill transactions attributable to the respective acquirer. The “percent 
of the sample”, however, includes all negative goodwill transactions of the sample. 
 
Summarizing the frequency analysis, our results provide support for the conclusions of ES-
MA (2014) and statements of several respondents during the PIR on IFRS 3 that the phenom-
enon of negative goodwill transactions is not as rare as the standard would suggest. Further-
more, this section identified the exceptional case of Arques Industries AG and the high fre-
quency of negative goodwill transactions in the real estate sector. While this section purely 
focused on the frequency of the phenomenon, the following analyses will investigate whether 
Year Number of NGW 
Transactions
(Thereof Arques 
Industries) 
Percent of 
Sample 
2005 6 (0) 6.25%
2006 16 (11) 16.67%
2007 23 (9) 23.96%
2008 13 (4) 13.54%
2009 9 (0) 9.38%
2010 6 (0) 6.25%
2011 12 (0) 12.50%
2012 8 (0) 8.33%
2013 3 (0) 3.13%
Total 96 (24) 100.00%
Standard Number of NGW 
Transactions
(Thereof Arques 
Industries) 
Percent of 
Sample 
IFRS 3 (2004) 67 (24) 69.79%
IFRS 3 (2008) 29 (0) 30.21%
Total 96 (24) 100.00%
Table IV
Frequency of Negative Goodwill Transactions b   d Standard
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the observed negative goodwill transactions are also relevant in terms of their materiality, 
especially with regard to the income statement of the acquirer. 
 
3.2.2 Materiality 
Since the introduction of IFRS 3 in 2004, negative goodwill is fully recognized as a day-one 
profit. While some studies as well as anecdotal evidence indicate that the frequency of nega-
tive goodwill has been underestimated by the IASB, to the best of our knowledge, no com-
prehensive study exists which examines whether the resulting gains are material to the income 
statement of the acquirers. The only exception is the study by ESMA (2014) which docu-
ments the materiality for seven negative goodwill transactions arising in the year 2012 and 
finds that on average gains from negative goodwill make up for 12 percent of net income be-
fore taxes. 
A further gap in understanding could be identified with the review of the comment letters that 
revealed the ambiguity under what line item gains from negative goodwill transactions should 
be recognized. IFRS 3 (2004 / 2008) does not prescribe a specific line item, an approach that 
is criticized by standard users as it is said to impede the comparability of income statements 
(IASB, 2014b).
77
 Our analysis of the disclosure required by IFRS 3.64(n)(i) (2008), however, 
shows that even without the specification, the recognition of negative goodwill is handled 
consistently across our sample. In particular, we find that 94 out of the 96 negative goodwill 
transactions directly contribute to the operating result (earnings before interests and taxes, 
EBIT) of the acquirer and are usually recorded under a line item called “Other operating in-
come”. Thus, negative goodwill is not highlighted in the income statement as an income flow 
of extraordinary character but directly increases the operating result of the acquirer. 
This recognition technique is particularly noteworthy as the IASB highlights in 
IFRS 3.BC378 (2008) that “[f]inancial analysts and other users have often told the boards that 
they give little weight to one-off or unusual gains, such as those resulting from a bargain pur-
chase transaction”. The recognition under operating income, however, makes it more difficult 
for analysts to identify negative goodwill as such an unusual transaction. In particular, the 
                                                 
77
  See the comment letter of the Financial Reporting Council of Mauritius stating: “IFRS 3 does not specify 
where in the profit or loss the excess should be shown. This impedes comparability and the Standard should 
require presentation of this gain on the face of the profit or loss” (IASB, 2014b). 
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inclusion in a line item such as “Other operating income” – thus, reporting the gain commin-
gled with other income sources – requires more effort to identify what analysts aim to disre-
gard. Or are such gains typically of so little weight that an in-depth analysis is not even con-
sidered necessary or useful? 
Table 4.4, however, does not support the latter thought and shows instead that negative 
goodwill transactions can be of considerable materiality to the financial statements of acquir-
ing firms. The negative goodwill transactions of our sample result in an average (median) 
gain of 20.9 million euro (3.9 million euro). Also in relative terms, negative goodwill substan-
tially contributes to the acquirer’s income in the period of acquisition. Thus, the gain from a 
negative goodwill transaction as a fraction of the acquirer’s operating income results in an 
average (median) of 16 percent (4 percent) for the sample period between 2005 and 2013. In a 
next step, we follow ESMA (2014) and calculate also the ratio of gains from negative good-
will transactions over net income before taxes. For our full sample period, we obtain an aver-
age of 48 percent which is a remarkable fraction in comparison to the 12 percent in the study 
by ESMA for the year 2012. 
Relative to the size of the acquirer, table 4.4 shows that even when opposed to the respective 
acquirer’s market capitalization, which is drawn from a sample of Germany’s largest listed 
companies, gains from negative goodwill transactions account on average (median) for 4 per-
cent (1 percent). 
Table 4.4: Materiality of Negative Goodwill Transactions 
 
Notes: The table above illustrates the average, median and percentile ranges for all 96 negative goodwill (NGW) 
transactions of our sample in absolute as well as relative terms to income and firm size figures. The firm-year 
specific data for the respective acquirers (e.g. market capitalization) was retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. As for the income ratios, the gains from negative goodwill transactions were not subtracted from the 
operating or net income results. In cases of negative income figures, the absolute ratios were used for calcula-
tions.  
 
Thereby, it is to highlight that we chose a rather conservative approach in assessing the mate-
riality of gains from negative goodwill transactions. As the frequency analysis revealed, we 
Variable Number of NGW 
Transactions
Average Standard 
Deviation
10th 
Percentile
Median 90th
Percentile
NGW in MEur 96 20.85 50.43 0.33 3.94 57.67
NGW over EBIT 96 0.16 0.48 0.00 0.04 0.37
NGW over net income before taxes 96 0.48 2.70 0.00 0.04 0.48
NGW over market capitalization 96 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.07
Table V
Materiality of Negative Goodwill Transactions 
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observed for several firm-year observations more than one negative goodwill transaction. In-
stead of clustering the resulting gains on a yearly basis, we analysed the materiality for each 
separate transaction. Furthermore, we opposed the transaction gains to the operating result 
and the net income before taxes as reported instead of deducting the gains from negative 
goodwill transactions. To still judge upon the materiality of the phenomenon for negative in-
come results, we used the absolute ratios in such cases. 
As the difference in the averages and medians of table 4.4 suggests, there are a number of 
cases with exceptionally high negative goodwill in our sample. Table 4.5 shows examples of 
these transactions and their characteristics with the intent of demonstrating the extraordinary 
role gains from negative goodwill transactions can overtake in selected cases. 
Table 4.5: Selected Transactions With High Materiality of Negative Goodwill 
 
Note: The table above illustrates the transactions of our sample with the highest absolute or relative negative 
goodwill. The grey fields are to highlight the extraordinary character of the selected transactions. 
 
After having shown the high materiality of gains from negative goodwill transactions for our 
sample, the question arises whether the in section 3.2.1 identified high frequencies in the 
manufacturing and real estate sector are also of substantial materiality. While with 19 percent 
the manufacturing sector indeed shows an above average negative goodwill over EBIT ratio 
compared to the full sample of negative goodwill transactions, the median only amounts to 2 
percent (see table 4.6). These results indicate that materiality in the manufacturing sector is 
driven by extraordinary transactions such as the acquisition of STEAG HamaTech by Singu-
lus Technologies illustrated in table 4.5. When excluding the latter transaction the average 
ratio decreases to 4 percent for the manufacturing sector.  
However, the real estate sector shows a high materiality in terms of the average gain from 
negative goodwill over EBIT with 13 percent and the median with 8 percent. Further industry 
Name of Acquirer Name of Acquiree Fiscal
Year
NGW 
in MEur
NGW 
over 
EBIT
NGW over 
Net Income 
before Taxes
NGW over 
Market 
Capitalization
Metro Group Wal-Mart Germany Group 2006 410.00 0.20 0.27 0.03
Deutsche Bank AG ABN Amro Bank N.V. 2010 216.00 0.03 0.04 0.01
Deutsche Lufthansa AG Austrian Airline AG 2009 87.00 1.34 0.38 0.02
Arques Industries AG Siemens Home und Office 
Communication Devices
2008 81.70 0.80 0.55 1.29
Singulus Technologies AG STEAG HamaTech AG 2006 33.78 4.33 7.92 0.08
Tom Tailor Holding AG Bonita Gruppe 2012 11.10 0.67 25.46 0.03
Table VI
Selected Tra sactions with High Materiality of Negative oodwill
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patterns are difficult to detect as there are either only few negative goodwill transactions in 
the respective sector (e.g. in the retail trade industry) or the results are driven by extraordinary 
transactions (e.g. the acquisition by Deutsche Lufthansa in the transportation and public utili-
ties industry). 
Table 4.6: Negative Goodwill Over EBIT per Transaction and Industry 
Notes: The table above illustrates the average, median and percentile ranges for all 96 negative goodwill (NGW) 
transactions of our sample and their ratio of negative goodwill over earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT). 
The results are grouped by their industry sector that is identified with help of the two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes for the acquirer’s primary business. Due to the high frequency of negative goodwill 
transactions and its industry reclassification in 2010, Arques Industries AG (or later: Gigaset AG) is depicted in 
a separate line. Furthermore, the finance, insurance and real estate industry is subdivided into its subsectors with 
the respective results being indicated in brackets. 
 
While in the previous section it was shown that negative goodwill transactions are not as rare 
as might be expected, the analyses in this section identified the substantial impact gains from 
negative goodwill transactions can overtake for the financial performance of the acquirer. In 
the following, we will focus on the acquirer’s disclosures which are supposed to enable users 
of financial statements to understand why the transaction resulted in negative goodwill. 
 
3.3 Reasons for Negative Goodwill 
The importance of adequate information to enable financial statement users to understand and 
evaluate a transaction that led to negative goodwill has often been emphasized. For example, 
ESMA (2014) and several respondents during the recent PIR on IFRS 3 highlight the im-
Industry 
(by SIC Codes)
Number of NGW 
Transactions
Average Standard 
Deviation
10th 
Percentile
Median 90th
Percentile
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing (01-09) 3 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.07
Mining (10-14) 6 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.13
Construction (15-17) 1 0.61 - - - -
Manufacturing (20-39) 28 0.19 0.81 0.00 0.02 0.11
Transportation & Public Utilities (40-49) 7 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.02 0.56
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Retail Trade (52-59) 2 0.44 0.33 0.25 0.44 0.62
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate (60-67) 19 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.33
Depository Institutions (60) (1) (0.03) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Insurance Carriers (63) (1) (0.07) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Real Estate (65) (17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.01) (0.08) (0.34)
Services (70-89) 2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Arques Industries 24 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.12 0.48
Total 96 0.16 0.48 0.00 0.04 0.37
Table VII
Negative Goodwill over EBIT per Transaction and Industry
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portance of disclosures about the reasons for a “bargain purchase”.78 The IASB addressed this 
need in the initial version of IFRS 3 issued in 2004 with the requirement to describe the na-
ture of the gain (IFRS 3.67(h), 2004). In the revised standard, the IASB introduced the more 
specific requirement to describe “the reasons why the transaction resulted in a gain” 
(IFRS 3.B64(n)(ii), 2008). 
To examine the reasons for the occurrence of a negative goodwill, we analysed the notes to 
the financial statements of all firm-year observations that exhibited a negative goodwill trans-
action. Table 4.7 provides an overview of the disclosure practice and compliance with the 
requirements. For 61 (64 percent) of all negative goodwill transactions the firms did neither 
provide a description of the nature of the gain nor a description of the reasons why the trans-
action resulted in negative goodwill. In ten cases (ten percent) firms only provided boilerplate 
or meaningless disclosures which do not go beyond an explanation on the mathematical me-
chanics of business combinations accounting. The remaining 25 (26 percent) of the negative 
goodwill transactions are accompanied by a description which explains why a gain was rec-
ognized. 
Table 4.7: Disclosure of Reasons for Negative Goodwill Transactions 
Notes: The table above illustrates for all 96 transactions of our sample whether the reasons for the recognition of 
negative goodwill are disclosed. For transactions where the reasons are disclosed we further distinguish if the 
provided information is reasonable as to explain the occurrence of negative goodwill (otherwise classified as 
boilerplate). Additionally, column 4 and 6 split the observations by the applicable versions of IFRS 3 (2004 / 
2008). 
 
All in all, our findings provide evidence for substantial non-compliance in IFRS financial 
statements of large listed German firms. This is of particular interest since the accounting for 
business combinations and the related disclosure requirements have been one of the main fo-
                                                 
78
  See, for example, the comment letters of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, American Ap-
praisal (UK) Ltd, Bayer AG, CPC, the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board or TÜV SÜD AG available 
at IASB (2014b).  
Disclosed Reasons Number of 
Observations
Percent of 
NGW 
Transactions
Number of 
Observations 
IFRS 3 (2004)
Percent of 
Observations 
IFRS 3 (2004)
Number of 
Observations 
IFRS 3 (2008)
Percent of 
Observations 
IFRS 3 (2008)
Disclosed Reason 25 26.04% 7 10.45% 18 62.07%
Boilerplate 10 10.42% 8 11.94% 2 6.90%
No Disclosed Reason 61 63.54% 52 77.61% 9 31.03%
Total 96 100.00% 67 100.00% 29 100.00%
Table VIII
Disclosure of Reasons for Negative Goodwill Transactions
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cus areas of the German FREP in almost all years after its establishment in 2004.
79
 Thus, 
firms and auditors should have presumably paid extraordinary attention to business combina-
tion disclosures. However, for the most recent years of our sample period, we observe an im-
provement in the compliance with the disclosure requirements: only for one out of a total of 
eleven negative goodwill transactions during 2012 and 2013 we did not find an explanation of 
why the acquirer could recognize a gain. This almost coincides with the explicit mentioning 
of bargain purchases as one of the main focus areas of the German FREP in recent years.
80
 
Moreover, our analysis indicates that the change introduced by IFRS 3 (2008) to require in-
formation about the reasons, why negative goodwill occurred, improved the quality of firms’ 
disclosures about negative goodwill transactions. While almost 80 percent of the transactions 
accounted for under IFRS 3 (2004) were not accompanied by any description of the gain rec-
ognized by the acquirer, meaningful reasons for negative goodwill have been described by the 
majority of firms (62 percent) under the current version of the standard. However, the number 
of meaningless or missing disclosures is still remarkable. 
In a next step, we clustered all disclosures describing the nature or reasons for negative 
goodwill transactions according to our framework of potential reasons developed in fig-
ure 4.1. Table 4.8 summarizes our results and shows that, in line with the reasoning of the 
IASB, “bargain purchases” account for the most frequently disclosed reasons of negative 
goodwill. As expected, we do not find any reasons relating to errors regarding recognition or 
measurement of identifiable net assets acquired or of the consideration transferred. If the 
firms and its auditor are aware of errors resulting in a negative goodwill transaction during the 
reporting period, this should already have been corrected prior to the issuance of the annual 
report, of course. Moreover, the requirement for reassessment in case of the existence of a 
negative goodwill according to IFRS 3.36 (2008) may help to mitigate the likelihood of er-
rors. It is noteworthy, however, that the third possible reason mentioned by the IASB in 2004, 
exceptions from the recognition and measurement principles that are generally applicable to 
business combinations, does also not result in a negative goodwill transaction in our sample. 
Based on these findings, the current treatment of recognizing negative goodwill immediately 
                                                 
79
  See the “Main Focus Areas” 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 and 2016 available at FREP (2016). 
80
  See the “Main Focus Areas” 2012, 2013, and 2014 available at FREP (2016). 
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as a gain seems appropriate, if one accepts that only these three reasons as mentioned by the 
IASB in 2004 may cause a negative goodwill result. 
Nevertheless, some descriptions for the origin of negative goodwill leave room for interpreta-
tion relating especially to the measurement sub-categories of “bargain purchases”. The level 
of detail does not always allow for a clear-cut distinction of whether (1) the “highest and best 
use” principle is applied according to IFRS 13 but the net assets are worth less to the specific 
acquirer or of whether (2) the lower purchasing price results from different views on valuation 
by the involved parties. Especially in the latter case, we find that more elaborate descriptions 
would be desirable since great differences in valuation should be limited by the assumption 
that sellers – excluding companies pressured by the threat of financial distress or even insol-
vency – should not be willing to close a deal for a price below the business’ value. Conse-
quently, disclosures describing measurement differences in little detail might call into ques-
tion the validity of gains resulting from negative goodwill (see again Comment Letter E of 
table 4.A.1). 
Table 4.8: Classification of Disclosed Reasons 
 
Notes: The table above shows the disclosed reasons according to the framework of potential reasons developed 
in figure 4.1. Thereby, more than one reason can be indicated so that the 36 classifications concern 35 negative 
goodwill transactions with the respective disclosures. The dotted lines are to separate the reasons that are explic-
itly mentioned by IFRS 3 (2004) (i.e. bargain purchase, errors, exceptions), the reasons explicitly not accepted 
(i.e. expectations of future losses and restructuring expenses) and the reasons not explicitly mentioned (i.e. mar-
ket conditions and others). Column 4 and 5 further indicate what reasons could be found in the real estate and 
manufacturing sectors, in particular. 
 
Apart from the reasons explicitly accepted by the IASB, table 4.8 shows that reasons, which 
were not accepted (i.e. expectations of future losses and restructuring expenses) or not men-
tioned (i.e. market conditions and other) by the IASB, also lead to a remarkable number of 
Disclosed Reasons Number of 
Observations
Percent of 
Disclosed 
Reasons
Number of 
Observations 
Real Estate 
Number of 
Observations 
Manufacturing 
Bargain purchase 13 36.11% 7 2
Errors in recognition and measurement 0 0.00% 0 0
Recognition or measurement exceptions 0 0.00% 0 0
Expectations of future losses and 
restructuring expenses
7 19.44% 0 2
Market conditions 6 16.67% 3 2
Other 0 0.00% 0 0
Boilerplate 10 27.78% 2 6
Total 36 100.00% 12 12
Table IX
Classification of Disclosed Reasons
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negative goodwill transactions. Together, they are of equal importance as to explain the exist-
ence of negative goodwill for our sample. 
Having identified that the expectation of future losses and expenses (especially related to re-
structuring) is one of the major stated reasons for a negative goodwill, as argued by opponents 
to the current treatment, we are interested in the acquirees’ performance after the acquisition. 
To examine whether acquirees incur, in fact, losses after the negative goodwill transaction, we 
examine the specific disclosures required by IFRS 3.64(q) (2008) regarding the profit or loss 
which was contributed to the consolidated income statement of the group from the acquisition 
date to the end of the reporting period. Our analysis reveals that out of the 59 disclosed profit 
and loss contributions the acquiree contributed in 29 transactions (49 percent) nothing or even 
a negative result to the consolidated income of the group after the acquisition. These results 
suggest that the “Expectations of future losses and restructuring expenses” as a reason for a 
negative goodwill might even be understated by the number of firms which explicitly dis-
closed this explanation.
81
 
Another six (17 percent) observations relate to the reason “Market conditions” which was not 
mentioned by the IASB. Thereby, the descriptions of our sample cover two scenarios, with 
the first one arising from the consideration being paid (at least partially) in the form of a fixed 
amount of shares whose price changed between the closing of negotiations and their ultimate 
handover. The second case is also connected to the acquisition via a share deal, in which the 
acquirer overtakes at least the proportion of shares (and voting rights) that will secure control 
over the acquiree. However, when the price for the shares of the acquiree is lower than the fair 
value of the net assets acquired, a negative goodwill results. 
While fluctuations in share prices stemming from time differences in the transfer of shares 
should be avoidable via contractual design, the second scenario is especially noteworthy as 
market participants – via their estimations of the share price – view the future prospects of the 
acquiree negatively thus contributing to the occurrence of a negative goodwill. Consequently, 
the nature and interpretation of such transactions appears related to the category of “Expecta-
tions of future losses and restructuring expenses”.  
                                                 
81
  The comment letter by the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) supports the observations from our 
sample as follows: “Some preparers stated that after they recognised gains on negative goodwill for business 
combinations, they often ended up recognising losses in subsequent periods” (IASB, 2014b).  
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Taking the above into consideration, our results indicate that the quality of disclosures has 
been improved over time and more and more firms are describing the reasons for negative 
goodwill transactions. With regard to classifying the content of these disclosures, we find in-
teresting results. While the real “bargain purchase” or “lucky buy” appears to be the dominant 
reason, especially when focusing on the reasons mentioned explicitly by the IASB when 
IFRS 3 (2004) was introduced, the expectation of future losses and (restructuring) expenses 
seems to be a noteworthy reason for the phenomenon under consideration. Moreover, market 
conditions, especially the development of share prices, overtake a central role for the occur-
rence of negative goodwill, a reason that has been understated by the IASB in the past. Given 
the relatively high frequency of explanations other than real “bargain purchases”, it appears 
questionable whether the immediate recognition of the full gain from negative goodwill is the 
most appropriate accounting treatment of the phenomenon and it should thus be reconsidered 
whether a more differentiated treatment according to the underlying reasons of negative 
goodwill would be a better alternative.  
 
4. Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research 
Why would a seller willingly sell a business below its value to an unrelated party? During the 
development of IFRS 3 (2004), the IASB considered transactions, in which the fair value of 
the acquired assets and liabilities assumed exceeds the cost of a business combination, as 
anomalous and rarely occurring. Ten years later, the questions of how often business combi-
nations result in negative goodwill, how material the amounts are to the financial statements 
of the acquiring firms, and, importantly, why such transactions occur are still not answered 
convincingly. 
This paper documents the relevance of negative goodwill transactions to German IFRS prac-
tice. For a sample of the yearly 160 largest German listed firms for the years 2005 to 2013, we 
find 96 negative goodwill transactions indicating that the phenomenon is not as rare as might 
be expected. Moreover, our analyses show that the gains recognized are contributing to the 
acquirers’ operating results, i.e. EBIT, and that amounts are generally material. In particular, 
gains from “bargain purchases” account on average for 16 percent of the acquirers’ EBIT. 
Frequency of and Reasons for Bargain Purchases: Evidence From Germany 
 
137 
 
With regard to the reasons for negative goodwill transactions, the quality of the disclosures 
provided improves over time, probably at least to some extent attributable to the change in the 
requirements from IFRS 3 (2004) to IFRS 3 (2008). Overall, however, the notes to financial 
statements often lack information to understand the nature or reason of the gain recognized as 
a result of the business combination. Our analysis shows that the reason stated most often by 
acquirers is that the firm closed a “bargain purchase”, while no firm disclosed errors or excep-
tions from the general recognition or measurement principles of IFRS 3 as a cause for nega-
tive goodwill. Although this seems to support the current treatment of negative goodwill un-
der IFRS, a noteworthy number of firms disclosed reasons related to the expectation of future 
losses or restructuring expenses and market conditions, such as low share prices of the ac-
quiree. This calls into question whether the current treatment of negative goodwill as a day-
one (operating) gain is always the most appropriate. 
With the above findings, our study contributes to the academic literature on business combi-
nations accounting. To date, few descriptive studies exist that focus on negative goodwill 
transactions. Our results should, however, be of interest beyond academic research. In particu-
lar, we call upon enforcement institutions to become aware of the room for improvement with 
regard to the disclosures of reasons for negative goodwill, that are emphasized to be important 
for users as to understand the conditions of the gain and that constituted the main focus areas 
of enforcers in recent years. Moreover, standard setters, especially the IASB, should be inter-
ested in empirical evidence on the frequency, materiality as well as the reasons for negative 
goodwill transactions, a phenomenon which is not as rare (and immaterial) as expected a dec-
ade ago. 
Our study is, however, subject to certain limitations. First, we are focusing on a single coun-
try, Germany. However, this design allows us to examine a greater width of firms instead of 
some few pre-selected firms from multiple countries and to avoid country-specific bias. 
Moreover, our results are drawn from a sample of only 96 identifiable transactions that is to 
the authors’ best knowledge nevertheless the greatest sample of negative goodwill transac-
tions ever studied. A further important caveat is the examination of reasons as stated by the 
preparers of IFRS financial statements. Of course, this may not in every case reveal the under-
lying reasons, especially in the case of missing disclosures. Thus, future research should ex-
plore the determinants of negative goodwill transactions beyond what the acquirers explicitly 
disclose. These results could then be compared to the findings presented in this study. A fur-
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ther fruitful research opportunity lies in studying the consequences of negative goodwill 
transactions: Do investors really care about the gain from negative goodwill transactions? 
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Appendix 
Table 4.A.1: Extracts From Comment Letters on Reasons for Negative Goodwill 
Comment Letter A - Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA, UK): 
Negative goodwill can arise for very specific economic reasons, such as when an entity is forced to 
leave a particular market quickly, or makes the decision to do so on the grounds of a perceived 
longer-term benefit. 
Comment Letter B - Mazars (France): 
[A] negative goodwill is frequently justified by future restructuring expenses, or future operating 
losses to be incurred before restoring the profitability of the acquiree, that the acquirer cannot account 
for at acquisition date. […] Sometimes, negative goodwill could also arise from IFRS 13 measure-
ment of acquired assets, according to the 'highest and best use' principle, without having considered 
the acquirer's objectives. [...] Negative goodwill is even more counter-intuitive when it is increased 
by choosing to measure NCIs at fair value (i.e. when the fair value of NCIs is lower than their share 
in the fair value of the net assets of the acquiree). 
Comment Letter C - European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG): 
Some respondents believe that the recognition of negative goodwill could indicate the presence of 
structural problems in the acquiree that could result in a future liability for restructuring costs. [...] 
In cases where negative goodwill results mainly from anticipated future losses, the immediate 
recognition of negative goodwill as a gain in profit or loss leads to a periodic mismatch when the 
future los[s]es are recognised [...]. Another respondent noted that a 'gain' generated by the fair valua-
tion of items such as intangible assets [...] should not be recognised on the date of the acquisition. 
There is a risk that the company could recognise a 'bargain purchase' at the acquisition-date based on 
judgemental values and in future years recognise an impairment loss if the 'fair value' estimated was 
not correct. 
Comment Letter D - Austrian Financial Reporting and Auditing Committee (AFRAC, Aus-
tria): 
We also believe that negative goodwill often creates suspicion that artificial gains may have been 
recognised through the over-valuation of assets. [...] In our opinion, the fair value of intangibles 
alone should not lead to a gain from a bargain purchase. 
Comment Letter E - Roche (Switzerland): 
We do not believe a 'gain' generated by the fair valuation of items such as intangible assets [...] 
should be recognised on day one. Given the existing IFRS 3 requirements, there is a risk that a com-
pany could recognise a 'bargain purchase' gain at acquisition based on judgmental fair values from 
what they believe is a bargain from, for example, a 'distressed seller' and then years later book an 
impairment charge upon crystallisation if the 'fair value' they assumed was incorrect and could not be 
realised. 
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Comment Letter F - American Appraisal Ltd (US): 
We find it improbable that any acquirer can make a series of purchases that result in negative good-
will if the ‘market participant’ assumptions of fair value are applied correctly. If an acquirer is con-
stantly recognising gains from negative goodwill, we consider that this most likely is a result of using 
an ‘intrinsic value’ basis, which considers specific value to that buyer, rather than using the fair val-
ue basis and its market-participant-based assumptions. [...] Negative goodwill is more common in 
crisis situations (more distressed sales, more sales where the vendor’s primary concern is speed of 
sale) and there are questions over whether the rules account for this. 
Comment Letter G - Grant Thornton International Ltd (UK): 
Bargain purchase gains also arise for reasons that seem less or unrelated to the economics of the ne-
gotiated exchange, for example: 
 differences of view on valuation including, but not limited to, the acquisition date fair value of 
contingent consideration and intangible assets [...] 
 short-term fluctuations / market reactions in the quoted price of the acquirer's shares when part 
of the consideration is transferred 
 combinations in which the fair value of NCI is lower than the NCI's share of net identifiable assets 
and NCI is recorded at fair value. In this context we note IFRS 3.34 requires this gain to be at-
tributed to the acquirer. 
Comment Letter H - Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contábeis (CPC, Brazil): 
[...] it is clear to assume, when a business is offered for sale, that the seller[)] will estimate the price 
for which the business could be sold, and this involves measuring the value of that business both as a 
continuing operation [...] and as a discontinued operation [...], and certainly the seller will target to 
sell it for the higher of the two resulting figures. Therefore, in practice, if the fair value of net assets is 
the higher amount, this will be the price asked by the seller regardless of what the acquirer will do 
with the business (whether continue or discontinue the operations) and its net assets (use or sell 
them). Accordingly, apart from a possible gain from a bargain purchase arising from poor measure-
ments, given the existing exceptions in IFRS 3, a transaction may only result in a gain from a bargain 
purchase to the acquirer when the parties are not equally knowledgeable of the subject or when 
their measurement bases are significantly different. 
Comment Letter I - PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC, UK): 
We observe that negative goodwill arises in a number of different circumstances, such as where (i) 
companies are sold during periods of distress (for example, during the recent financial crisis), (ii) 
restructuring provisions are required and contemplated in the economics of a deal but cannot be 
recorded at acquisition under the standard, or (iii) share prices fluctuate significantly subsequent to 
fixing the exchange ratio. 
Comment Letter J - Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ, Japan): 
A company found that the cause of negative goodwill was attributable to the expectation that addi-
tional expenses (for example, restructuring costs) would be incurred in future periods and such 
expectations were already reflected in the consideration transferred. The company stated that a 
mismatch in timing of recognition arose between the gains on negative goodwill and such future 
costs, because existing business combination standards do not permit an entity to recognise provi-
sions for such future costs. 
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Comment Letter K - Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Sweden): 
We believe that in the overwhelming majority of cases where negative goodwill is created, severe 
restructuring of the acquiree is needed and restructuring provisions should give a better picture of 
the transaction. 
Comment Letter L - Institut der Wirtschaftspruefer (IDW, Germany): 
[...] negative goodwill often arises when an acquirer anticipates future restructuring expenses 
which cannot be recognised as a liability on acquisition. Expected future losses cannot always be 
allocated to the acquiree’s assets, since by definition the fair values do not encompass the expected 
future losses of the entity as a whole. 
Comment Letter M - Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB, Canada): 
Negative goodwill (and a gain) can also arise when an acquirer issues its own equity shares as con-
sideration for an acquired business and there is a fall in the share price between the date the acquisi-
tion is negotiated and the date on which the acquirer obtains control of the acquire[e] (i.e., the acqui-
sition date that is used in applying the acquisition method). This circumstance is particularly common 
in the resource industries as share prices are often significantly affected by short-term commodity 
price changes while reserve prices are affected by long-term commodity price changes. 
Comment Letter N - BusinessEurope (Belgium): 
When negative goodwill is not an indicator of restructuring or an indicator of a bargain purchase, it is 
usually a strong indicator that the group of assets acquired is a single asset purchase and is not a 
business. 
Comment Letter O - Sanofi (France): 
Negative Goodwill might be an indicator of the need for restructuring the acquiree or an indicator of a 
good deal. However, when we are not in one of the situations listed above, negative goodwill is a 
strong indicator that the group of asset acquired is a single asset purchase and is not a business. 
Source: IASB (2014b), emphasis added by the authors. 
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Abstract 
With the introduction of IFRS 3 Business Combinations, the International Accounting Stand-
ards Board aligned the treatment of negative goodwill as a day-one profit to the reason of 
lucky buys that are officially addressed to as “bargain purchases”. However, among interna-
tional standard setters and practitioners the doubt prevails that negative goodwill merely rep-
resents an accounting phenomenon. We aim to provide a new perspective to the discussion by 
testing whether upon initial announcement investors perceive negative goodwill acquisitions 
as more value creating than a set of comparable transactions. Based on a sample of negative 
goodwill acquisitions by Germany’s yearly 160 largest listed firms from 2005 to 2014 and 
their matched counterparts, we indeed find a positive differential reaction in average cumula-
tive (abnormal) returns for a three-day event window. The difference particularly holds when 
excluding adverse market conditions as a by the negative goodwill acquirer disclosed reason 
for the gain. Therefore, our evidence suggests that investors might associate the occurrence of 
negative goodwill to actual lucky buys.  
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1. Introduction 
For decades, academic studies have been researching upon the drivers for firms’ merger and 
acquisition activities. One of the underlying motivations for submitting an offer, i.e. the value 
creation for the acquirer, has, however, been shown to be overestimated. The brought forward 
rationale is that a great portion of the incremental value to be created from the business com-
bination, e.g. through cost synergies or cross-selling potentials, is distributed to the target. 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) support this argumentation with their findings that 
shareholders of the acquiring firm frequently perceive to have overpaid the acquiree and show 
in effect no or even negative market reactions to acquisition announcements. Given the latter 
evidence on perceived overpayments, the question suggests itself whether shareholders of the 
buying firm react more positively to acquisitions when underpaying for the target. 
A scenario of “underpayment” presents itself with the phenomenon of negative goodwill that 
arises when an acquirer attains control over a business for a price less than the fair value of its 
net assets. While the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) appraises such trans-
actions as anomalous and rarely occurring (IFRS 3.BC147, 2004),
83
 Boehm, Teuteberg and 
Zülch (2016) uncover 96 such negative goodwill transactions for the yearly index composi-
tion of the German HDAX and SDAX for the years from 2005 to 2013. Next to a higher than 
expected frequency, such transactions are found to be of substantial materiality when com-
pared to the operating result and market capitalization of the acquirer. Furthermore, an analy-
sis of the disclosed reasons for negative goodwill reveals that other by the IASB not accepted 
or not mentioned reasons are equally likely as the proclaimed reason of lucky buys, officially 
addressed to as “bargain purchases”. 
Extending upon these findings, we study the consequences of negative goodwill transactions 
in the underlying paper. Following an event study design, we examine whether shareholders 
of the buying firm show more positive reactions to negative goodwill acquisition announce-
ments than to a set of comparable transactions indicating that bargain purchases are actually 
valued as such by the market. No differential reaction would on the contrary provide further 
                                                 
83
  In this paper, we use the abbreviation IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) when referring to 
the accounting standards developed by the IASB or its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) and the related SIC / IFRIC interpretations. The standards that were issued by the IASC 
are called International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
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evidence that negative goodwill is merely an accounting phenomenon. With our study, we 
intend to contribute to the academic research on business combinations that so far provides 
little insights upon the determinants and consequences of negative goodwill transactions (see 
Boennen and Glaum, 2014).  
Moreover, our study is also of practical relevance for the standard setter as it examines how 
market participants perceive the phenomenon of “bargain purchases” and thus allows for in-
ferences upon the recognition method of negative goodwill. While the IASB aligned the under 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations introduced recognition method of negative goodwill as a day-
one profit to the reason of lucky buys, respondents to the Request for Information (RfI) on the 
recent Post-implementation Review (PIR) hold against that negative goodwill is often a result 
of the applied accounting principles (IASB, 2014). However, we find a positive differential 
reaction to negative goodwill acquisition announcements for our sample indeed suggesting 
that on average investors perceive such transactions as lucky buys.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the conceptual back-
ground of negative goodwill including its accounting treatment under the IFRS and its poten-
tial reasons for occurrence. Section 3 provides a literature review on investors’ reactions to 
acquisition announcements. Section 4 describes the sample selection and section 5 shows the 
applied methodology. Section 6 presents the sample characteristics and critically discusses the 
results leading over to the conclusion in section 7. 
 
2. Conceptual Background 
Each revision of the applicable accounting standards on business combinations, with the first 
one being issued in 1983 (IAS 22 Business Combinations), also included substantial changes 
to the treatment of negative goodwill indicating the controversial nature of the phenomenon. 
While all standards similarly define the precondition, namely in the event an acquirer over-
takes control of a business and the purchase- or acquisition method is applied, a negative 
goodwill is realized where the fair value of the net assets exceeds the acquisition costs, great 
differences are observable regarding its subsequent recognition. 
These cover methods of diverse nature such as (1) the amortization of negative goodwill over 
its useful life with a consequent deferred income recognition; (2) a reduction of the acquired 
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non-monetary assets by the amount of negative goodwill with a recognition of income upon 
their use or final sale; or (3) an allocation of the income from negative goodwill according to 
the losses or restructuring provisions expected to occur from the acquiree in the future. Any 
excess of negative goodwill remaining in methods (2) and (3) was either recognized as in-
come immediately or on a systematic basis similarly to method (1). 
While we refer the reader to Boehm et al. (2016) for an in depth discussion of the historic 
development of negative goodwill accounting, it has to be highlighted that all standards pre-
ceding IFRS 3 Business Combinations distributed the income recognized from negative 
goodwill over time and especially with regards to methods (2) and (3) differentiated between 
the share of negative goodwill resulting from accounting provisions or from subjectivity in 
valuation and the gains attributable to lucky buys. 
With IFRS 3 becoming applicable for all business combinations occurring on or after March 
31, 2004, however, negative goodwill has to be fully recognized as a day-one profit assuming 
that its occurrence is only accountable to bargain purchases. Although the IASB also allows 
for errors in valuation remaining after the required reassessment or for fair-value accounting 
exceptions (e.g. deferred tax assets and liabilities) (IFRS 3.57, 2004), the income recognition 
method of negative goodwill is fully aligned to bargain purchases, because a separated contri-
bution of the other two, by the IASB accepted, reasons cannot be determined (IFRS 3.BC150-
156, 2004). 
That the current accounting treatment of negative goodwill is still highly controversial finds 
expression in the under the recent Post-implementation Review (PIR) to IFRS 3 (2008) sub-
mitted comment letters (IASB, 2014). Not only are alternative recognition methods or a return 
to earlier treatments discussed, but also are other than by the IASB accepted reasons frequent-
ly attested. Building upon these insights and prior literature, Boehm et al. (2016) group poten-
tial reasons for negative goodwill by their accepted, explicitly not accepted and not mentioned 
status by the IASB.  
In this way, the authors identify specific scenarios for the accepted reason of bargain purchas-
es, i.e. owners are prepared to accept a lower price (IFRS 3.BC148, 2004), because they need 
to sell quickly to avoid a mandatory insolvency filing or to resolve succession issues, because 
they perceive certain subsidiaries of minor importance, or because they have different views 
on valuation. Furthermore, expectations of future losses and (restructuring) expenses can of-
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ten be found in the comment letters although they represent an explicitly not accepted reason 
by the IASB.
 84
 Moreover, the classification reveals a third group of reasons that are not men-
tioned by the IASB and relate to adverse market conditions on the side of the target or the 
acquirer.
85
 
While the prevalence of other than by the IASB accepted reasons questions the current treat-
ment as a day-one profit, a conclusive response on the suitability of the recognition method 
might be difficult to achieve based on an exclusive analysis of the disclosed reasons. On one 
hand, the in the acquirer’s annual report presented reason might not conform to the real origin 
of the gain (e.g. Lilien, Sarath and Schrader, 2013) and on the other hand more than one rea-
son might have caused the negative goodwill preventing a clear-cut classification. Further-
more, Boehm et al. (2016) detect a substantial non-compliance in IFRS financial statements 
with only 26.0 percent of their sample explicitly disclosing the nature or reason for the gain. 
Therefore, an event study examining whether on average investors perceive negative goodwill 
transaction as lucky buys should add a new perspective to the discussion. 
Thereby, it is to highlight that not the in the acquirer’s income statement recognized non-
recurring day-one profit stands in the centre of analysis, but rather the perceived value creat-
ing potential of negative goodwill transactions. Theoretically, an immediate resale of a bar-
gain purchase should already cash in value for the shareholders and if recognized as such 
should be priced in via positive market reactions upon the acquisition announcement. Nega-
tive goodwill resulting from pure accounting assumptions or later to follow (restructuring) 
expenses should, however, not cause positive reactions. The following section will further 
discuss the expected response by reviewing prior literature on the phenomenon as well as on 
acquisition announcements in general.  
                                                 
84
  According to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, provisions for future losses 
and (restructuring) expenses can only be recognized when the acquiree has a present (legally or factually 
binding) obligation as a result of a past event, that is more likely than not and can be reliably estimated. 
While a usually missing past event for future restructuring expectations prevents their recognition, lowered 
purchasing prices take these into account. 
85
  Adverse market conditions on the side of the target can occur if during extreme market downturns, the com-
bined value of shares lies below the fair value of its net assets. On the side of the acquirer, a negative good-
will can occur if the consideration transferred is exchanged in form of a fixed amount of shares of the acquir-
er, whose value falls between the agreement- and acquisition date.  
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3. Prior Literature 
In a large sample summary paper, Andrade et al. (2001) analyse the three-day cumulative 
abnormal stock returns for all acquisition announcements between 1973 and 1998, whose ac-
quirer as well as acquiree were publicly listed in the US. For their sample of 3,688 completed 
acquisitions, the authors find a statistically significant, average cumulative abnormal return of 
16.0 percent for the target firm and a negative but insignificant average cumulative abnormal 
return of 0.7 percent for the acquiring firm. Based on their observed negative announcement 
returns, the authors propose that the acquiring firm’s shareholders come close to subsidizing 
the target’s owners via overpayment.  
In a more recent study, Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar and Travlos (2013) examine the share-
holder reactions to 3,035 US acquisition announcements between 1990 and 2007 and find a 
significantly negative average cumulative abnormal return of 1.5 percent for the acquiring 
firm during a three-day event window. Ang and Mauck (2011) also observe a significantly 
negative average cumulative abnormal return for their acquiring sample firms over a three-
day event window. Furthermore, the latter authors try to identify potential fire sales and their 
effects on payment premiums for 5,794 US acquisitions announced between 1977 and 2008. 
Targets are thereby classified as distressed if they show a negative net income in the year pre-
ceding the acquisition with fire sales occurring by assumption in recessionary periods. How-
ever, instead of associating such fire sales with lucky buys and underpayment, the authors 
uncover average payment premiums for these sample transactions.  
Choosing an alternative approach of identifying potential underpayment, Comiskey, Clarke 
and Mulford (2010) examine a sample of 43 negative goodwill (NGW) transactions that were 
acquired by US listed firms in the years between 2000 and 2007.
86
 The authors test the alter-
native hypothesis whether “returns of firms involved in NGW acquisition transactions exceed 
those of matched firms” (p.340). In contrast, no differential reaction would suggest that nega-
tive goodwill transactions do not increase the value of the firm. Thus, the opinion of various 
                                                 
86
  Under the during the sample period applicable accounting standards, Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
Opinion No. 16 and from 2001 onwards the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 14, 
negative goodwill had to be allocated against a set of qualifying assets reducing their fair values. Any re-
maining negative goodwill had to be amortized to income under the former provision or be recognized as a 
day-one extraordinary gain under the latter. 
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critics (e.g. Haaker, 2014; Lilien et al., 2013) would be confirmed that negative goodwill is a 
mere accounting phenomenon instead of the result of actual lucky buys.  
Indeed, Comiskey et al. (2010) provide only limited evidence that negative goodwill is valued 
by the market. For an 11-day event window, the authors find a significant difference between 
the higher median raw returns of negative goodwill acquirers relative to a broad sample of 
4,614 positive goodwill acquirers and a by acquisition date, industry, acquirer size and rela-
tive acquisition size matched sample. However, the evidence loses in significance for the 
three-day event window, during which significant differences can only be observed for high 
negative goodwill acquirers, i.e. all acquirers with above median ratios of negative goodwill 
over market capitalization. 
The authors conclude that despite the high materiality of negative goodwill in their sample, 
which amounts to an average (median) 21 percent (7 percent) of market capitalization, nega-
tive goodwill appears not to be valued by shareholders. The presented evidence questions the 
with SFAS No. 141(R) for all fiscal years starting after December 15, 2008 introduced recog-
nition practice as a day-one profit from continuing operations (Comiskey and Mulford, 2008). 
Nevertheless the authors call for a replication of their study under SFAS No. 141(R) that also 
requires an explicit disclosure of the reasons for negative goodwill. 
Dunn, Kohlbeck and Smith (2016) follow this quest and study a total sample of 182 by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) assisted failed bank acquisitions in the years 
2009 and 2010. Given the focus on forced sale transactions and the timely conditions under 
which they are closed by the FDIC, the authors observe that 79 of the 142 firm-year acquirers 
recognize a gain from negative goodwill from at least one badwill transaction.  
For a subsample of 52 acquisition announcements by public acquirers, the authors find a sig-
nificant average abnormal return of 4.5 percent for 33 bargain purchases over a five-day event 
window [-3, +1] and insignificant returns for the non-bargain purchase transactions. Further-
more, the authors present evidence that on one hand the recognition of negative goodwill as a 
day-one profit incentivizes management opportunism and influences the likelihood of bargain 
purchases. On the other hand, investors are found to value bargain purchases less in cases of 
likely earnings management, i.e. a pre-badwill decline in net income.  
While the in a joint-project with the IASB developed SFAS No. 141(R) was only introduced 
in 2008, its equivalent under the IFRS reporting regime has to be applied to all business com-
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binations closed on or after March 31, 2004. Among a sample of the yearly 160 largest listed 
German firms in the fiscal years from 2005 to 2013, Boehm et al. (2016) detect 61 firm-years 
with negative goodwill and a total of 96 individual badwill transactions. On the example of 
Germany, the authors thus confirm the observations by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA, 2014)
 “that bargain purchases appear to happen more frequently than the 
IASB originally expected” (p.3). 87 
Similarly, acquisition studies by Glaum, Street and Vogel (2007), Glaum and Vogel (2008) or 
Glaum and Wyrwa (2011) attest three to eight percent of negative goodwill transactions 
among all acquisitions by Europe’s largest listed acquirers for the years 2005, 2007 and 
2009.
88
 However, despite such transactions’ relatively high frequency and as shown by 
Boehm et al. (2016) considerable materiality,
89
 there is an ongoing debate upon their nature 
and the consequent recognition of the gain from negative goodwill as was discussed in section 
2. 
Since the evidence by Comiskey et al. (2010) is constrained to a pre-SFAS No. 141(R) period 
and as Dunn et al. (2016) focus on an exclusive sample of US forced bank sales, there is no 
conclusive evidence on the phenomenon yet motivating a further event study on badwill 
transaction announcements. Therefore, the following examination will analyse the exemplary 
case of IFRS reporting negative goodwill acquirers that are listed in Germany.  
 
4. Sample Selection 
Building upon Boehm et al. (2016), our initial sample consists of the negative goodwill acqui-
sitions by all listed firms forming part of the yearly index composition of the main indices 
(DAX30, MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX) of the German stock exchange, Deutsche Börse 
                                                 
87
  For the fiscal year 2012, ESMA (2014) examines 56 European listed companies and their 66 business combi-
nations, of which seven report a gain from negative goodwill. 
88
  For 2005, the authors find 14 individually disclosed negative goodwill transactions on a total sample of 266 
transactions. For cases where business combinations are summarized, two companies with aggregate nega-
tive goodwill were found on a total of 97 disclosures. For 2007, 10 of 377 individually disclosed- and 5 of 
161 aggregately disclosed negative goodwill transactions are found. For 2009, 17 of 212 individually dis-
closed- and 3 of 82 aggregately disclosed negative goodwill transactions are reported.  
89
  Boehm et al (2016) find that the gain from negative goodwill transactions amounts to an average (median) of 
4 percent (1 percent) relative to the respective acquirer’s market capitalization. Comiskey et al. (2010) point 
out that their studied acquirers with negative goodwill transactions are typically small explaining the higher 
ratio of an average 21 percent. 
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AG.
90
 The period of analysis starts from fiscal year 2005, as the first full year of IFRS 3 be-
coming mandatory to all closed business combinations, and extends upon the fiscal year 2014. 
In order to filter the resulting 1,600 firm-year observations, we screened our dataset for posi-
tive values of the S&P Capital IQ data item “IQ_Impairment_GW”. 91 The respective output 
of 80 firm-year observations was then made subject to a detailed analysis of the acquirers’ 
annual reports decreasing the sample to 67 firm-years that in fact contained documentable 
gains from negative goodwill.  
Moreover, we were able to break down the on a firm-year basis aggregated gains from nega-
tive goodwill into individual transactions resulting in 103 observations. Since the detailed 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 3 also apply to business combinations with negative good-
will, we supplemented further relevant transaction data regarding especially the date of acqui-
sition, the name of the target, the consideration transferred, the resulting gain from negative 
goodwill and the reason or origin for the gain (see IFRS 3.67, 2008). 
To associate a control group to the negative goodwill sample described above, S&P Capital 
IQ was screened for comparable business combinations. Following Comiskey et al. (2010), 
our searching criteria filtered all publicly traded firms of the same industry sector as the nega-
tive goodwill acquirer that announced a business combination within one year of the negative 
goodwill announcement date. Sector affiliation was thereby defined with the two digit prima-
ry standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. Additionally, we required that the buyer is 
listed in Germany and part of the regulated market,
92
 the transaction status of the announced 
transaction is closed, the percentage sought is greater than 50 percent and the final considera-
tion transferred is provided. 
                                                 
90
  The DAX30, MDAX and SDAX are composed of the 130 largest companies by market capitalization of the 
prime standard segment. The TecDAX adds another 30 of the largest companies of the technology sector in 
the prime standard segment. For information on the individual indices refer to www.boerse-frankfurt.de (last 
retrieved on March 10, 2017). 
91
  This item contains the net amount of goodwill impairment charges and income from bargain purchase trans-
actions. Considering the rather low frequency of these two items, we examine all firm-years exhibiting a pos-
itive amount for “IQ_Impairment_GW”, acknowledging that this procedure may understate the prevalence of 
bargain transactions. We thank Dr. Tobias Stork genannt Wersborg for the provision of this data. 
92
  As part of the regulated market, companies fall under the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 
WpHG) and are in Germany either part of the general or prime standard of the Deutsche Börse AG. Required 
under both market segments is the application of international accounting standards (IFRS or US-GAAP) and 
the publication of ad-hoc announcements. 
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Given these stringent criteria, we do not find a control group for 11 negative goodwill transac-
tions. The sample of negative goodwill is further reduced by 34 transactions as they were ei-
ther not included in the S&P Capital IQ databank or no consideration transferred was given to 
match a single control transaction. Consequently, the sample of negative goodwill transac-
tions amounts to a total of 58 observations, for each of which a single matched acquisition 
was identified.  
Regarding the matching procedure, the closest candidate of each control group is identified as 
lying in the range of 70 to 130 percent of the market capitalization of the negative goodwill 
acquirer with the most similar relative transaction size. As in Alexandridis et al. (2013), rela-
tive transaction size is defined as the final consideration transferred to shareholders relative to 
the market capitalization of the respective buyer one month prior to the acquisition an-
nouncement.
 93
 
 
5. Methodology 
We employ an event study design to test the alternative hypothesis whether negative goodwill 
transactions result on average in more positive shareholder reactions than a set of matched 
control transactions. As in Dodd (1980), the date of the first public acquisition announcement 
is used as the event day, around which one to two trading days are tested as an event window. 
The event day is identified with S&P Capital IQ and checked with an extensive review of all 
major German newspapers (including Börsen-Zeitung), ad-hoc news providers and sector-
specific publications through the LexisNexis databank. To determine the abnormal returns, 
the stock returns are calculated for the estimation window [-202; -3] and regressed against the 
market returns, Rmt, of the German regulated market (CDAX) following the market model. 
As described in equation 1, the estimated stock return, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, can then be calculated for the days 
of the event window considering the systematic risk of the acquirer, 𝛽𝑖, and the firm-specific 
constant, 𝛼𝑖. The difference between the actual stock returns, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 , and the estimated ones, 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡, for an acquirer i results in the estimated abnormal returns, 𝐴?̂?𝑖,𝑡 (refer to equation 2), that 
                                                 
93
  Furthermore, each matching candidate is checked for the S&P Capital IQ item “IQ_Impairment_GW” to 
avoid negative goodwill transactions within the control group. 
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when summed produce the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the acquirer for the respec-
tive event window.  
𝑅𝑖,?̂? =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (1)  
𝐴?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
Following the method applied by Comiskey et al. (2010), we additionally calculate the raw 
returns per transaction being defined as the cumulative stock returns of the acquirer during the 
event window. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Sample Characteristics  
Table 5.1 depicts the distribution of the negative goodwill transactions of our sample over 
their announcement years. Given that the prevalence of negative goodwill is often related to a 
forced sale of the target, a higher frequency could – in line with the assumption by Ang and 
Mauck (2011) – have been expected for the period of the financial crisis (particularly in the 
years 2008 and 2009). However, we do not observe such a trend in our sample and associate 
the greater frequency in the announcement years 2006 and 2007 to a total of nine negative 
goodwill transactions by the private equity firm, Arques Industries AG (today Gigaset AG), 
that up until its transition into the telecommunication sector in 2010 specialized on acquisi-
tions of non-core businesses and distressed targets.  
The compared to the full sample above average amount of negative goodwill per transaction 
in the announcement year 2008 mainly originates from the acquisition of parts of ABN Amro 
Bank by Deutsche Bank with a badwill of 216.0 million euro. Whereas in the announcement 
year 2013, the acquisition of Corealcredit by Aareal Bank with 154.0 million euro of 
badwill
94
 and the purchase of Prime Office by Deutsche Office with 115.4 million euro of 
badwill drive the average and median results. 
 
                                                 
94
  A following the acquisition announcement by the Börsen-Zeitung published article presents anecdotal evi-
dence documenting the over days positive market reaction in response to the 342 million euro payment for 
Corealcredit standing for only 46 percent of the target’s equity (Neubacher, 2013).  
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Table 5.1: Negative Goodwill Transactions per Announcement Year 
 
Notes: The table above illustrates the distribution of our sample of badwill transactions by announcement year, 
for each of which the number of transactions and the correspondent sample distribution as well as the average 
and median amounts of negative goodwill are depicted.  
 
While the above named negative goodwill transactions represent together with the acquisition 
of Wal-Mart Germany by Metro (announced in 2006, badwill of 410.0 million euro) the four 
largest negative goodwill transactions of our sample, 55.2 percent of our negative goodwill 
acquirers recognize badwills of more than 10.0 million euro as illustrated in table 5.2. In aver-
age (median) terms, the gain from negative goodwill amounts to 34.1 million euro (13.6 mil-
lion euro) per transaction. Also relative to the size of the respective acquirer that is measured 
in terms of market capitalization one month prior to the acquisition announcement, the gain 
from negative goodwill amounts to an average of 5.7 percent per transaction highlighting the 
phenomenon’s materiality also when compared to Germany’s largest listed firms.  
Transactions with NGW
Announcement N Percent of Average NGW Median NGW
Year Sample in MEur in MEur 
2005 3 5.17 13.46 4.40
2006 11 18.97 46.27 10.73
2007 10 17.24 27.74 23.32
2008 9 15.52 51.21 20.02
2009 4 6.90 33.01 20.81
2010 7 12.07 7.10 2.56
2011 2 3.45 13.24 13.24
2012 5 8.62 33.04 11.10
2013 4 6.90 79.45 74.69
2014 3 5.17 0.46 0.30
Total 58 100.00 34.14 13.60
Does Underpayment Pay the Acquirer? An Event Study on Bargain Purchases 
 
158 
 
Table 5.2: Materiality of Negative Goodwill Transactions  
Notes: The table above illustrate the materiality of negative goodwill (NGW) transactions. Negative goodwill 
transactions are grouped by their amount of gain and associated to the average market capitalization of the re-
spective acquirers, the average relative NGW, i.e. the ratio of negative goodwill over the acquirer’s market capi-
talization, and the average relative transaction size, i.e. the final consideration transferred to shareholders over 
the acquirer’s market capitalization.  
 
Assuming that negative goodwill is not a pure accounting phenomenon, the above observed 
high materiality of the day-one profit suggests a positive market reaction compared to the 
matched non-negative goodwill transactions.
95
 Further speaking for “real” bargain purchases 
and forced sales is that we find for 21 negative goodwill transactions a reference to the target 
or selling mother company in the context of a restructuring or insolvency proceeding within 
one year of the acquisition announcement.
96
 Also we detect for nine additional transactions 
disclosures in the acquirers’ annual reports explaining the reason for the gain from negative 
goodwill with a bargain purchase.  
Moreover, we checked the announcement statements with help of the databank LexisNexis 
and find for 63.8 percent of our negative goodwill transactions either an explicit indication of 
a badwill or a purchasing price. For the rest of our sample, we also assume that the relative 
underpayment is compared to the matched transactions known by the market although the full 
amount of badwill might not yet be clear in the date of acquisition announcement.  
                                                 
95
  A good example that at least a portion of the recognized gain is associable to a bargain purchase poses the 
acquisition of Wal-Mart Germany by Metro and a related article in the Börsen-Zeitung upon the transaction 
announcement. There it is stated that the net assets exceed the purchasing price also after deducting all poten-
tial restructuring provisions and costs of integration thus suggesting an actual lucky buy (Becker, 2006).  
96
  References to restructuring provisions are not included as according to the classification scheme developed 
by Boehm et al. (2016) they do not cause bargain purchases but are rather associated to negative goodwill as 
a pure accounting phenomenon.  
Transactions with NGW
Ranges N Percent of Average NGW Size Acquirer Relative Relative Trans-
in MEur Sample in MEur in MEur NGW action Size
0 < NGW ≤ 1 8 13.79 0.52 4,828.53 0.003 0.014
1 < NGW ≤ 10 18 31.03 4.07 2,376.98 0.013 0.063
10 < NGW ≤ 20 8 13.79 14.02 3,163.27 0.031 0.183
20 < NGW ≤ 30 7 12.07 21.91 3,243.66 0.077 0.040
30 < NGW ≤ 40 6 10.34 34.35 2,109.85 0.067 0.059
40 < NGW ≤ 100 7 12.07 76.54 1,473.27 0.155 0.246
NGW > 100 4 6.90 223.85 12,811.03 0.190 0.283
Total 58 100.00 34.14 3,511.07 0.057 0.107
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6.2 Announcement Returns 
As explained in section 5, we test with the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the cumu-
lative returns (RAW) according to Comiskey et al. (2010) different measures of investor reac-
tions to the acquisition announcements of our sample. In order to correct for extreme observa-
tions and to respond to the critique by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005),
97
 we addi-
tionally winsorize each measure at the upper and lower first percentile. Table 5.3 illustrates 
our results for each measure across the examined three- and five-day event windows. For the 
CAR [-1; +1] we find a positive average difference of 1.3 percentage points between the 
negative goodwill transactions and each of their matched counterparts also holding for the 
RAW [-1; +1] and WRAW [-1; +1] measures.  
During the three-day event window, not only the average investor reactions seem to indicate a 
difference, but also the medians with returns close to zero percent for the matched transac-
tions and 1-1.4 percent for the negative goodwill transactions. For the five-day event window, 
the average differences between the two subsamples, however, diminish across all investor 
reaction measures. Nevertheless, the compared to the three-day event window more similar 
returns between the two subsamples provide supporting evidence that the observed reactions 
might be related to the negative goodwill transaction announcements and are diluted by other 
confounding events for longer periods of time.  
Next to the above described absolute differences between the transaction pairs with and with-
out negative goodwill, we test their significance for all reaction measures and event windows 
with help of a one-sided paired t-test. For the three-day event window, we find for all four 
measures an at the 10 percent level significant average positive difference. For the five-day 
event window, the null hypothesis of the average investor reactions to negative goodwill 
transaction announcements being lower than to their matched counterparts cannot, however, 
be rejected for our sample. Given our relatively small sample size and the skewness of the 
differences that can be observed in the frequency distribution illustrated in figure 5.A.1, we 
additionally test the median difference upon equality with help of a Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test. As shown in table 5.3, the p-values to the latter test do not allow for a rejection of the 
                                                 
97
  Moeller et al. (2005) bring forward that the commonly observed negative average announcement returns for 
US listed acquirers are mostly driven by some few large loss-making transactions in the sample period from 
1991 to 2001. 
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null hypothesis for all investor reaction measures during the three- as well as five-day event 
window.  
Summarizing the above observations, we find a positive average difference in investor reac-
tions of 1.1-1.3 percentage points when comparing the announcement returns of negative 
goodwill transactions to each of their matched transactions over a three-day event window. 
The effect, however, diminishes over a five-day event window providing further evidence for 
the announcement-specific returns that become diluted by other confounding events over 
time. Also a one-sided paired t-test attests an on average more positive investor reaction to 
negative goodwill acquisitions at the 10 percent significance level suggesting that investors 
might indeed perceive such transactions as value adding bargain purchases.  
However, the additional Wilcoxon signed-rank test of our 58 observations weakens the latter 
evidence so that the following section will undertake further robustness checks concerning 
potentially confounded events, transaction characteristics and the underlying reasons for 
negative goodwill. 
Table 5.3: Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements 
 
CAR [-1; +1] CAR [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.015 0.002 0.009 0.007
Standard Deviation 0.057 0.036 0.078 0.055
10th Percentile -0.043 -0.041 -0.052 -0.051
Median 0.010 -0.001 0.006 -0.001
90th Percentile 0.064 0.050 0.092 0.066
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58
Average Difference 0.013 0.003
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.080 * 0.412
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.174 0.702
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Table 5.3: Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements (Continued) 
  
Notes: The table above illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), the at the upper and lower first per-
centile winsorized cumulative abnormal returns (WCAR) and following Comiskey et al. (2010) the cumulative 
returns (RAW) and winsorized cumulative returns (WRAW) for the event windows [-1; +1] and [-2; +2]. In 
order to evaluate the differences in shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements with and without nega-
tive goodwill (NGW), a one-sided paired t-test and a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test were undertaken. 
Thereby, one star (*) indicates significance at the 10 percent level, while two (**) and three stars (***) stand for 
the 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. 
WCAR [-1; +1] WCAR [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.013 0.002 0.008 0.007
Standard Deviation 0.048 0.036 0.066 0.055
10th Percentile -0.043 -0.041 -0.052 -0.051
Median 0.010 -0.001 0.006 -0.001
90th Percentile 0.064 0.050 0.092 0.066
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58
Average Difference 0.011 0.002
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.083 * 0.430
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.169 0.702
RAW [-1; +1] RAW [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.019 0.005 0.014 0.013
Standard Deviation 0.052 0.044 0.079 0.059
10th Percentile -0.030 -0.047 -0.058 -0.049
Median 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.005
90th Percentile 0.074 0.063 0.109 0.077
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58
Average Difference 0.013 0.001
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.066 * 0.470
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.208 0.960
WRAW [-1; +1] WRAW [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.018 0.005 0.015 0.013
Standard Deviation 0.050 0.044 0.068 0.059
10th Percentile -0.030 -0.047 -0.058 -0.049
Median 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.005
90th Percentile 0.074 0.063 0.109 0.077
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58
Average Difference 0.013 0.002
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.070 * 0.437
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.211 0.960
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6.3 Robustness Checks 
In addition to section 6.2, we conduct various robustness checks starting with an exclusion of 
transactions with potentially confounded events. For this purpose, we searched all major 
German newspapers (including the Börsen-Zeitung) with help of the databank, LexisNexis, 
for other acquirer-specific news during the three-day event window. We excluded all poten-
tially confounded negative goodwill acquisition announcements with their respective matched 
transactions. Furthermore, we checked all acquisition announcements of our matched transac-
tions for negative news that would artificially increase the difference in observed investor 
reactions. With the described approach, we exclude a total of 11 transaction pairs. The re-
duced sample also dismisses two of the in section 6.1 outlined four transactions with the larg-
est badwills of above 100.0 million euro. The average (median) gain from negative goodwill 
for the reduced sample amounts to 23.4 million euro (10.7 million euro). 
We repeat the analysis depicted in table 5.3 and illustrate our results in table 5.A.1. For the 
three-day event window, we only find an average difference in investor reactions of 0.6-0.8 
percentage points across the various return measures that is neither tested as significant under 
the one-sided paired t-test nor (for the median results) under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
For the five-day event window, we even observe a negative average difference between the 
announcements of negative goodwill transactions and their matched counterparts. Following 
these with respect to section 6.2 diminished reactions, we take a closer look at the transaction 
details of the ten negative goodwill transactions with the highest as well as the lowest differ-
ences in CAR [-1; +1] and with the greatest gains from negative goodwill in our restricted 
sample. 
Table 5.A.2 summarizes the results and shows that the transactions with the greatest differ-
ences in investor reactions by CAR [-1; +1] do not necessarily have the highest gains from 
negative goodwill. The average recognized badwill is with 38.7 million euro even higher for 
the ten transactions with the lowest differential announcement returns than for the ten with the 
highest (, i.e. 23.5 million euro of average badwill). Associating where available the in the 
annual reports disclosed reasons for negative goodwill to the respective transactions, we dis-
cover that the lowest, fifth-, seventh- and ninth lowest investor reactions relate to transactions 
with negative goodwill being explained by the underlying market conditions. Also when ana-
lysing the by their amount of negative goodwill top ten transactions of the restricted sample, 
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we identify adverse market conditions on the side of the acquirer or the target as the disclosed 
reason for four acquisitions namely of Prime Office by Deutsche Office, of GEHAG by 
Deutsche Wohnen, of Solibro by Global PVQ and of Colonia Real Estate by TAG Immo-
bilien.  
Thus, it is interesting to highlight that market conditions as a reason not even mentioned by 
the IASB (refer to Boehm et al., 2016) account for transactions with some of the greatest 
gains from negative goodwill in our restricted sample that all result in negative announcement 
returns. We exclude all six negative goodwill transactions together with their matched coun-
terparts that given the acquirers’ disclosures are associated to adverse market conditions. Next 
to their outlier status, the rationale is that on one hand badwills that are caused by the adverse 
market conditions of the acquiring firm might not even by known in the date of announce-
ment, because the consideration transferred takes the form of a fixed amount of the buyers’ 
shares, whose value falls only between the agreement- and closure date.
98
 On the other hand, 
the badwill might be caused by an extreme market downturn for the target’s share reflecting 
market participants’ negative outlook of the acquiree and not speaking for a lucky buy.  
In our reviewed analysis of the CAR [-1; +1] and WCAR [-1; +1] we observe average differ-
ences between the two subsamples of 1.8 and 1.5 percentage points respectively that are sig-
nificantly greater than zero at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, when we repeat the examina-
tion of our extended sample explained in section 6.2, but also exclude the six transaction 
pairs, we receive average differences of CAR [-1; +1] and WCAR [-1; +1] amounting to 2.1 
and 1.8 percentage points respectively that are significantly greater than zero at the 2 percent 
level with also the medians testing indifferent from zero under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
 
 
                                                 
98
  A good example poses the acquisition of GEHAG by Deutsche Wohnen (2007) with the following disclo-
sure: “The amount of the negative consolidation difference is attributable […] to the development of the 
share price between the time of the signing of the purchase contract and the actual effective date of the trans-
fer. It fell between July 2, 2007 [announcement date] and August 9, 2007 [closing date] from approximately 
39 EUR/share to approximately 29 EUR/share. With the number of shares issued this corresponds to a reduc-
tion in the purchase price of approximately EUR 64 million” (p.122).  
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7. Conclusion 
In the underlying paper, the hypothesis was examined whether investors perceive negative 
goodwill acquisitions as more value enhancing than a set of comparable transactions. The 
analysis was based on a sample of negative goodwill acquirers all forming part of Germany’s 
yearly 160 largest listed firms from 2005 to 2014 and their respective returns upon transaction 
announcement. For the selection of similar acquisitions, we closely followed the methodology 
developed by Comiskey et al. (2010) and matched by the respective negative goodwill acquir-
er’s industry sector and market capitalization as well as by the relative transaction size and 
announcement year.  
In contrast to the latter authors, we find positive average differences of 1.1-1.3 percentage 
points depending upon the applied return measure when comparing the investor reactions of 
negative goodwill transaction announcements to their matched counterparts during a three-
day event window. Providing further evidence for the announcement-specific effects, the av-
erage difference in cumulative (abnormal) returns diminishes over a five-day event window. 
Although the average difference over the three-day event window also tests significantly at 
the 10 percent level, the medians do not test indifferent to zero at the same or lower levels. 
Our evidence is further weakened by excluding potentially confounded transactions pairs 
from our sample. 
Additional robustness checks, however, uncover that some of the greatest gains from negative 
goodwill within our sample originate from – according to the disclosures of the acquirers – 
adverse market conditions on the side of the target or the acquiring firm itself. This finding is 
especially noteworthy since market conditions are not even mentioned by the IASB as a po-
tentially underlying reason for negative goodwill (Boehm et al., 2016). When excluding the to 
adverse market conditions related acquisition pairs from our extended and restricted sample, 
we find an average difference in cumulative abnormal returns of 1.5-2.1 percentage points 
over the three-day event window testing significantly different from zero at the 5 percent lev-
el.  
The latter results provide initial evidence for a differentiated and on average more positive 
reaction to negative goodwill transactions suggesting a relation of the phenomenon to actually 
underpaid for bargain purchases. Therefore, also the with IFRS 3 introduced and to lucky 
buys aligned treatment of negative goodwill as a day-one profit might be justified although 
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our evidence does not allow for any inferences on whether the total amount of the booked 
gain is associated to bargain purchases. For the interpretation of our results, the shortcomings 
of our paper have to further be kept in mind that are connected to our small sample size and to 
the chosen matching approach, which might not be able to capture all acquirer- or transaction-
specific influences.  
Due to data limitations, we nevertheless decided to apply the described methodology and to 
present initial evidence on Germany for an in difference to Dunn et al. (2016) general, not to 
forced sales restricted sample covering in difference to Comiskey et al. (2016) the treatment 
of negative goodwill as a day-one profit and the mandatory disclosure of the reasons for its 
occurrence. We understand our results as laying the groundworks for future research on larger 
sample evidence applying event study- or market value methodologies.  
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Appendix 
Figure 5.A.1: Distribution of Differences in Investor Reactions 
 
Notes: The figure above illustrates the distributions of the differences in investor reactions between each nega-
tive goodwill transaction and its matched counterpart for the return measures, CAR, WCAR, RAW as well as 
WCAR, and the two event windows [-1; +1] and [-2; +2].  
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Table 5.A.1: Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements Excluding Potentially Con-
founded Transactions 
CAR [-1; +1] CAR [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.012 0.004 0.005 0.011
Standard Deviation 0.059 0.036 0.082 0.058
10th Percentile -0.043 -0.040 -0.052 -0.042
Median 0.005 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
90th Percentile 0.062 0.050 0.079 0.068
Number of Observations 47 47 47 47
Average Difference 0.008 -0.007
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.210 0.691
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.711 0.498
WCAR [-1; +1] WCAR [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.011
Standard Deviation 0.048 0.036 0.068 0.058
10th Percentile -0.043 -0.040 -0.052 -0.042
Median 0.005 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
90th Percentile 0.062 0.050 0.079 0.068
Number of Observations 47 47 47 47
Average Difference 0.006 -0.008
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.256 0.749
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.711 0.498
RAW [-1; +1] RAW [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.017
Standard Deviation 0.052 0.042 0.082 0.061
10th Percentile -0.030 -0.046 -0.058 -0.038
Median 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.005
90th Percentile 0.074 0.063 0.100 0.077
Number of Observations 47 47 47 47
Average Difference 0.008 -0.005
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.209 0.659
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.695 0.472
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Table 5.A.1: Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements Excluding Potentially Con-
founded Transactions (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table above illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), the at the upper and lower first per-
centile winsorized cumulative abnormal returns (WCAR) and following Comiskey et al. (2010) the cumulative 
returns (RAW) and winsorized cumulative returns (WRAW) for the event windows [-1; +1] and [-2; +2]. In 
order to evaluate the differences in shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements with and without nega-
tive goodwill (NGW), a one-sided paired t-test and a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test were undertaken. 
Thereby, one star (*) indicates significance at the 10 percent level, while two (**) and three stars (***) stand for 
the 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. With help of an extensive search of the databank, LexisNexis, 
eleven matched transaction pairs with potentially confounding events were excluded in difference to table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.A.2: Negative Goodwill Transactions Summary 
  
WRAW [-1; +1] WRAW [-2; +2]
With NGW Without NGW With NGW Without NGW
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Average 0.015 0.007 0.013 0.017
Standard Deviation 0.050 0.042 0.069 0.061
10th Percentile -0.030 -0.046 -0.058 -0.038
Median 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.005
90th Percentile 0.074 0.063 0.100 0.077
Number of Observations 47 47 47 47
Average Difference 0.007 -0.004
P-value, H0: μ1 - μ2 < 0 0.220 0.659
P-value, H0: m1 - m2 = 0 0.695 0.472
Top 10 NGW Transactions by Investor Reactions
Acquirer Acquiree CAR [-1; +1] NGW Announcement
Difference in MEur Year
Arques Industries Auto-Windscreens 0.346 20.02 2008
Singulus Technologies Oerlikon Balzers 0.128 15.65 2008
TAG Immobilien Ostara Alpha 0.097 3.98 2009
CTS Eventim Top Ticket France 0.088 0.24 2014
Gerry Weber International Castro Germany 0.058 2.11 2011
T-Online International Albura Telecommunicaciones 0.058 4.40 2005
Aareal Bank Corealcredit 0.049 154.00 2013
Arques Industries Oxxynova 0.048 10.73 2006
Salzgitter Flachform Stahl 0.045 0.11 2006
Arques Industries Actebis Zentral 0.043 25.44 2007
Average 0.096 23.47
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Table 5.A.2: Negative Goodwill Transactions Summary (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table above illustrates a selection of negative goodwill transactions based on the higher or lowest 
differences in investor reactions measured by CAR [-1; +1] and the highest realized gains from negative good-
will. All transactions highlighted in grey represent gains from negative goodwill that are according to the disclo-
sures by the respective acquirers related to adverse market conditions. 
 
Bottom 10 NGW Transactions by Investor Reactions
Acquirer Acquiree CAR [-1; +1] NGW Announcement
Difference in MEur Year
Deutsche Office Prime Office -0.127 115.39 2013
Kontron Thales Computers -0.084 1.81 2007
Arques Industries Woco Michelin -0.068 66.17 2007
Hannover Rück American ING-Lifeinsurance 
Portfolios
-0.066 86.44 2009
TAG Immobilien FranconoWest -0.063 3.58 2010
Salzgitter Vallourec Précision Eirage -0.052 8.09 2006
Deutsche Wohnen GEHAG -0.047 64.10 2007
Colonia Real Estate Domus Grunstücksverwal-
tungsgesellschaft
-0.043 5.65 2007
TAG Immobilien Colonia Real Estate -0.043 32.38 2010
Kontron ChiliGREEN -0.040 3.23 2008
Average -0.063 38.68
Top 10 NGW Transactions by Gain
Acquirer Acquiree CAR [-1; +1] NGW Announcement
Difference in MEur Year
Aareal Bank Corealcredit 0.049 154.00 2013
Deutsche Office Prime Office -0.127 115.39 2013
TAG Immobilien DKB Immobilien 0.015 99.16 2012
Hannover Rück American ING-Lifeinsurance 
Portfolios
-0.066 86.44 2009
Arques Industries Siemens Home and Office 
Communication Devices
0.029 81.70 2008
Arques Industries Woco Michelin -0.068 66.17 2007
Deutsche Wohnen GEHAG -0.047 64.10 2007
TAG Immobilien TLG Wohnen 0.043 51.24 2012
Global PVQ Solibro -0.024 35.90 2009
TAG Immobilien Colonia Real Estate -0.043 32.38 2010
Average -0.024 78.65
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